State v. Peterson, 19196
| Decision Date | 05 April 1971 |
| Docket Number | No. 19196,19196 |
| Citation | 180 S.E.2d 341,255 S.C. 579 |
| Parties | The STATE, Respondent, v. Frank PETERSON, Appellant. |
| Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
Frank Beattie, Aiken, and Thomas Allgood, Augusta, Ga., for appellant.
Atty. Gen. Daniel R. McLeod and Asst. Attys. Gen. Emmet H. Clair and John P. Wilson, Columbia, Sols. L. A. Williamson, Aiken, and Randolph Murdaugh, Hampton, for respondent.
The appellant, Frank Peterson, was tried at the 1969 May Term of the Court of General Sessions for Aiken County under an indictment charging him with the murder of Isadore Williams, Sr. on June 12, 1968. The appellant was found guilty of manslaughter and was sentenced to imprisonment for a term of fifteen years. This appeal followed.
The first contention of the appellant is that the trial judge committed reversible error in refusing to allow his counsel to personally conduct a Voir dire examination of each of the prospective jurors.
While the trial judge refused the request made by appellant's counsel that they be permitted to personally examine each prospective juror he offered to propound to the jurors on Voir dire examination any reasonable question suggested by counsel. Thereafter the trial judge conducted a Voir dire examination of each prospective juror propounding the questions as required by Section 38--202 of the 1962 Code of Laws. After the statutory questions were asked counsel for the appellant made no request that the trial judge submit any additional questions to the prospective jurors.
We held in State v. Britt, 237 S.C. 293, 117 S.E.2d 379, that the trial judge may, if the circumstances seem to him to demand it, permit counsel engaged in the cause to also examine prospective jurors. However, we therein expressed the opinion that the better practice is for the trial judge, and not the attorneys, to conduct the examination. We also pointed out in the Britt case that after the statutory questions have been asked and answered, any further examination of a juror on Voir dire must be left to the discretion of the trial judge. It is, therefore, clear in the light of the foregoing principles, that the method and scope of a Voir dire examination rests within the discretion of the trial judge, which is subject to review only for abuse thereof.
We find no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial judge in conducting the Voir dire examination here in question, as he followed the procedure as prescribed by Code Section 38--202, supra, and additionally afforded appellant's counsel the opportunity to submit other reasonable questions, which they declined to do. We conclude that the action of the trial judge was free from error and, therefore, appellant's contention is without merit.
The appellant also argues that the trial judge committed reversible error in refusing to admit into evidence the details of alleged previous difficulties between himself and the deceased.
It is well established in this jurisdiction that in homicide cases, evidence that the accused and the deceased had previous difficulties is admissible, if not too remote in time, for the purpose of showing the animus of the parties, thereby aiding the jury in reaching a conclusion as to who was the probable aggressor, however, the details of such difficulties are inadmissible. State v. Clinkscales, 231 S.C. 650, 99 S.E.2d 663, and the numerous cases cited therein.
The above rule obviously has application in the instant case and the trial judge's exclusion of testimony showing the details of previous difficulties between the appellant and the deceased was proper. The record, however, reflects that while the trial judge was cognizant of the rule as so stated, he nevertheless allowed the appellant and several other witnesses to testify as to previous difficulties between the appellant and the deceased...
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State v. Jones
...as to the scope of juror examination and we perceive no error. State v. Dawkins, 268 S.C. 110, 232 S.E.2d 228 (1977); State v. Peterson, 255 S.C. 579, 180 S.E.2d 341 (1971); State v. Britt, 237 S.C. 293, 117 S.E.2d 379 (1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 886, 81 S.Ct. 1040, 6 L.Ed.2d 197 (1961).......
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State v. Tyner
...S.E.2d 768 (1977). The question of whether an argument is improper is addressed to the discretion of the trial judge. State v. Peterson, 255 S.C. 579, 180 S.E.2d 341 (1971); State v. Durden, 264 S.C. 86, 212 S.E.2d 587 (1975). We conclude the trial court properly handled the (15) Appellant ......
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State v. Ham
...newspaper accounts about the activities of the defendant?' We held in State v. Britt, 237 S.C. 293, 117 S.E.2d 379, and State v. Peterson, 255 S.C. 579, 180 S.E.2d 341, that the trial judge may, if the circumstances seem to him to demand it, permit counsel engaged in the case to also examin......
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State v. Penland
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