State v. Phillips
Decision Date | 17 August 2011 |
Docket Number | A141812; D090271M. |
Citation | 261 P.3d 55,245 Or.App. 38 |
Parties | STATE of Oregon, Plaintiff–Respondent,v.Stephen Michael PHILLIPS, Defendant–Appellant. |
Court | Oregon Court of Appeals |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Jedediah Peterson, Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for appellant. With him on the brief was Peter Gartlan, Chief Defender, Office of Public Defense Services.Justice Joy Rillera, Assistant Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent. With her on the brief was John R. Kroger, Attorney General, and David B. Thompson, Interim Solicitor General.Before BREWER, Chief Judge, and GILLETTE, Senior Judge.BREWER, C. J.
Defendant appeals his convictions for assault in the fourth degree and driving under the influence of intoxicants (DUII). Defendant assigns error to the trial court's denial of his motion in limine to admit evidence of an altercation that he had with a police officer inside the Intoxilyzer room of the Hillsboro police station. That evidence was admissible, defendant argued, to impeach another officer—who had been present in the room but had not participated in the altercation—for bias against defendant. We review for errors of law, and affirm. State v. Hubbard, 297 Or. 789, 800, 688 P.2d 1311 (1984).
Officer Cook arrested defendant for DUII and took him to the Hillsboro police station. Cook instructed defendant to sit in a chair in the Intoxilyzer room of the station. That room is used both for conducting Intoxilyzer breath tests of DUII suspects and for observing suspects for signs of intoxication. Defendant refused to take a breath test, so Cook remained in the room to observe defendant for signs of intoxication. A video camera was activated and focused on a portion of the room, including the chair on which defendant was seated and the desk where Cook sat while observing defendant. The video camera did not record sound. The video showed that, as Cook was observing defendant, a second officer, Kaufman, entered the room. Kaufman had been present when Cook arrested defendant for DUII. While Cook was making a telephone call in the corner of the room, defendant stood up from the chair and began motioning toward Cook. Kaufman pushed defendant back down, leading to an altercation between Kaufman and defendant that left defendant with injuries.1
Defendant filed a motion in limine to admit the video recording of the altercation along with photographs of defendant's injuries. At the hearing on that motion, the prosecutor informed defense counsel and the court that she did not intend to call Kaufman as a witness, because Cook had been the arresting officer on the DUII and had made the observations of defendant's level of intoxication upon which the state intended to rely to prove that defendant had driven under the influence. The prosecutor described the contents of the recording:
Defense counsel did not challenge the prosecutor's description of the contents of the video recording, but urged the court to view the recording itself. The court declined to do so.2
Defense counsel argued that the video recording was relevant to show bias on the part of Cook, and was admissible under OEC 609–1:
“Further, the video shows an extreme bias on the part of the police officer, which is relevant to his writing of the report in this case, and also shows that there could be fabrication in his recitation of what happened, and perhaps his attempt to protect himself or the other officers who were involved in this.”
The prosecutor then argued:
“I would argue that these photographs and the video are not relevant. They are certainly not relevant with regard to the assault four. They're also not relevant to the DWII. They're—in no way do they—does anything surrounding the resisting arrest have anything to do with whether or not the defendant was intoxicated. There's no evidence that helps or hurts the defense surrounding the issue of intoxication, and specifically surrounding the issue of whether or not the defendant drove while under the influence of alcohol.
“The officer who conducted the DUII stop, Officer Cook, was not the officer who was involved in the resisting arrest.
“ * * * * *
Defense counsel responded:
“Officer Cook's actions as the assault is taking place, and after the assault has taken place, and also what he wrote in his police report as to the Department was out to—not to be fair to my client, was out to get him.”
The trial court denied defendant's motion in limine:
Defendant was convicted by a jury; this appeal followed.
Defendant renews his argument on appeal.3 Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion in limine because
(Citation omitted.) In defendant's view, the video was admissible under OEC 609–1 to show Cook's bias. The state replies that the video did not tend to show any bias on Cook's part, because Cook did not participate in the altercation and, indeed, had been on the phone in another part of the Intoxilyzer room when it took place. Because the trial court's ruling precluded defendant from meeting the initial evidentiary threshold for the introduction of bias evidence, we review for errors of law. Hubbard, 297 Or. at 800, 688 P.2d 1311.
OEC 609–1 provides:
(Emphasis added.) Initially, the text of the rule requires that the proffered impeachment evidence must show that the witness engaged in conduct or made statements showing bias or interest. In addressing that requirement, both defendant and the state rely on the Supreme Court's decision in Hubbard. 4
In Hubbard, the defendant had been charged with attempting to elude a police officer and escape. The defendant sought to introduce evidence concerning the arresting officer's knowledge of potential sanctions against officers who used excessive force in performing arrests. 297 Or. at 791, 688 P.2d 1311.5 Because the defendant and the officer were the only witnesses, “the credibility of the officer was a critical prosecutorial element of the trial.” Id. The defendant's theory of the case was that the officer's “version of the events might be slanted because of his desire to avoid departmental discipline” for use of excessive force. Id. at 792, 688 P.2d 1311. The trial court excluded the evidence as unfairly prejudicial, based on the undue risk that it would create the impression that a complaint concerning excessive force had been made against the officer. Id.
The Supreme Court held that it was error to exclude the proffered evidence. The court noted that the trial court apparently believed that it had “discretion to limit the extent of cross-examination for bias or interest.” Id. at 794, 688 P.2d 1311. The Supreme Court observed that that proposition is not absolute. In particular, the court stated that ...
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...bias resulting from such a relationship requires the stacking of too many inferences to the point of speculation. In State v. Phillips , 245 Or. App. 38, 261 P.3d 55 (2011), rev. den. , 351 Or. 545, 274 P.3d 184 (2012), the defendant sought to introduce evidence of an altercation between th......
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...when evaluating the relevance of evidence meant to show bias, there must be more than mere speculation. See State v. Phillips , 245 Or. App. 38, 46, 261 P.3d 55 (2011), rev. den. , 351 Or. 545, 274 P.3d 184 (2012) (stating that "reasonable inferences are permissible but ‘speculation *** is ......
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State v. Zielinski
...when evaluating the relevance of evidence meant to show bias, there must be more than mere speculation. See State v. Phillips , 245 Or.App. 38, 46, 261 P.3d 55 (2011), rev. den. , 351 Or. 545, 274 P.3d 184 (2012) (reasoning that to show the bias of a witness, reasonable inferences are permi......
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...the trial court erred by denying the defendant the opportunity to cross-examine about bias. On the other hand, in State v. Phillips, 245 Or.App. 38, 46, 261 P.3d 55 (2011), we concluded that the string of inferences required to support the defendant's theory of bias simply was too long. The......