State v. Peterson

Decision Date18 February 1974
Docket NumberNo. 54028,54028
Citation290 So.2d 307
PartiesSTATE of Louisiana v. Sue Ellen PETERSON.
CourtLouisiana Supreme Court

William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Barbara Rutledge, Asst. Atty. Gen., Knowles M. Tucker, Dist. Atty., Edward M. Leonard, Jr., Asst. Dist. Atty., for plaintiff-appellee.

Wilson C. Krebs, Patterson, for defendant-appellant.

BARHAM, Justice.

Defendant was convicted, after a jury trial for murder, of manslaughter and was sentenced to ten years' imprisonment. Upon this appeal, defendant urges alleged error in the trial court's denial of two motions in arrest of judgment as the basis for a reversal of her conviction and sentence.

Very few facts of the case are revealed by the record. Apparently, defendant and another were involved in a shooting homicide which occurred in St. Mary Parish on the 29th of September, 1972. The record and the briefs filed in this Court indicate that this defendant did not directly commit the act which resulted in the death of the victim.

The basis for defendant's first motion in arrest of judgment is stated in ground (1) of Code of Criminal Procedure Article 859. That ground provides for arrest of judgment when the indictment is substantially defective by reason of the omission of an essential averment. Defendant argues that the indictment charging her with murder is defective because it does not reflect that the Grand Jury considered the fact that she was being charged as a principal and does not indicate that 'principal' was considered by the Grand Jury. It is further alleged in the motion that the record does not reflect any amendment to the indictment, that no specific bills of information were filed, and that the indictment was not sufficient to properly inform the defendant of the nature of the charges against her. Finally, this motion in arrest of judgment alleges that the essential elements of the lesser offense of which she was convicted, manslaughter, are not included in the indictment for the offense charged.

Code of Criminal Procedure Article 464 requires that the indictment be a plain, concise and definite written statement of the essential facts constituting the offense charged. Article 465 of the Code of Criminal Procedure specifically authorizes the use of a short from indictment in charging murder. Nowhere, in any of our Code of Criminal Procedure provisions or elsewhere, is it required that a person charged with an offense who did not directly commit the act constituting the offense be specifically denominated a 'principal'. Any and all persons involved in the commission of a crime to an extent which will satisfy the definition of 'principal' stated in R.S. 14:24, whether the direct perpetrator of the act constituting the offense or not, may be charged with commission of the offense. There is absolutely no requirement that an indictment explicitly denominate the accused as 'principal'. That the accused is indicted for the offense itself, and not charged as an accessory after the fact, irrefutably evidences that he is charged as a principal.

Defendant claims that the indictment is defective because it did not sufficiently inform her of the nature of the charge against her. It is true that short form indictments and informations often do not supply the defendant with information he believes to be necessary to apprise of the nature of the charge being levied. However, to satisfy the constitutional requirement that an accused be informed of the nature of the charge against him, our Code of Criminal Procedure Article 484 provides the defendant with a right to file a motion for a bill of particulars. Defendant's remedy, if she felt she had not sufficient information, would have been to request a bill of particulars; her failure to do so cannot be urged as error on the part of the State, given the fact that the indictment returned was in legally sufficient form. See State v. Berry, 188 La. 612, 177 So. 684 (1937).

Defendant argues that the indictment under which she was charged was defective because it did not include all the essential elements of the lesser offense of manslaughter. There is no merit in defendant's argument. As stated above, C.Cr.Proc. Art. 859(1) provides for arrest of judgment when the indictment omits an essential averment. Defendant was indicted for murder, and the indictment which charged her met the requirements set forth in Articles 464 and 465 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for such indictment. Conformity with these provisions insured the indictment's sufficiency. Manslaughter was not the charge levied by the indictment; hence, there is no requirement that the indictment include all the essential elements of that crime. The propriety Vel non of making manslaughter a responsive verdict in a murder prosecution appears to be the core of defendant's complaints; this matter will be discussed when the correctness of the trial court's denial of defendant's second motion in arrest of judgment is considered.

