State v. Peters

Decision Date23 June 1975
Docket NumberNo. 55822,55822
Citation315 So.2d 678
PartiesSTATE of Louisiana v. Troy Lee PETERS.
CourtLouisiana Supreme Court

Richard W. Watts, Watts & Cassidy, Franklinton, for defendant-appellant.

William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Barbara Rutledge, Asst. Atty. Gen., W. W. Erwin, Dist. Atty., John N. Gallaspy, Bogalusa, for plaintiff-appellee.

BARHAM, Justice.

Troy Lee Peters was convicted of armed robbery in violation of La.R.S. 14:64 and sentenced to thirty years at hard labor, without benefit of parole, probation or suspension of sentence. Defendant relies upon two specifications of error. Because we find error in the trial judge's refusal to suppress inculpatory statements allegedly made by defendant, we do not reach the merits of his second argument.

On the evening of September 1, 1973, Troy Lee Peters, two of his brothers, and a friend rode into Bogalusa from their home in Angie, and were stopped by police for a traffice violation. When the police officers discovered that Troy Lee's brother, the driver of the car, had no driver's license, they took him to the Bogalusa jail and set his bail at $1,000 property or $95 cash.

Defendant removed a tape player from the car and left the police station with a view toward getting help or selling the tape player to raise bond for his brother. He went first to a service station, where he spoke to Mr. Vernon Freeman, who testified that defendant was polite and friendly. The defendant offered to sell the tape player to Freeman, but left the service station when Freeman said he would only pay $15 for it.

It was at this point, at approximately 3:00 a.m., that defendant approached Mr. James Stewart, the alleged victim of the armed robbery. Stewart, a dealer for the Times-Picayune, testified that he was standing at the rear of his truck assembling newspapers when defendant walked up to him and tried to sell him a tape player. Stewart claimed that he told defendant he was not interested in buying the player and that he turned back to his work when defendant walked away. He said that he was then struck across the shoulders and fell on the ground. When he looked up, he claims to have seen defendant standing over him, holding what looked like a 'two by four.' Stewart testified that in response to defendant's demand for money, he gave him his checkbook.

Defendant, on the other hand, maintained throughout his testimony that when he asked Stewart to buy the tape player, Stewart said he would not 'do anything for no damn nigger.' This led to an argument and defendant claims that he picked up a stick in the street and struck Stewart to protect himself, because he feared Stewart was going to hit him. He denies that he took a checkbook or anything else. About an hour and a half later, he was arrested at a lounge and taken to police headquarters.

Defendant responded to questioning by Lieutenant Pritchard and Sergeant Penton, the interrogation beginning at approximately 5:20 a.m. At the hearing on the motion to suppress defendant's alleged inculpatory statements, the police officers testified that they read defendant his rights from a printed form, which defendant initialed, and that his oral statement was reduced to writing upon his request. In the signed statement the defendant admits he struck Stewart with the stick but makes no mention of taking the checkbook. Both officers testified that no special favors were offered the defendant, and that they did not strike or otherwise abuse him in order to compel him to confess. Moreover, Sergeant Penton testified that the defendant called him to his cell approximately three hours after he signed the statement, and told him that he had flushed the checks down the commode at the lounge where he was arrested. However, at trial Penton testified that defendant told him that he had flushed the checks down the commode at the jail. The checks were never found.

Defendant, on the other hand, testified at the motion to suppress that at the 5:20 a.m. interrogation Lieutenant Pritchard threatened him with violence, used harsh language to compel him to sign the written statement and backhanded him, breaking his tooth and bruising his lip. Peter displayed his broken tooth for the judge at the hearing. He claimed that he signed that statement only because of the physical duress to which he was subjected; he further disclaims any other conversation with any officer and denies ever having admitted to Sergeant Penton that he flushed checks down a commode.

