State v. Piatt, 4943

Decision Date29 December 1981
Docket NumberNo. 4943,4943
Citation644 P.2d 881,132 Ariz. 145
PartiesSTATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. James Edward PIATT, Appellant.
CourtArizona Supreme Court
Robert K. Corbin, Atty. Gen. by William J. Schafer III and Robert S. Golden, Asst. Attys. Gen., Phoenix, for appellee

Charles L. Weninger, Tucson, for appellant.

James Edward Piatt, in pro per.

CAMERON, Justice.

On 30 January 1980, James Edward Piatt was found guilty of first degree murder in violation of former A.R.S. §§ 13-451 and 13-452. The State did not seek the death penalty and defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment without possibility of parole for 25 years, pursuant to former A.R.S. § 13-453(A). From this judgment, defendant appeals. In addition to the brief of counsel, this court permitted defendant to file a supplemental brief in propria persona. We have jurisdiction pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-4031.

The following questions were raised on appeal by defendant's counsel:

1. Was the defendant's confession voluntary?

2. Was the State's key witness competent to testify despite the fact that she had been taking narcotics at the time of the homicide?

3. Was it error for the trial court to deny defendant's motion that would have required the State's key witness to undergo psychiatric examination by defendant's expert?

In addition, the defendant raised the following issues in his supplemental brief:

4. Was the defendant denied his right to speedy trial?

5. Was there sufficient evidence to support the verdict?

6. Did defense attorney's acts or omissions deny the defendant his right to effective assistance of counsel?

The facts necessary for a determination of these issues are as follows. Thomas Schmidt, the victim, and the defendant were business associates in the illegal trafficking of narcotics, including marijuana, LSD, and amphetamines. Robin Cyphers was Schmidt's 15-year-old girl friend. At the time of the murder, Cyphers and Schmidt had been living together for several weeks. On the evening of 23 February 1978, Cyphers and Schmidt went to an apartment occupied by the defendant. Despite the fact that both Schmidt and Cyphers had been taking LSD at the time, Cyphers testified that she had a clear recollection of the events of the evening. After some conversation, Schmidt told the defendant that he and Cyphers had to leave and asked the defendant to "give him the money." Defendant went into a back room, returned, and without any warning, shot the victim five times. On 19 March 1978, the body of Thomas Schmidt was discovered in the trunk of a car in Tucson, Arizona. Although the corpse was in an advanced state of decomposition, a pathology examination revealed that the victim had died of multiple gunshot wounds to the abdomen, neck and head.

Cyphers later testified that because of her fear of the defendant, she accompanied him to Texas where they lived together intermittently until they were arrested for possession of narcotics. Defendant was injured in one eye during the arrest, he claims by a gun barrel. He did not ask for medical treatment for the injury. At the time of the arrest, two Tucson detectives who had traveled to Texas interviewed the defendant. The defendant denied his complicity in the murder and refused to waive his right to counsel. The Tucson detectives then returned to Arizona. Meanwhile, on advice from her attorney, Cyphers contacted Arizona authorities and recounted her story of the shooting. As a result, the charges in Texas were dropped and she was offered immunity in Arizona. Subsequently, at defendant's request, a telephone call to Texas from Tucson elicited a taped confession from the defendant that he had committed the murder. According to defendant's statement, the motives for the murder were that the victim was somehow cutting into defendant's drug business, and that defendant was upset to hear that the victim had planned to exploit Robin Cyphers in prostitution and to addict her to heroin. After he arrived in Tucson from Texas, defendant refused to talk further with the Tucson officers and insisted upon his right to counsel. From a jury verdict of guilty to first degree murder, defendant appeals.

VOLUNTARINESS OF CONFESSION

The defendant first contends that his taped telephonic confession was involuntary and therefore inadmissible, in that it was obtained in return for a promise of better quarters and that it was the result of coercion by one of the Texas deputies.

On 23 January 1980, a suppression hearing was held to determine the voluntariness of the confession. Prior to the hearing on the motion to suppress, the State proposed to hear the Arizona officers and then continue the motion to suppress to the time of the trial at which time members of the sheriff's department in Austin, Texas, would be available. Defendant objected because he would be forced to trial without knowing whether the confession was suppressed or admitted. The trial court agreed and denied the motion.

