State v. Peters
| Decision Date | 19 October 1978 |
| Docket Number | No. 20787,20787 |
| Citation | 271 S.C. 498,248 S.E.2d 475 |
| Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
| Parties | The STATE, Respondent, v. Raymond Leroy PETERS, Appellant. |
Barry Krell, of Uricchio, Howe & Krell, Charleston, for appellant.
Atty. Gen. Daniel R. McLeod, Asst. Atty. Gen. Brian P. Gibbes and Staff Atty. Kay G. Crowe, Columbia, and Sol. Capers G. Barr, III, Charleston, for respondent.
The appellant, Raymond Leroy Peters, was charged with possession of marijuana with intent to distribute. Prior to trial, the appellant moved to suppress evidence of 23 pounds of marijuana seized during a warrantless search of his automobile, and also to suppress his statement to arresting officers admitting the ownership of the seized marijuana. Following an evidentiary hearing wherein both motions were denied, the appellant waived a jury trial and was found guilty by the presiding judge of possession of marijuana with intent to distribute. In his appeal, appellant questions only the correctness of the trial judge's denial of the motion to suppress, conceding that determination of the legality of the search of his automobile would govern admissibility of his subsequent incriminating statement. We affirm.
The undisputed facts in this case are that on June 28, 1977, a Folly Beach police officer, Officer Watson, received a telephone call at approximately 10:00 A.M. from an informant personally known to him. This informant told him that a yellow Grand Prix automobile with a white top and S. C. license tags bearing the digits "308" would be leaving the beach within a short period of time transporting a quantity of marijuana. The officer solicited the aid of a fellow officer and the two of them immediately drove to and positioned themselves on Center Street, which is the only exit from Folly Beach. No search warrant was procured by the officers. In less than five minutes after so positioning themselves, they observed a car fitting the informant's description traveling away from the beach. Upon following the vehicle, Officer Watson recognized the driver of the car, who is the appellant in this case, as a person who had been seen by him in the past in the company of people when drug-like pills and marijuana were being used. The identity of the passenger was likewise known because Officer Watson in the past had arrested and charged him with possession of marijuana. After following the Grand Prix for four blocks, the officers stopped the car and instructed the driver and passenger to remove themselves from the car.
Despite the refusal of the driver to allow the officers to search his automobile, the police commenced a search of the interior whereupon they discovered what appeared to be a portion of a marijuana cigarette in the ashtray. They then obtained the keys and opened the trunk of the automobile which contained a locked suitcase. The officers were able to open the suitcase without a key and it was found to contain marijuana. The police then arrested both occupants and advised the driver upon arrival at the police station that if the passenger was not the owner of the marijuana they would not charge him with the offense. It was at this point that the appellant gave the oral statement admitting ownership of the marijuana. The officers had appellant's car towed to the police station where they conducted an inventory search of the vehicle and discovered a cardboard box in the trunk containing additional marijuana.
It is well settled that searches conducted without a warrant are Per se unreasonable unless an exception to the warrant requirement is presented, 1 and the burden is upon the State to justify a warrantless search. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971). The factual circumstances of this case fall within the Carroll Doctrine automobile exception to the warrant requirement which permits warrantless searches conditioned upon the presence of both: (1) probable cause to believe that an automobile contains evidence of a crime and (2) exigent circumstances arising out of the mobility of the automobile and its consequently likely disappearance if the search is not executed immediately. Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 90 S.Ct. 1975, 26 L.Ed.2d 419 (1970); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 45 S.Ct. 280, 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925). The appellant does not question the exigency of the circumstances which precipitated the initial search of his automobile but alleges an absence of probable cause under Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 84 S.Ct. 1509, 12 L.Ed.2d 723 (1964). He contends (1) that there was insufficient evidence that the informant was reliable or credible and (2) that, even assuming the informant to be reliable or credible, he failed to furnish the police authorities with sufficient detailed information or the underlying circumstances incident to the informant's receipt of his information. We agree with appellant that the standards of Aguilar, supra, and Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 89 S.Ct. 584, 21 L.Ed.2d 637 (1969) are controlling under the facts of the case at bar even though the action now under consideration was warrantless. 2
Appellant first contends that the evidence presented in the form of testimony from both officers was insufficient to establish that the informant was reliable or credible in conformity with the first requirement of Aguilar. Officer Watson testified that he recognized the informant's voice on the telephone and stated that the informant had previously given him information on four or five occasions concerning ". . . the location of drugs on the beach," and ". . . told me where certain people would be, when marijuana would be in their possession and they would be smoking it." This information was later personally verified as true by the officer. Although the officer had made no arrests resulting from these tips, he explained that he ". . . did not make the arrest because at the time I was trying to build into a larger case some people who I thought were bringing drugs in the beach." On the basis of this testimony, it would appear to us that the inherent credibility of the informant had been established; however, even if there was not...
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The State v. Taylor
...this reliance was reasonable. Courts have allowed such reliance when reviewing probable cause determinations. See State v. Peters, 271 S.C. 498, 504, 248 S.E.2d 475, 478 (1978) (“In dealing with probable cause, ... as the very name implies, we deal with probabilities. These are not technica......
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State v. Key
...issue before us is the settled principle that "the burden is upon the State to justify a warrantless search." State v. Peters , 271 S.C. 498, 501, 248 S.E.2d 475, 477 (1978). At no time has this Court placed the burden on a defendant to establish that an exception to the warrant requirement......
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State v. Weaver
...at 572 (holding automobile exception applied to shotgun seized from trunk of vehicle parked at defendant's home); State v. Peters, 271 S.C. 498, 501, 248 S.E.2d 475, 477 (1978) (finding probable cause existed to conduct warrantless search of vehicle based on Carroll doctrine where police st......
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State v. Dunbar, 3631.
...Generally, warrantless searches are per se unreasonable unless an exception to the warrant requirement is present. State v. Peters, 271 S.C. 498, 248 S.E.2d 475 (1978). Recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement include: (1) a search incident to a lawful arrest; (2) "hot pursuit"; (3)......