Defendant's brother testified that he saw Troy Lee immediately before he was interrogated and that he was not physically injured; he further stated that when he saw him shortly after he had been alone with Penton and Pritchard, Troy Lee's tooth was broken and his lip badly bruised. Likewise, defendant's mother, while quite honestly admitting that her son had given her a great deal of trouble, swore that she had seen her son the day before the questioning and that his tooth was not broken nor his lip bruised, whereas those signs of physical abuse were present two days after he was arrested and incarcerated. The State offered no evidence rebutting the testimony of Peters, his mother, or his brother that he suffered an injury to his mouth, nor did it attempt to explain how his tooth was broken and his lip bruised.

The following provisions of Louisiana law are pertinent to our inquiry:

La.R.S. 15:451:

'Before what purposes (purports) to be a confession can be introduced in evidence, it must be affirmatively shown that it was free and vountary, and not made under the influence of fear, duress, intimidation, menaces, threats, inducements or promises.'

La.R.S. 15:452:

'No person under arrest shall be subjected to any treatment designed by effect on body or mind to compel a confession of crime.'

La.C.Cr.P. art. 703(C):

'On the trial of a motion to suppress filed under the provisions of this article the burden of proof is one the defendant to prove the grounds of his motion, except that the state shall have the burden of proving that a purported written confession or written inculpatory statement was made freely and voluntarily and was not made under the influence of fear, duress, intimidation, menaces, threats, inducements or promises.'

La.Const. Art. I, § 11 (1921):

'No person shall be compelled to give evidence against himself in a criminal case or in any proceeding that may subject him to criminal prosecution, except as otherwise provided in this Constitution. No person under arrest shall be subjected to any treatment designed by effect on body or mind to compel confession of crime; nor shall any confession be used against any person accused of crime unless freely and vountarily made.'

Voluminous jurisprudence interpreting these provision has firmly rooted into Louisiana law the proposition that before a confession may be admitted into evidence, the State has the burden of proving Affirmatively and Beyond a reasonable doubt that the statement was made freely and voluntarily by the defendant and not through coercion. See, e.g., State v. Thomas, 242 La. 210, 135 So.2d 275 (1961); State v. Stewart, 238 La. 1036, 117 So.2d 583 (1960); State v. Michel, 225 La. 1040, 74 So.2d 207 (1954); State v. Wilson, 217 La. 470, 46 So.2d 738 (1950). It is true that he decision of the trial judge on the question of whether a confession is free and voluntary is entitled to great weight. State v. Hall, 257 La. 253, 242 So.2d 239 (1970). However, a reviewing court cannot avoid its responsibility to examine the record to be certain that the State has fully borne its heavy burden of proof in these cases.

A review of the jurisprudence indicates some of the circumstances that have convinced this Court to disturb the trial court's finding that the State had proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant's confession was free and voluntary. For instance, in State v. Robinson, 215 La. 974, 41 So.2d 848 (1949), in the face of testimony by the jailer, to whom defendant had allegedly confessed, that the confession was free and voluntary, and by one of the officers who questioned the defendant that the accused had not been mistreated, this Court reversed the trial court's finding that the confession was free and voluntary. The Court said:

'We are, nevertheless, of the opinion that the record as made up fails to establish the state discharged its burden of establishing affirmatively the confession was freely and voluntarily made. We think that after the accused testified in detail about the mistreatment he received and the inducements offered him at the time he confessed, the jailer should have been recalled and re-examined with respect to the particulars testified to by the accused in order that the trial judge might have been afforded a better opportunity to weigh and decide this very important issue.' 41 So.2d at 854.

In State v. Honeycutt, 216 La. 610, 44 So.2d 313 (1950), we again concluded that the State had not offered sufficient proof of the confession's voluntary character to sustain the trial court's admission of his statement. There the accused testified that he was mistreated and threatened in order to induce him to confess. Only the deputy sheriff who was alleged to have abused defendant was called by the State to rebut defendant's testimony. Because the State could have called some or all of the five other officers who were present at the questioning, thereby affording the trial court a better opportunity to weigh and decide whether the confession was free and voluntary, the Court found clearly erroneous the trial judge's admission of the confession merely because he did not believe defendant's testimony.

In State v. Simien, 248 La. 323, 178 So.2d 266 (1965), police officers testified that the oral confession made by the accused was free and vountary and made without any inducements or promises, and that he was not threatened or harmed in any way. Defendant then testified...

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