State v. Peterson

• Decision Date: 18 November 2021
• Docket Number: No. 98201-5,98201-5
• Citation: 498 P.3d 937
• Parties: STATE of Washington, Petitioner, v. Jerry Lynn PETERSON, Respondent.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

498 P.3d 937

STATE of Washington, Petitioner,

v.Jerry Lynn PETERSON, Respondent.

No. 98201-5

Supreme Court of Washington.

Argued November 19, 2020

Filed November 18, 2021

Sara I. Beigh, Lewis County Prosecutors Office, 345 W. Main St. Fl. 2, Chehalis, WA, 98532-4802, for Petitioner.

Thomas E. Weaver Jr., Attorney at Law, P.O. Box 1056, Bremerton, WA, 98337-0221, for Respondent.

David T. Sulzbacher, Attorney at Law, 1037 Ne 65th St. #80304, Seattle, WA, 98115-6655, James Elliot Lobsenz, Carney Badley Spellman, 701 5th Ave. Ste. 3600, Seattle, WA, 98104-7010, for Amicus Curiae on behalf of Washington Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers.

Alexandria Marie Hohman, The Washington Defender Association, 110 Prefontaine Pl. S. Ste. 610, Seattle, WA, 98104-2626, for Amicus Curiae on behalf of Washington Defenders Association.

Breanne Schuster, Mark Muzzey Cooke, American Civil Liberties Union of Washington, P.O. Box 2728, Seattle, WA, 98111-2728, for Amicus Curiae on behalf of American Civil Liberties Union of Washington.

González, C.J. ¶1 Jerry Lynn Peterson pleaded guilty to the sale of heroin in violation of RCW 69.50.410 of the Uniform Controlled Substances Act (UCSA). She now asks us to hold that RCW 69.50.410, if not all of the UCSA, is invalid and unconstitutional because, she contends, the statute has been impliedly repealed and, among other things, violates the privileges and immunities clause of the state constitution. Accordingly, she argues, the charges against her must be dismissed. The judicial branch has the power to declare a statute or its application unconstitutional or invalid under narrow circumstances. See, e.g. , State v. Blake , 197 Wash.2d 170, 183, 481 P.3d 521 (2021) ; State v. Gregory , 192 Wash.2d 1, 19, 427 P.3d 621 (2018) (plurality opinion). In the absence of those circumstances, we are bound by our role in our divided government to uphold and apply the laws properly enacted by our elected legislative bodies. Our elected state legislature has the constitutional power (within constitutional constraints) to define and redefine crimes and punishments. Finding no constitutional infirmity in the statute, we reject Peterson's arguments and remand for resentencing.

BACKGROUND

¶2 Peterson was charged with and pleaded guilty to selling heroin for profit under RCW 69.50.410(1).¹ Verbatim Report of Proceedings (VRP) (Mar. 27, 2018) at 2-7. RCW 69.50.410 is part of the UCSA. The UCSA and the Sentencing Reform Act of 1981 (SRA), ch. 9.94A RCW, provide different sentences for selling controlled substances. Peterson initially argued that RCW 69.50.410(3)(a)'s 2 year sentence applied, rather than the 68+ to 100 month sentence under the SRA.² VRP (June 13, 2018) at 13-14.

¶3 Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals agreed that the UCSA's two year sentence applied. VRP (June 13, 2018) at 15; State v. Peterson , 12 Wash. App. 2d 195, 199, 457 P.3d 480 (2020). The State petitioned for our review and argued that the SRA should provide the applicable sentence. Meanwhile, we announced our decision in State v. Cyr , where we concluded that the SRA provides the applicable sentences for UCSA convictions. 195 Wash.2d 492, 508, 461 P.3d 360 (2020). Both parties submitted additional briefing on Cyr 's applicability, and we granted review. 195 Wash.2d 1023, 466 P.3d 777 (2020). Peterson subsequently conceded that the SRA controls her sentence and joined amici curiae Washington Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, the American Civil Liberties Union of Washington, and the Washington Defenders Association (Amici Curiae or Amici) in arguing that RCW 69.50.410 is invalid and unconstitutional. We called for additional briefing on these issues.

ANALYSIS

¶4 We review the validity and constitutionality of a statute de novo. Cyr , 195 Wash.2d at 498, 461 P.3d 360 (quoting In re Pers. Restraint of Cruz , 157 Wash.2d 83, 87, 134 P.3d 1166 (2006) ); State v. Villela , 194 Wash.2d 451, 456, 450 P.3d 170 (2019) (quoting State v. Lanciloti , 165 Wash.2d 661, 667, 201 P.3d 323 (2009) ). We begin by determining the meaning of RCW 69.50.410. In determining the meaning of a statute, "our ‘primary goal ... is to ascertain and give effect to the legislature's intent and purpose.’ " Cyr , 195 Wash.2d at 501-02, 461 P.3d 360 (alterations in original) (quoting Cruz , 157 Wash.2d at 87, 134 P.3d 1166 ). "[W]e must ‘consider[ ] the statute as a whole, giving effect to all that the legislature has said, and using related statutes to help identify the legislative intent embodied in the provision in question.’ " Id. at 502, 461 P.3d 360 (quoting Cruz , 157 Wash.2d at 88, 134 P.3d 1166 ) (second alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). If possible, we must "harmonize and give effect to all of the relevant statutory language." Id. (citing State v. Hirschfelder, 170 Wash.2d 536, 543, 242 P.3d 876 (2010) ). As the party challenging the statute, Peterson bears the burden of establishing that RCW 69.50.410 is unconstitutional or invalid. See Villela , 194 Wash.2d at 456, 450 P.3d 170 (citing Lanciloti , 165 Wash.2d at 667, 201 P.3d 323 ).