The trial court did not err in denying this motion in arrest of judgment. Defendant's arguments relative thereto are without merit.

Defendant bases her second motion in arrest of judgment on a contention that Code of Criminal Procedure Article 814, authorizing a jury to return a verdict of guilty of manslaughter in a murder prosecution, is unconstitutional in that it allows conviction of manslaughter under an indictment which does not include the essential elements of that crime. Though the motion is purportedly based on ground (2) of Article 859 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, on that basis it is clearly without merit. Ground (2) of Article 859 provides for arrest of judgment when the offense Charged is not punishable under a valid statute. In this case, the offense Charged is murder, and it is not contended that the statute under which murder is punished, R.S. 14:30, is invalid.

Nevertheless, it is readily apparent that the thrust of defendant's argument is actually based on the fifth ground included in that article, which provides for arrest of judgment when the verdict is not responsive to the indictment, or is otherwise so defective that it will not form the basis for a valid judgment. Such an error would be subject to our review even in the absence of a formal bill of exceptions. C.Cr.Proc. Art. 920(2).

Responsiveness of a verdict of manslaughter in a murder prosecution is expressly provided by the legislature under Code of Criminal Procedure Article 814. This, defendant readily concedes. She argues, nevertheless, that manslaughter is not a legally or constitutionally responsive verdict, especially in a case where there is no evidence to support such a verdict (that is, no evidence of the 'passion' element).

Defendant cites cases in which this Court has declared verdicts returned in criminal trials unresponsive to the charge being tried because essential elements of the lesser crime found by verdict were not essential elements of the greater crime charged. State v. Roberts, 213 La. 559, 35 So.2d 216 (1948) (aggravated battery not responsive to charge of attempted murder) and State v. Clayton, 236 La. 1093, 110 So.2d 111 (1959) (verdict of unauthorized use of a movable not responsive to a charge of issuing worthless checks). However, we note that in these cases the erroneous responsive verdicts were not provided for in statutory enactments by the legislature.

Notwithstanding that the legislature has provided statutorily for a responsive verdict of guilty of...

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  • Warren v. State
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Wyoming
    • 5 Junio 1992
    ......at 67; see also Fike v. State, 255 Ark. 956, 959, 504 S.W.2d 363, 365 (1974) (applying jury function theory); [State v.] Brown, 163 Conn. at 60-61, 301 A.2d at 552 [ (1972) ] (same); State v. Peterson, 290 So.2d 307, 311 (La.1974) (same); Beach, 429 Mich. at 461-65, 418 N.W.2d at 866-68 (describing the jury function theory in conjunction with strict statutory-elements approach.) .         2. Court function theory. Courts that have chosen to employ the court function theory have not ......
  • In re State T.H.
    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of Louisiana (US)
    • 4 Junio 2014
    ...whereas T.H. refers to it as video surveillance. 2. T.H. was not charged as a principal to the crime. However, in State v. Peterson, 290 So.2d 307 (La.1974), the court explained that is not necessary: Code of Criminal Procedure Article 464 requires that the indictment be a plain, concise an......
  • In re State T.H.
    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of Louisiana (US)
    • 4 Junio 2014
    ...whereas T.H. refers to it as video surveillance. 2. T.H. was not charged as a principal to the crime. However, in State v. Peterson, 290 So.2d 307 (La.1974), the court explained that is not necessary:Code of Criminal Procedure Article 464 requires that the indictment be a plain, concise and......
  • 96-58 La.App. 3 Cir. 10/9/96, State v. McCartney
    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of Louisiana (US)
    • 9 Octubre 1996
    ...... Page 421 . to apprise him of the nature of the charge being levied, it is incumbent upon the defendant to file a motion for a bill of particulars to procure details as to the statutory method by which he committed the offense that he is charged with. See State v. Peterson, 290 So.2d 307 (La.1974). .         The record reveals the defendant failed to file a bill of particulars asking the state to designate the underlying felony it intended to prove in developing its prosecution for second degree murder after the indictment was amended. Therefore, the state ......
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