State v. Petitjean
| Decision Date | 17 November 2000 |
| Docket Number | No. 99CA31.,99CA31. |
| Citation | 140 Ohio App.3d 517,748 NE 2d 133 |
| Parties | The STATE of Ohio, Appellee, v. PETITJEAN, Appellant. |
| Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
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Gary A. Nasal, Miami County Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.
James T. Ambrose and Daniel L. O'Brien, for appellant.
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Shawn H. Petitjean appeals from his conviction for aggravated murder, which was entered on his plea of no contest after the trial court overruled Petitjean's motion to suppress evidence. Petitjean was sentenced to life imprisonment with the eligibility for parole after having served twenty years.
Tara Latimer was stabbed to death in her apartment on December 17, 1998. She suffered eight stab wounds, which were inflicted with a knife. She was also beaten about the head and face. Her two young children were in the apartment but were not harmed. Petitjean was one of five or six people whom detectives suspected of Latimer's murder.
On December 22, 1998, Petitjean came to the Troy Police Department at the request of Troy Police Detectives Steve Cruea and Joe Stutz. Detective Stutz escorted Petitjean to an interview room on the second floor of the police department. The detectives gave Petitjean a "Non-Custodial Interview Form," which stated that Petitjean was not under arrest, that he did not have to speak with the detectives, and that he was free to leave. Petitjean signed and dated the form, acknowledging that he understood its terms.
The two detectives questioned Petitjean about Latimer's murder. Their conversation was both tape-recorded and videotaped. Detective Cruea had asked Petitjean to submit to a computer voice stress analyzer ("CVSA") examination. Petitjean declined the request. Nevertheless, Detective Cruea proceeded to conduct the CVSA without Petitjean's knowledge. The results of the CVSA examination were inconclusive, and the detectives were unable to eliminate Petitjean as a suspect as a result of the interview.
On February 4, 1999, the detectives came to Petitjean's apartment and asked to speak with him again at the police department. On February 8, Petitjean went to police headquarters. The detectives again gave him a Non-Custodial Interview Form and Petitjean again signed and dated the form. During the subsequent interview, Petitjean admitted to killing Latimer when he went to her apartment to complain about Latimer's interference in Petitjean's relationship with another woman. The detectives then read Petitjean the warnings required by Miranda v. Arizona (1966), 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, and Petitjean again admitted to killing Latimer. After a break, during which Petitjean was fingerprinted, photographed, and provided refreshments, Petitjean was Mirandized a second time. Petitjean proceeded to answer more questions regarding Latimer's murder during a further, second interview.
Petitjean was indicted for aggravated murder. He filed a motion to suppress his statements to the detectives, arguing that his waiver of his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination was not voluntary. The trial court held a hearing on the motion on the 13th and 15th of April, 1999. The trial court denied the motion, concluding that Petitjean "did not appear to be overcome with fear during the process of the interview to such a degree that his will was overcome at any time." The court also found that Petitjean was not in custody and therefore Miranda warnings were not required until he was handcuffed at the end of the second interview on February 8. The court also found that Petitjean had not requested counsel and concluded that his constitutional right to counsel was not violated.
On July 12, Petitjean entered a plea of no contest to a charge of aggravated murder in violation of R.C. 2903.01(A). He was sentenced to life imprisonment with the possibility of parole after serving twenty years.
Petitjean timely appealed. He presents three assignments of error for our review. They will be considered in the order that facilitates our discussion of them.
"The trial court committed prejudicial error when it ruled that the defendant was not in custody at the time of his interrogation."
Petitjean argues that police were required to give the warnings prescribed by Miranda v. Arizona, supra, earlier than they did, which was after he had confessed to killing Tara Latimer during the February 8, 1999 interrogation at police headquarters. His complaint in that regard necessarily pertains to the prior portions of that interview, as well as to the interview on December 22, 1998.
