State v. Pierce
| Decision Date | 28 March 2012 |
| Docket Number | No. 2011–KA–0095.,2011–KA–0095. |
| Citation | 89 So.3d 1 |
| Parties | STATE of Louisiana v. Clifford PIERCE. |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Louisiana — District of US |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Leon A. Cannizzaro, Jr., District Attorney, Brad Scott, Assistant District Attorney, New Orleans, LA, for Plaintiff/Appellee.
Katherine M. Franks, Louisiana Appellate Project, Abita Springs, LA, for Defendant/Appellant.
(Court composed of Chief Judge JOAN BERNARD ARMSTRONG, Judge MAX N. TOBIAS, JR., Judge PAUL A. BONIN).
[4 Cir. 2]A jury convicted Clifford Pierce of illegal possession of an automobile valued at more than five hundred dollars. See former La. R.S. 14:69 B(1). Following habitual offender proceedings, the district judge sentenced him to the remainder of his natural life in prison, without the benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence. SeeLa. R.S. 15:529.1 A(1)(c)(i) and G.1 The defendant, Mr. Pierce, timely 2 appealed his conviction and sentence.
Mr. Pierce, who is represented by different counsel on appeal than at trial, argues that he is entitled to a reversal of his conviction and a new trial because the district court cannot submit a transcript of the trial proceedings and has so certified to us the loss of the court reporter's notes and tapes.
Because we find that the failure to submit a trial transcript is not attributable to the defendant and that without a trial transcript Mr. Pierce's constitutional right [4 Cir. 3]to judicial review of his conviction is rendered meaningless, we vacate his conviction and sentence, and remand this matter for a new trial.
“No person shall be subjected to imprisonment ... without the right of judicial review based upon a complete record of all evidence upon which the judgment is based.” La. Const. Art. I, § 19. A defendant has an absolute right to appeal a felony conviction. La. Const. Art. V, § 5(D). To effectuate this right to judicial review, the Legislature in felony cases, such as this, mandates that “the court stenographer shall record all proceedings, including the examination of prospective jurors, the testimony of witnesses, statements, rulings, orders, and charges by the court, and objections, questions, statements, and arguments of counsel.” La.C.Cr.P. Art. 843. Thus, “[w]ithout a complete record from which a transcript for appeal may be prepared, a defendant's right of appellate review is rendered meaningless.” State v. Ford, 338 So.2d 107, 110 (La.1976).
The remedy for a deprivation of the right to judicial review based upon the unavailability through no fault of the defendant or his attorney of a complete trial transcript is a new, fully-recorded trial. Id. See also State v. Milanez, 09–1396, p. 3 (La.App. 4 Cir. 12/16/09), 28 So.3d 523, 525.
We do not find that the unavailability of the complete trial transcript is in any way attributable to the fault of Mr. Pierce. Most importantly, the district court has certified that the court reporter upon her retirement delivered her notes and [4 Cir. 4]tapes in this matter to the district court, but that they cannot be located. Thus, the reporter cannot prepare a transcript of the trial. Loss of these materials was in no way occasioned by the defendant. See State v. Harris, 01–1910 (La.App. 4 Cir. 4/24/02), 817 So.2d 1164;State v. Johnson, 01–1909 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1/23/02), 807 So.2d 1071.
The prosecution argues that Mr. Pierce bears responsibility for the trial transcript's unavailability because he delayed in filing a motion for appeal. See, e.g., State v. Gonzales, 95–0860 (La.App. 4 Cir. 9/18/96), 680 So.2d 1253 (); State v. Ford, 92–2029 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1/31/95), 650 So.2d 808 (); State v. Clark, 93–0321 (La.App. 4 Cir. 10/27/94), 644 So.2d 1130 ().
