State v. Peterson

• Citation: 153 Idaho 157,280 P.3d 184
• Decision Date: 21 May 2012
• Docket Number: No. 38723.,38723.
• Court: Court of Appeals of Idaho
• Parties: STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff–Respondent, v. Wade Lamonte PETERSON, Defendant–Appellant.

153 Idaho 157

280 P.3d 184

STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff–Respondent,

v.Wade Lamonte PETERSON, Defendant–Appellant.

No. 38723.

Court of Appeals of Idaho.

May 21, 2012.

Sara B. Thomas, State Appellate Public Defender; Sarah E. Tompkins, Deputy Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant.

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Kenneth K. Jorgensen, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent.

MELANSON, Judge.

Wade Lamonte Peterson appeals from the district court's order denying Peterson's motion for an order for reimbursement of sums he paid as fines, fees, and restitution on a criminal conviction that was subsequently vacated on appeal. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.

I.FACTS AND PROCEDURE

This appeal arises from the denial of Peterson's motion seeking an order for reimbursement that Peterson filed after his judgment of conviction for felony possession of a controlled substance was vacated by the Idaho Supreme Court in State v. Peterson, 148 Idaho 593, 226 P.3d 535 (2010). In that case, the following facts and procedural background relative to Peterson's prior criminal case were set forth. In 2003, Peterson was arrested for possession of a controlled substance, carrying a concealed weapon, possession of illegal fireworks, and illegal possession of prescription drugs. The state filed a complaint against Peterson, charging him with felony possession of a controlled substance, I.C. § 37–2732(c), and two misdemeanors.

At a preliminary hearing held before a magistrate, the felony charge was dismissed because the state failed to obtain a lab report within the appropriate time limit. At Peterson's arraignment for the two misdemeanor charges, the state sought to amend the complaint to reinstate the dismissed felony charge. The magistrate denied this request and informed the prosecutor that the felony charge could be refiled after a lab report was obtained. A new complaint was filed against Peterson for felony possession of a controlled substance and a probable cause hearing was held. At that hearing, the prosecutor informed the magistrate that the state intended to amend the new complaint containing the felony charge to add the misdemeanor charges. At a pretrial conference on the misdemeanor complaint, the magistrate asked whether the felony charge had been refiled. The prosecutor indicated that, to his knowledge, the misdemeanor charges were the only charges pending against Peterson. Thereafter, Peterson appeared before the magistrate and entered into an Idaho Criminal Rule 11 plea agreement with the state whereby Peterson pled guilty to one misdemeanor charge and the remaining misdemeanor charge was dismissed.

In 2004, after Peterson completed his probation for the misdemeanor, a warrant was issued for Peterson on the felony charge for possession of a controlled substance. At the arraignment before the magistrate, Peterson indicated that he believed the felony charge had been dismissed as part of his plea agreement with the state in 2003. Peterson filed a motion to dismiss, which was denied by the district court. Peterson entered a conditional guilty plea to the felony. The district court sentenced Peterson to a unified term of seven years, with a minimum period of confinement of two years; suspended the sentence; and placed Peterson on probation for seven years. The district court also ordered Peterson to pay financial penalties including costs, fees, fines, and restitution. Peterson appealed.

In February 2010, the Idaho Supreme Court held that, based upon the record before the district court in interpreting the plea agreement, the district court's determination that the plea agreement did not encompass all charges arising from Peterson's 2003 arrest was erroneous. Peterson, 148 Idaho at 597, 226 P.3d at 539. Thus, the Court vacated Peterson's judgment of conviction for felony possession of a controlled substance. Id. Accordingly, in March 2010, the district court entered an order dismissing Peterson's case. In February 2011, Peterson filed a motion in his criminal case, seeking an order for reimbursement of the $520 Peterson paid in financial penalties and restitution in 2006 and 2007 pursuant to his felony conviction. Specifically, Peterson's motion indicated that it was based upon the following costs, fees, fines, and restitution: $17.50 for court costs, $6 for POST fees, $10 for administrative surcharge fees,¹ $5 for ISTARS fund fees, $50 fine for the victims compensation account, $1,000 criminal fine, and $100 for restitution. Peterson attached an accounting to his motion showing the financial penalties assessed as a result of his felony conviction and the payments he made to the clerk of the district court. After a hearing, the district court found that it lacked personal jurisdiction over the nonparty agencies that collected, disbursed, or retained the $520 paid by Peterson and entered an order denying his motion. Peterson appeals.