Miranda requires police to give a suspect certain prescribed warnings before custodial interrogation commences and provides that if the warnings are not given, any statements elicited from the suspect through police interrogation in that circumstance must be suppressed. The critical issue in most instances is whether the suspect was in custody when the interrogation took place. That is the issue here.
The Miranda court stated: "By custodial interrogation, we mean questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." Id., 384 U.S. at 444, 86 S.Ct. at 1612, 16 L.Ed.2d at 706. In subsequent cases, the court held that custody requires an arrest or its functional equivalent and that this determination must be based on objective criteria, not the subjective view of either the police officer or the suspect.
Miranda was concerned with the inherent coercion of station-house interrogation. However, not all station-house interrogation triggers the Miranda warning requirement. It is the fact of custody, not its purpose, that is determinative.
In Oregon v. Mathiason (1977), 429 U.S. 492, 97 S.Ct. 711, 50 L.Ed.2d 714, a police officer asked the defendant to come to the police station, and after he arrived the officer told the defendant that he was not under arrest. The defendant confessed during the interview. The Supreme Court held that warnings were not required, stating:
Id., 429 U.S. at 495, 97 S.Ct. at 714, 50 L.Ed.2d at 719.
Whether a station-house interrogation is custodial depends on whether there is a "formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement" of the degree associated with a formal arrest. California v. Beheler (1983), 463 U.S. 1121, 1125, 103 S.Ct. 3517, 3520, 77 L.Ed.2d 1275, 1279. The issue is determined by an objective test: whether a reasonable person would believe, based on all of the circumstances, that he or she was under arrest or its functional equivalent. Stansbury v. California (1994), 511 U.S. 318, 114 S.Ct. 1526, 128 L.Ed.2d 293.
Here, Petitjean voluntarily came to police headquarters on both December 22, 1998 and February 8, 1999. So did the defendants in Mathiason, Beheler, and Stansbury, and in each of these cases that fact was significant to the finding that they were not in custody. As in Mathiason, Petitjean was informed that he was not under arrest. The form that Petitjean signed on each occasion also advised him that he was free to leave at any time. He was not searched or handcuffed and was not put into a jail uniform. The interrogations were conducted in a room where the door was closed but unlocked.
We conclude, as did the trial court, that a reasonable person in Petitjean's situation would not believe that he was under arrest or its functional equivalent until the time when Miranda warnings were in fact given, after he had confessed to killing Tara Latimer. The first assignment of error is overruled.
"The trial court committed prejudicial error when it ruled that the defendant's constitutional rights to counsel was not violated."
When Petitjean arrived at police headquarters on December 22, 1998, Detective Cruea asked him to submit to a "covert voice stress analysis," or CVSA test. Petitjean testified at the suppression hearing that he told Detective Cruea that he would want to speak with a lawyer or his mother before he could agree. Det. Cruea testified that he could recall no such request, and had one been made he would remember it. The trial court found, as a matter of fact, that Petitjean made no such request when he was asked to submit to the CVSA.
The Sixth Amendment right to counsel pertains to judicial proceedings. The right attaches in felony cases after the defendant's initial appearance in court on the charge. United States v. Dohm (C.A.5, 1980), 618 F.2d 1169. The right does not pertain to police interrogation, except when an accused who is in custody invokes his Miranda right to speak with an attorney. Then, interrogation must cease until the accused consults with an attorney. Edwards v. Arizona (1981), 451 U.S. 477, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378.
Petitjean was not in custody when he made the alleged request. However, and more fundamental to the issue presented, the trial court found that he made no such request. We are required to give great deference to that decision. State v. George (1989), 45 Ohio St.3d 325, 544 N.E.2d 640. Evaluations of the evidence and of the credibility of the witnesses are issues for the trier of fact. State v. Mills (1992), 62 Ohio St.3d 357, 582 N.E.2d 972.
Essentially, the trial court found that Petitjean was not credible,...
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