At the hearing to suppress, the trial court heard the tape of defendant's confession and a transcript of the taped conversation was available. The defendant also testified. Counsel stipulated that the defendant was informed of his constitutional rights pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), including the right to remain silent and to have an attorney present during questioning. There is no question that the defendant reinstituted this conversation by asking that the Tucson detectives call him. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981).

"BUNTING: OK, now having been advised of those rights and understanding those rights, will you answer my questions?

"PIATT: Yes.

"BUNTING: OK. Would you state your name for me, please?

"PIATT: JAMES EDWARD PIATT.

"BUNTING: OK, and what's your date of birth, JIM?

"PIATT: March 9th, 1954.

"BUNTING: OK. I don't know, you know, what it is you want to talk to me about. That's all I was told. The reason I'm calling you is that if depending on what it is, you know, we might fly out there to, you know talk to you further but we wanted to get some sort of an indication prior to the time we did that. You want to tell me what it is you want to talk about?

"PIATT: Uhh, I don't know, I guess it's be called your confession or whatever you wanted to hear.

"BUNTING: OK, well, it's you know, I ... what we're looking for is the truth, if ... you want to give me the basics of ... of what you want to say.

"PIATT: Uhh ... well, I did it and I had reasons which I don't want to get into over the phone.

"BUNTING: OK, I understand that."

Later defendant was asked:

"BUNTING: Have you spoke to your attorney?

"PIATT: Uh, yes I have but not concerning this.

"BUNTING: OK. Did you ... when I talked to you the last two times you told me that you wanted to talk to your attorney. Did you just change your mind? Remember when I was there ...

"PIATT: I don't trust attorneys.

"BUNTING: OK, well then it ... it's your choice that you didn't want to talk to him, right?

"PIATT: Yes.

"BUNTING: And has anybody coerced you or ... or forced you into changing your mind?

"PIATT: No, sir.

"BUNTING: OK. Are you willing to waive extradition?

"PIATT: Yes. I've been trying since Wednesday to get word to you."

The defendant testified that he had given the confession in return for being placed in a general cell with others where he could play chess and cards, rather than solitary confinement. The trial judge stated that even if it were shown that "while the defendant was held in Texas he was placed in a small one man cell, he had not talked to any attorney, and he was promised that he would be placed back in the general population if he made a statement," it would make no difference in the court's ruling. As to the alleged coercion by the Texas authorities, defendant testified:

"Q When did you see Officer Walsh?

"A Well, they took me back upstairs on the 29th, and about a half an hour later they brought me down. And there was Jim Walsh again. And he said this is what's going on. He says you are going to confess to this and get extradited, or you are going to have a successful suicide. We want you out of Texas."

Based upon the stipulation that defendant had received his Miranda rights prior to the confession, the confession itself, and the testimony of the defendant, the court ruled:

"I have considered the stipulation that was entered into a few minutes ago by the attorneys and I have considered the testimony of Mr. Piatt and I have also considered contents of the statements of December the 1st that were referred to by the county attorney, particularly the certain questions and answers on page five, and on page 13. And at this time I find that the statement was voluntarily made. And that at that time the defendant knew of his constitutional rights, and he voluntarily waived the constitutional rights. Therefore, the motion to suppress is denied."

All confessions are prima facie involuntary and the burden is on the State to show that a confession was freely and voluntarily made and not the result of promise or inducement. State v. Arnett, 119 Ariz. 38, 579 P.2d 542 (1978); State v. Jerousek, 121 Ariz. 420, 590 P.2d 1366 (1979). To sustain its position, the State must prove the voluntariness of the confession by a preponderance of the evidence. State v. Knapp, 114 Ariz. 531, 562 P.2d 704 (1977); State v. Arredondo, 111 Ariz. 141, 526 P.2d 163 (1974). In determining whether it is admissible, the trial court must look to the totality of the circumstances surrounding the giving of the confession. State v. Arnett, supra; State v. Knapp, supra; see also A.R.S. § 13-3988.

In the instant case, we believe that the State made a prima facie case of voluntariness and it was up to the defendant to go forward with the evidence to overcome the State's prima facie case. Unfortunately, the defendant was not allowed to rebut the State's case because his...

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26 cases
  • State v. R.W.
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