State v. Phillips
| Decision Date | 18 January 1967 |
| Citation | 245 Or. 466,422 P.2d 670 |
| Parties | The STATE of Oregon, Respondent, v. Michael Dana PHILLIPS, Appellant. |
| Court | Oregon Supreme Court |
Verden L. Hockett, Jr., Roseburg, argued the cause for appellant. With him on the briefs was Thomas C. Hartfield, Roseburg.
Doyle L. Schiffman, Deputy Dist. Atty., Roseburg, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was Avery W. Thompson, Dist. Atty., Roseburg.
Before McALLISTER, C.J., and PERRY, SLOAN, O'CONNELL, GOODWIN, DENECKE and HOLMAN, JJ.
Defendant has appealed from a judgment of conviction of first degree murder. At the time of the alleged murder he was 17 1/2 years old. He was remanded to adult court by the juvenile court for trial. The following is a construction of the evidence most favorable to the state, as is required after conviction. United States National Bank v. Underwriters at Lloyd's, 239 Or. 298, 315, 382 P.2d 851, 396 P.2d 765 (1964); Durkoop v. Mishler et al., 233 Or. 243, 246, 378 P.2d 267 (1963).
The defendant was a high school student with an intelligence quotient of 116 (bright normal). In the middle of the night he arose from his bed and went to another home a short distance away where he knew a female high school classmate was baby sitting. He did this with the intention of attempting to have sexual intercourse with her. He obtained entrance through an unlocked kitchen window and went into a bedroom where the victim and a small child were sleeping. As he was standing over the victim she awakened and he panicked for fear of being identified and killed her by stabbing her repeatedly with a bayonet. When the small child commenced to awaken he hit her over the head with the butt of the bayonet and then fled through a rear door.
On the afternoon after the murder two police officers called at the defendant's home to see him. He resided with a brother, who was his guardian, and the brother's wife. The police officers were making a routine check of various persons in the neighborhood who had been previously known to law enforcement agencies and had no reason to particularly suspect the defendant or to arrest him. He was only one of several who were questioned and fingerprinted. They gave him warning concerning his right to counsel and to remain silent and told him they were investigating the death of the victim. In response to their inquiry as to where he had been the night before he told them he had been to a mill with his brother and had returned about midnight, and that he had been in bed until he arose the next morning to go bean picking. The officers asked to search his room and he took them to it where they found nothing of interest. They asked him if he would accompany them to the sheriff's office to be fingerprinted, to which he consented. He was told he was not under arrest.
Upon arriving at the sheriff's office defendant was left sitting unattended while the deputy who brought him to the court-house secured from the juvenile court an order authorizing that defendant's fingerprints be taken. This order was demonstrated to defendant and he was fingerprinted. He was then taken to an interrogation room in the jail where he was again given warnings relative to his rights. After about five minutes of questioned during which he refused to take a polygraph test, the following occurred:
Defendant claims the court erred in overruling his objection to the admission of the evidence of the oral statements he made to the police relative to his commission of the crime. Defendant contends that at the time of questioning he was in custody, less than eighteen years of age, and therefore under the exclusive jurisdiction of the juvenile court. He urges that under these circumstances the police had no authority to question him and the information received by them prior to remand was inadmissible because he was entitled to the protection of the juvenile court.
Prior to the time a juvenile court order was obtained permitting defendant to be fingerprinted, his questioning would appear to have been noncustodial. However, after the order was obtained he was in the custody of the police and the damaging admissions were the result of custodial questioning. Being in custody, defendant was within the exclusive jurisdiction of the juvenile court. ORS 419.476(1)(a) 1 and 419.573(1) 2.