II.ANALYSIS

We initially address the state's assertion that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to consider Peterson's motion because, while raised for the first time on appeal, a challenge to a court's subject matter jurisdiction may be brought at any time. See State v. Lundquist, 134 Idaho 831, 835, 11 P.3d 27, 31 (2000) ; State v. Diggie, 140 Idaho 238, 240, 91 P.3d 1142, 1144 (Ct.App.2004). A claim that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction presents a question of law over which we exercise free review. State v. Savage, 145 Idaho 756, 758, 185 P.3d 268, 270 (Ct.App.2008) ; State v. Parvin, 137 Idaho 783, 785, 53 P.3d 834, 836 (Ct.App.2002).

In State v. Jakoski, 139 Idaho 352, 355, 79 P.3d 711, 714 (2003), the Idaho Supreme Court held that, "absent a statute or rule extending its jurisdiction, the trial court's jurisdiction to amend or set aside a judgment expires once the judgment becomes final, either by expiration of the time for appeal or affirmance of the judgment on appeal." The Court noted that such rules include I.R.C.P. 60(b), which permits a civil judgment to be set aside for several specified reasons, and I.C.R. 35, which permits a motion to correct an illegal sentence. Jakoski, 139 Idaho at 355 n. 5, 79 P.3d at 714 n. 5. The state argues that, pursuant to the holding in Jakoski, the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to consider Peterson's motion because the motion was filed over ten months after the district court issued a final order dismissing Peterson's case. The state further asserts that no rule extended the district court's jurisdiction. The state, therefore, characterizes the motion as one seeking an amendment to the district court's order dismissing Peterson's case to include an order for reimbursement. We conclude that this is an appropriate characterization of Peterson's motion. In reply to the state's argument, Peterson asserts that the district court's jurisdiction to hear his motion was extended by various rules and related case law.

Specifically, Peterson argues that, because the underlying costs, fines, and fees awarded by the district court were part of Peterson's underlying and vacated criminal sentence, his motion seeking an order for reimbursement of money paid toward these criminal penalties should be treated as a motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to I.C.R. 35. Idaho Criminal Rule 35(a) is a narrow rule which allows a trial court to correct an illegal sentence or to correct a sentence imposed in an illegal manner at any time. State v. Farwell, 144 Idaho 732, 735, 170 P.3d 397, 400 (2007). The question of whether the sentence imposed is illegal is a question of law freely reviewable by the appellate court. State v. Josephson, 124 Idaho 286, 287, 858 P.2d 825, 826 (Ct.App.1993) ; State v. Rodriguez, 119 Idaho 895, 897, 811 P.2d 505, 507 (Ct.App.1991). Here, Peterson's sentence was legal when imposed and had already been reversed when the judgment of conviction was vacated. There is no longer an order imposing costs, fines, or fees that could be corrected or vacated via a Rule 35 motion. Therefore, I.C.R. 35 is inapplicable. Accordingly, we do not construe Peterson's motion seeking an order for reimbursement as a motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to I.C.R. 35.

Peterson also asserts that, pursuant to State v. Jensen, 149 Idaho 758, 241 P.3d 1 (Ct.App.2010), the jurisdictional time limit articulated in Jakoski does not apply in the context of proceedings related to restitution entered in conjunction with a criminal conviction. To support this argument, Peterson emphasizes the following passage in that opinion:

Restitution is a statutorily granted power to the criminal trial court, not constitutional. See [ State v. Armstrong, 146 Idaho 372, 378, 195 P.3d 731, 737 Ct.App.2008] (noting that the Supreme Court in Jakoski specifically referenced a constitutional basis for its holding). Restitution is in the nature of a civil remedy as opposed to a criminal sentence and, indeed, the statute references applicability of the rules of civil procedure. I.C. § 19–5304(10). The time frames set out in I.C. § 19–5304(6) and (10), regarding when a court may entertain a request for restitution or entertain a request for relief, are procedural in nature. While the procedure is apparently designed to secure finality so that the order of restitution may become a civil judgment, I.C. § 19–5305, that purpose does not change their nature from defining when the court may act to, instead, terminating the court's subject matter jurisdiction to act. Orders of a criminal trial court relating to restitution do not invade the authority over a criminal defendant that is constitutionally or statutorily conferred upon the executive branch. The 42–day time limit in I.C. § 19–5304(10), while corresponding to the number of days granted to file an appeal, does not, itself, affect an appellate court's assumption of jurisdiction.

Jensen, 149 Idaho at 762, 241 P.3d at 5.

We note that the restitution statut...