¶5 Peterson argues that RCW 69.50.410 has been repealed by implication, is invalid under the doctrine of desuetude, and is unconstitutional under article I, section 12 of the Washington Constitution. She also contends that RCW 69.50.410 is not severable from the remainder of the UCSA, rendering the entire act invalid. We turn now to these issues.

I. Repeal by Implication

¶6 Peterson and Amici argue that RCW 69.50.410 has been repealed by implication. Repeal by implication is strongly disfavored. Amalg. Transit Union Legislative Council v. State , 145 Wash.2d 544, 552, 40 P.3d 656 (2002) (citing Tollycraft Yachts Corp. v McCoy , 122 Wash.2d 426, 439, 858 P.2d 503 (1993) ). Such a repeal will be found only where (1) a "later act covers the entire field of the earlier one, is complete in itself, and is intended to supersede prior legislation" or (2) "the two acts cannot be reconciled and both given effect by a fair and reasonable construction." State v. Conte , 159 Wash.2d 797, 815, 154 P.3d 194 (2007) (citing Amalg. , 145 Wash.2d at 552, 40 P.3d 656 ). Neither situation exists here.

¶7 Peterson and Amici claim that RCW 69.50.410 and the sentencing provisions of the SRA cannot be reconciled and both given effect by a fair and reasonable construction. They argue that RCW 69.50.410 cannot be given effect, in part, because its rehabilitative intent has never been met. (Second) Suppl. Br. of Peterson at 7; Br. of Amici Curiae in Supp. of Pet'r at 17-18. But based on the plain language and legislative history, when the legislature passed RCW 69.50.410 it clearly intended to punish.

¶8 The UCSA was passed in 1971 during a nationwide effort to reform drug sentencing laws. LAWS OF 1971, 1st Ex. Sess., ch. 308; Report of the Task Force on the Use of Criminal Sanctions to the King County Bar Association Board of Trustees , 30 FORDHAM URBAN L.J. 499, 506 (2003). Almost all states passed some form of the UCSA, which paralleled the federal Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1236, also known as the "Controlled Substances Act." Report of the Task Force , supra , at 506; see also Seeley v. State , 132 Wash.2d 776, 782, 940 P.2d 604 (1997). Both state and federal laws were "comprehensive statutory mechanism[s] to control the manufacture, distribution, and use of controlled substances" with "[p]enalties ... imposed for violations."

Seeley , 132 Wash.2d at 782, 940 P.2d 604. Our 1971 UCSA did not include addiction treatment or rehabilitation for drug users. See LAWS OF 1971, 1st Ex. Sess., ch. 308.

¶9 RCW 69.50.410 was passed two years later. LAWS OF 1973, 2d Ex. Sess., ch. 2, § 2. The statute states that

(1) Except as authorized by this chapter it is a class C felony for any person to sell for profit any controlled substance or counterfeit substance classified in Schedule I, RCW 69.50.204, except leaves and flowering tops of marihuana.

....

(3)(a) Any person convicted of a violation of subsection (1) of this section by selling heroin shall receive a mandatory sentence of two years in a correctional facility of the department of social and health services and no judge of any court shall suspend or defer the sentence imposed for such violation.

RCW 69.50.410.³ When enacted, the statute was entitled "Controlled Substances – Mandatory Sentences," and the legislature's intent was, at best, to provide some option for rehabilitation while imposing harsh mandatory sentences. It was based on House Bill 323, which provided "mandatory sentencing for certain violations involving controlled substances." HOUSE JOURNAL , 43d Leg., 1st & 2d Ex. Sess., at 1742 (Wash. 1973). Legislative discussions about the bill clearly demonstrate the intent to put a "very highly mobile group" of "very hard drug sellers" who could be "found moving constantly between Vancouver, British Columbia, and down as far as San Diego" "out of business and behind bars." Id. at 1756, 1744. Even when vetoing the bill for technical reasons, Governor Daniel Evans explained that "[t]his bill would have created mandatory sentences for persons convicted of certain types of crimes involving sale of drugs. I am in full agreement that we need stiff penalties for certain offenders, especially where the offender has earned enormous sums from the sale of drugs." LAWS OF 1973, 2d Ex. Sess., ch. 2, § 2. The legislature promptly overturned the governor's veto. Id .

¶10 Simply put, RCW 69.50.410(3)(a) as well as (2)(b) and (3)(b) impose mandatory minimum sentences for people selling heroin and other Schedule I drugs. This is particularly striking because, at the time the statute was passed, sentencing in our state was indeterminate. See ch. 9.95 RCW. Under this indeterminate sentencing system, trial courts sentenced offenders to the maximum amount of time that could be served and, usually, the former Board of Prison Terms and...