Most of defendant's contentions have been covered by an opinion of this court rendered since the filing of his appeal. State v. Gullings, Or., 416 P.2d 311 (1966). We there recognized that the Parens patriae position of the juvenile court should not be used to secure incriminating evidence against a juvenile for use in his conviction as an adult. However, we said:
'Presuming that federal constitutional Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights are granted, (citing cases) we believe that an absolute prohibition (of admissions and confessions received prior to remand) is not required so long as it is made clear to the juvenile that the questioning authorities are not operating as his friends but as his adversaries. * * *'
'* * * No 'principles of fundamental fairness' are offended when the information is secured in a setting that is so patently adversarial as to be understood by the child. The Parens patriae relationship does not exist between police and child but between court and child. Police are in the business of solving transgressions against the welfare of society and the apprehension of those who are responsible therefor. They are not engaged in the rehabilitation of the child and the treatment of his emotional and family problems where the free exchange of information and a close relationship is so important. The use of information secured by police will not, in our opinion, tend to make more difficult the establishment of a close relationship between juvenile workers and the child.
'Nor is the integrity of the juvenile court threatened so long as constitutional due process is required whenever the police secure information which is subsequently used against the child in an adult prosecution. * * *'
We believe the circumstances here were such that there would have been no misapprehension on defendant's part concerning the adversary position or purpose of the police.
Defendant contends the provisions of subsection (2)(a) of ORS 419.575 prohibits the type of questioning performed here. It is apparent from a reading of the entire statute 3 that its principal purpose is the prevention of the incarceration of juveniles in the presence of proximity of adult prisoners. 4 The prohibition of the statute is against detention in a jail. An exception to the prohibition, for a limited time, is granted for the purpose of questioning concerning certain enumerated subjects. The thrust of the prohibition then, is not against all questioning, but against detention in an improper place. In the present case, however, since the police were questioning defendant for purposes other than those enumerated, the statute prohibiting detention in jail was violated. However, defendant was not subjected to association with adult criminals, the evil it was the purpose of the statute to avoid, and the violation of the statute, therefore, was not sufficiently grievous to justify a prophylactic rule prohibiting the use of the evidence thus obtained as long as the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth federal constitutional amendment requirements were otherwise met. There is no contention that they were not.
The defendant also contends that the use of the information secured by the police was a violation of ORS 419.567(3), which prohibits information appearing in the juvenile records from being used to establish criminal liability against the child. The stated purpose of this provision was to insure a maximum disclosure of facts in juvenile court. 5 As previously indicated in Gullings at 82 Or Adv Sh 1011--1013, 416 P.2d 311, if a child is aware of the adversarial nature of the questioning and its implications, and constitutional safeguards are met, the safety of the public requires the use of the information and a maximum disclosure of facts to the juvenile court will not be prejudiced. As pointed out there, the provisions of the code permitting a remand to adult court for trial would be a useless gesture had the legislature contemplated that all information secured prior to remand could not be used.
The defendant also contends error was committed when he was required to submit to a psychiatric examination upon behalf of the state. The defendant pleaded not guilty and served notice on the state that at trial he would contend he was insane or mentally defective at the time of the...
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State ex rel. Johnson v. Woodrich
...has a right to at least a limited psychiatric examination of a defendant who pleads not guilty by reason of insanity. State v. Phillips, 245 Or. 466, 422 P.2d 670. In 1971 our holding was codified and extended to apply to cases in which a defendant intends to introduce expert testimony on d......
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State v. Kendall
...did not violate the privilege against self-incrimination United States v. Cohen, 530 F.2d 43 (5th Cir. 1976); State v. Phillips, 245 Or. 466, 422 P.2d 670 (1967); Annot., 32 A.L.R.2d 434 at 444; 8 Wigmore, Evidence, § 2265 (McNaughton rev. Defendant claims that he had a right not to answer ......
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State v. Corbin
...§ 42. The commentary to the proposed code indicates that this section is basically a codification of the holding of State v. Phillips, 245 Or. 466, 422 P.2d 670 (1967). In addition, the statute gives the defendant the right to object to the psychiatrist chosen by the State v. Phillips, supr......
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State ex rel. Johnson v. Richardson
...The circuit court demurred to the alternative writ and answered admitting the facts above stated. We held in State v. Phillips, 245 Or. 466, 475, 422 P.2d 670 (1967), that when a defendant pleads not guilty by reason of insanity the state is entitled to a mental examination. The legislature......