State v. Person

Decision Date19 March 1996
Docket NumberNo. 15228,15228
Citation673 A.2d 463,236 Conn. 342
CourtConnecticut Supreme Court
PartiesSTATE of Connecticut v. Michael PERSON.

Donald D. Dakers, Special Public Defender, for appellant (defendant).

Michele C. Lukban, Assistant State's Attorney, with whom were James R. Turcotte, Assistant State's Attorney, and, on the brief, Michael Dearington, State's Attorney, and David J. Sheldon, Deputy Assistant State's Attorney, for appellee (State).

Before PETERS, C.J., and CALLAHAN, BORDEN, BERDON, NORCOTT, KATZ and PALMER, JJ.

BERDON, Associate Justice.

The principal issue raised in this appeal is whether the Appellate Court properly concluded that the defendant was not entitled to a jury instruction on the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance because the defendant's trial testimony had contradicted such a defense.

After a jury trial, the defendant, Michael Person, was convicted of the murder of Leshea Pouncey in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54a(a), 1 and of criminal trespass in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-107(a)(2). 2 The trial court sentenced the defendant to an effective term of imprisonment of forty-eight years. On appeal to the Appellate Court, the defendant argued that the trial court had improperly refused to charge the jury on the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance. State v. Person, 36 Conn.App. 448, 454, 651 A.2d 754 (1994). The Appellate Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court. Id. We granted the defendant's petition for certification to appeal 3 and now reverse the judgment of the Appellate Court.

During the trial, defense counsel filed a written request to charge the jury on the defense of extreme emotional disturbance. At the close of the case, the court denied the defendant's request for two reasons: (1) the defendant on cross-examination had testified that he had not been upset by the events on which he partially relied for the defense; and (2) the defendant had produced insufficient evidence to raise the issue of extreme emotional disturbance. During a colloquy with counsel, out of the presence of the jury, the court stated: "I cannot see extreme emotional disturbance in this case. I don't see any evidence of it. You are asking in effect for the jury to find the opposite of what the defendant says occurred to support a claim by the defendant that he has offered evidence to support extreme emotional disturbance...." The court further stated: "I assumed from the outset that extreme emotional disturbance would be in this case but I didn't expect to hear the defendant on the stand denying every question that was asked about him leading to his mental state at various times." The trial court did instruct the jury on self-defense and on the lesser included offenses of manslaughter in the first degree, 4 manslaughter in the second degree and criminally negligent homicide.

The Appellate Court did not reach the issue of whether there was sufficient evidence to warrant an instruction on extreme emotional disturbance because it held that if, "as in the present case, the defendant specifically disavows having the requisite mental state for the instruction that he seeks, Cassino 5 and Zayas 6 preclude the defendant from obtaining the contradicting instruction." State v. Person, supra, 36 Conn.App. at 453-54, 651 A.2d 754. We disagree.

Section 53a-54a(a), in defining the crime of murder, excepts, as an affirmative defense, a homicide committed by a defendant who acts "under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance for which there was a reasonable explanation or excuse, the reasonableness of which is to be determined from the viewpoint of a person in the defendant's situation under the circumstances as the defendant believed them to be...." Under such circumstances, if a defendant intentionally causes the death of an individual, but does so under extreme emotional disturbance, the trier of fact may convict the defendant of manslaughter in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-55(a)(2). 7 State v. Asherman, 193 Conn. 695, 731, 478 A.2d 227 (1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1050, 105 S.Ct. 1749, 84 L.Ed.2d 814 (1985).

The trial court's denial of the defendant's request for an instruction on extreme emotional disturbance raises two issues: (1) whether the defendant's trial testimony precluded such an instruction because it directly contradicted the defense; 8 and, if not, (2) whether there was sufficient evidence to warrant the requested instruction. We review each of these issues in turn together with their related facts.

I

The following testimony was presented to the jury. The defendant and Pouncey had been romantically involved and had planned to marry. Pouncey, however, terminated their engagement, after which she commenced a relationship with Donald Moody. The defendant testified that on May 19, 1991, he had forcefully entered Pouncey's apartment while she was away in order to recover his personal belongings. While the defendant was in the rear bedroom gathering his possessions, Pouncey returned home with her child. The defendant further testified that after speaking on the telephone, Pouncey had confronted him in the bedroom with a can of Mace in one hand and two knives in the other. According to the defendant, Pouncey had instigated a struggle by spraying Mace in his eyes. In the course of the struggle, the defendant stabbed Pouncey. The defendant then fled the apartment and later surrendered himself at the New Haven police station.

