State v. Phipps
| Decision Date | 20 December 2019 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 46145 |
| Citation | 454 P.3d 1084,166 Idaho 1 |
| Court | Idaho Supreme Court |
| Parties | STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Kari Janae PHIPPS, Defendant-Respondent. |
Lawrence G. Wasden, Idaho Attorney General, Boise, for Appellant. Kenneth K. Jorgensen argued.
Kootenai County Public Defender's Office, Coeur d'Alene, for Respondent. Tyler R. Naftz argued.
The State appeals from the Kootenai County district court's reversal of the magistrate court's order denying Kari Janae Phipps's motion to suppress. Phipps asserted below that the statements she made while detained during a routine parole search of a parolee's residence, along with the evidence found as a result of her statements, were inadmissible on Fourth Amendment grounds. The State brings this appeal seeking to delineate the authority of parole officers to detain a non-parolee while performing a routine parole search of a parolee's residence. For the reasons stated below, we reverse the district court's decision and hold that the limited detention of Phipps was reasonable.
On November 18, 2016, Officer Kuebler and Officer Johnson from the Idaho Department of Correction performed a routine residence check on parolee Terry Wilson. Upon their arrival, the officers knocked on the apartment door and Wilson answered. As the officers entered, they noticed Phipps exit from a back bedroom. The officers recognized Phipps from previous visits. The officers asked Phipps and Wilson to take a seat in the living room while they "cleared the bedrooms for other persons." Officer Johnson testified that, although Phipps never asked to leave at that time, she was not
After ensuring there was no one else in the apartment, Officer Kuebler advised Phipps and Wilson that a drug dog would be brought in to aid in the search of the residence and asked whether there was anything in the apartment that they should know about. Phipps confessed to having a methamphetamine pipe in her backpack, which was on her person. Officer Kuebler proceeded to conduct a full search of the residence and found two safes containing drugs underneath a bed in a back bedroom. The officers called backup law enforcement to handle the drugs. At some point prior to the arrival of backup, the officers ascertained that Phipps had no outstanding warrants.1
Approximately ten to twenty minutes later, Officer Hutchison from the Coeur d'Alene Police Department arrived. Officer Hutchison talked with Phipps separately in a back bedroom after he read Phipps her Miranda rights. When asked whether she had a methamphetamine pipe in her backpack, Phipps confirmed that she did. Officer Hutchison searched Phipps's backpack and found the methamphetamine pipe. Consequently, Officer Hutchison issued Phipps a citation for possession of drug paraphernalia.
Officer Johnson similarly testified that the detention was "[d]epartment procedure to ensure officer safety."
When asked whether there was any suspicion of wrongdoing prior to the search of the residence, Officer Kuebler testified that they did not believe the parolee violated any terms or conditions of his parole; that they did not suspect he had any drugs in his apartment; and that they did not suspect he was illegally possessing a firearm. As for Phipps, Officer Johnson testified that he did not believe Phipps was violating any law at the time. The magistrate court found this to be the case as well: Therefore, the court found that, prior to Phipps's statement to the parole officers regarding the methamphetamine pipe, "there [was] no individual probable cause to hold or detain Ms. Phipps." Rather, "Ms. Phipps was simply a person merely present during a p[arole search] ... to check a residence."
After the suppression hearing, the magistrate court orally pronounced its findings of fact and conclusions of law. After analyzing cases from the U.S. Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, the court concluded that there is no legal difference between a search pursuant to a search warrant and a search pursuant to a parole waiver; in either case, law enforcement may detain all individuals found on the premises. Therefore, the court held that when parole officers are conducting a lawful parole search, they may detain and question all persons present, regardless of whether they have reasonable suspicion or probable cause, which is what the officers did in this case. Accordingly, the magistrate court denied Phipps's motion to suppress.2
On March 27, 2017, Phipps entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving the right to appeal the magistrate court's denial of her motion to suppress. On May 5, 2017, Phipps appealed the magistrate court's denial of her motion to suppress to the district court.
On appeal, the district court reversed the magistrate court's denial of Phipps's motion to suppress. The court held that parole officers may not detain non-residents found on the premises during a lawful parole search unless the officers have probable cause or reasonable suspicion. The court explained that "[i]n the case of a valid search warrant, ... the probable cause determination provides a nexus between an individual's presence at the location and the suspected criminal activity, rendering detention of individuals present reasonable." However, that same nexus "does not exist when law enforcement arrives at a parolee's residence to perform a routine search pursuant to standard conditions of parole" and the individuals "are not parolees nor residents of the home but are merely present at a parolee's residence when law enforcement arrives." Accordingly, the district court held that Phipps was unlawfully seized and suppressed the evidence of the methamphetamine pipe and the statement regarding the pipe under the exclusionary rule. The State timely appealed.
"On appeal of a decision rendered by the district court while acting in its intermediate appellate capacity, this Court directly reviews the district court's decision." State v. Chernobieff, 161 Idaho 537, 539, 387 P.3d 790, 792 (2016) (quoting In re Doe , 147 Idaho 243, 248, 207 P.3d 974, 979 (2009) ).
[T]he Supreme Court reviews the trial court (magistrate) record to determine whether there is substantial and competent evidence to support the magistrate's findings of fact and whether the magistrate's conclusions of law follow from those findings. If those findings are so supported and the conclusions follow therefrom and if the district court affirmed the magistrate's decision, we affirm the district court's decision as a matter of procedure.
Pelayo v. Pelayo, 154 Idaho 855, 858, 303 P.3d 214, 217 (2013) (quoting Bailey v. Bailey, 153 Idaho 526, 529, 284 P.3d 970, 973 (2012) ). "Thus, this Court does not review the decision of the magistrate court." Id. at 859, 303 P.3d at 218. "Rather, we are ‘procedurally bound to affirm or reverse the decisions of the district court.’ " Id. (quoting Bailey, 153 Idaho at 529, 284 P.3d at 973 ).
"The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated." State v. Mullins, 164 Idaho 493, 496, 432 P.3d 42, 45 (2018) (quoting State v. Watts, 142 Idaho 230, 232, 127 P.3d 133, 135 (2005) ). "When a decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, the Court accepts the trial court's findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but freely reviews the application of constitutional principles to the facts as found." Id. (quoting State v. McNeely, 162 Idaho 413, 414-15, 398 P.3d 146, 147-48 (2017) ).
The State asks this Court to reverse the district court's decision, which reversed the magistrate court's denial of Phipps's motion to suppress. The State contends that it is reasonable for officers conducting a parole search of a parolee's residence to detain third parties on the premises because the government's interest in conducting the parole search outweighs the burden caused to any third parties during the limited detention. The State relies on the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 101 S.Ct. 2587, 69 L.Ed.2d 340 (1981) to support its position. Phipps contends that the government's interests do not outweigh the detention when the detainee is a non-resident.
In assessing the validity of Phipps's detention, we initially note three undisputed facts essential to defining the scope of this Court's analysis. First, there is no dispute concerning the officers’ authority to enter and search the apartment. The parolee consented to suspicionless searches of his person and residence as a condition of his parole. Second, Phipps's initial detention qualifies as a seizure for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. The State does not contend otherwise and the record shows that Phipps was not free to leave the residence. Third, the officers conceded that they did not have reasonable suspicion or probable cause to initially detain Phipps. Once again, the State does not contend otherwise and the record shows that neither officer believed Phipps to be armed or dangerous or involved in...
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