[4 Cir. 5]But Mr. Pierce was not required to file an appeal from the initial sentence imposed when the prosecution had immediately filed a multiple bill against him. See n. 2, ante. Also, based upon our review of the minute entries in the district court, Mr. Pierce was placed on the “jail list” not less than thirty times so that he could be brought into court for the multiple bill hearing; on some occasions he was incarcerated either in Orleans Parish Prison, or Jefferson Parish Correctional Center, or the Louisiana Department of Corrections, or in the State of Georgia. These fruitless efforts extended over three years from November 2006 until February 2010. On some rare occasions during that period, when Mr. Pierce was successfully produced in open court, either his attorney was not present or court was cancelled. On August 19, 2006, the one occasion when both Mr. Pierce and his attorney were present together, the court continued the multiple bill hearing due to a trial which was in progress. This extraordinary delay was not occasioned through any fault of Mr. Pierce.
Thus, we conclude that the unavailability of the entire trial transcript is not attributable to the fault or inaction of Mr. Pierce. Without the trial transcript, we cannot discharge our function to review his conviction, and his constitutional right to review would be rendered meaningless.
The conviction and sentence of Clifford Pierce are vacated. We remand the case for a new trial.
[4 Cir. 1]Because on original hearing we found that the failure to submit the trial transcript was not attributable to the defendant, Clifford Pierce, and that without a trial transcript Mr. Pierce's constitutional right to judicial review of his conviction was rendered meaningless, we vacated his conviction and life without parole sentence, and remanded this matter for a new trial. Before our original decision became final, the prosecution informed us that transcripts of the trial and multiple bill hearing were available and, accordingly, sought rehearing, which we granted.
After the transcripts were submitted, the parties were allowed to supplement their briefs. Because the exhibits from the habitual offender hearing could not be located, the prosecution sought to supplement the record with materials which were related to the habitual offender hearing, which had resulted in the life sentence for illegal possession of an automobile valued at more than five hundred dollars. See former La. R.S. 14:69 B(1) (1999); see alsoLa. R.S. 15:529.1 A(4)(a) and G.
On rehearing, Mr. Pierce challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support a verdict of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. After our review of the sufficiency of the evidence under the well-known Jackson v. Virginia standard, we find that any rational trier of fact, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, could find that all essential elements of the offense of illegal possession of an automobile valued at more than $500 had been proved beyond a reasonable doubt and, accordingly, affirm Mr. Pierce's conviction.1
Mr. Pierce also challenges his adjudication as a fourth felony-offender and the imposition of the life without parole sentence. Because the prosecution has failed to satisfy us that the materials with which it sought to supplement the record are in fact the evidence submitted at the habitual offender proceeding, and Mr. Pierce has objected to our consideration of the materials, we deny the prosecution's motion to supplement. And because there is no evidence to support the trial court's adjudication of Mr. Pierce as an habitual offender, we vacate that adjudication.2 But we reinstate the sentence of nine years at hard labor, which sentence the trial judge initially imposed and which sentence is not challenged on appeal.
In the following Parts we explain in greater detail our decision.
In this Part we explain why we find the evidence sufficient to support Mr. Pierce's conviction. We first review the essential elements of the offense with which he was charged and Mr. Pierce's stated challenge to the sufficiency as to the essential elements. We then review the facts presented to the jury. And finally we apply the Jackson v. Virginia standard of review to the essential elements and to the facts as they could have been found by any rational trier of fact.
Mr. Pierce was convicted of illegal possession of stolen things valued at least $500, as prohibited by La. R.S. 14:69 B(1) (1999), as it existed at the time of the offense. (“Whoever commits the crime of illegal possession of stolen things, when the value of the things is five hundred dollars or more, shall be imprisoned, with or without hard labor, for not more than ten years, or may be fined not more than three thousand dollars, or both.”) In order to support a conviction for this offense, the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonabledoubt that the property was stolen; the property was worth was least $500; the defendant had possession of the property; and the defendant knew or should have known that it was stolen. State v. Phillips, 04–2005 (La.App. 4 Cir. 5/18/05), 905 So.2d 337.
By his first assignment of error, Mr. Pierce contends that the evidence adduced at trial was insufficient to support his conviction because specifically the prosecution, he argues, failed to show that: (1) he had possession of the car; (...
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