On direct examination, the defendant testified, with respect to his state of mind, that he had been "somewhat" upset by the fact that Pouncey had begun dating Moody. 9 On cross-examination, however, when asked if he was "upset because [he] felt that [Moody] was moving in on [his] gal," the defendant responded: "Not really." 10 Consequently, the court refused to instruct the jury on the defense of extreme emotional disturbance.

" 'A fundamental element of due process is the right of a defendant charged with a crime to establish a defense.' " State v. Belle, 215 Conn. 257, 273, 576 A.2d 139 (1990), quoting Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19, 87 S.Ct. 1920, 1923, 18 L.Ed.2d 1019 (1967). The question before us today is whether a defendant forgoes the right to have a jury instructed on a requested defense if the defendant denies having the state of mind required to establish the requested defense.

It is for the jury to evaluate the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be accorded the evidence. See State v. Breton, 235 Conn. 206, 234, 663 A.2d 1026 (1995). "The jury is free to juxtapose conflicting versions of events and to determine which is more credible." State v. Adams, 225 Conn. 270, 278, 623 A.2d 42 (1993). "[T]he [jury] can disbelieve any or all of the evidence ... and can construe [the] evidence in a manner different from the parties' assertions...." (Citations omitted.) State v. Steiger, 218 Conn. 349, 381, 590 A.2d 408 (1991). Therefore, because the jury was free to disbelieve the defendant's testimony, his assertions therein did not preclude a jury instruction on extreme emotional disturbance. Rather, as the state correctly conceded at oral argument, 11 a jury may be instructed on a requested defense theory, even if the defendant has testified to facts that contradict the requested charge, if there is sufficient evidence to warrant the instruction. See State v. Harris, 189 Conn. 268, 273, 455 A.2d 342 (1983).

The Appellate Court's reliance on State v. Cassino, 188 Conn. 237, 449 A.2d 154 (1982), and State v. Zayas, 3 Conn.App. 289, 489 A.2d 380, cert. denied, 195 Conn. 803, 491 A.2d 1104 (1985), was misplaced. Neither of those cases stands for the proposition that a defendant forfeits a defense theory if he or she testifies to a contradictory fact or conclusion. Our decision in Cassino "was based upon the conclusion that the defendant had failed to introduce sufficient evidence to warrant a self-defense instruction." State v. Harris, supra, 189 Conn. at 274 n. 4, 455 A.2d 342. Similarly, in Zayas, the defendant requested that the jury be charged on self-defense, but there was insufficient evidence tending to establish that defense. State v. Zayas, supra, at 294, 489 A.2d 380.

Instructing on a defense for which the defendant has given contradictory testimony is particularly appropriate in cases, such as the present one, in which the requested defense involves the defendant's mental state. The applicability of such a defense theory should not be judged solely upon the defendant's personal description of his or her own mental status. In fact, we have previously held that "a court may, under certain circumstances, impose a mental status defense [such as extreme emotional disturbance] on an unwilling defendant." State v. Manfredi, 213 Conn. 500, 516, 569 A.2d 506, cert. denied, 498 U.S. 818, 111 S.Ct. 62, 112 L.Ed.2d 37 (1990); see State v. Asherman, supra, 193 Conn. at 729, 478 A.2d 227 (jury instructed on extreme emotional disturbance defense over objection of defendant).

This analysis is consistent with the rule that a defendant is permitted to present inconsistent defenses to a jury. State v. Harris, supra, 189 Conn. at 273, 455 A.2d 342. In Harris, the defendant asserted two inconsistent defenses: (1) an alibi defense; and (2) an affirmative defense that the gun used in the alleged crimes was a toy. Id., at 271-72, 455 A.2d 342. The state argued that "contrived defenses would result [i]f a defendant could deny participation in a robbery, offer evidence of someone else's involvement using a toy gun, and still avail himself of the affirmative defense under [General Statutes] § 53a-134(a)(4)." 12 (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 272, 455 A.2d 342. We rejected the state's argument and held that "inconsistent defenses may be interposed in a criminal case.... [The fact t]hat a defense is interposed...

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