State v. Pierce

• Decision Date: 04 March 2002
• Docket Number: No. 27200.,27200.
• Citation: 47 P.3d 1266,137 Idaho 296
• Parties: STATE of Idaho, v. Jonathan A. PIERCE.
• Court: Idaho Court of Appeals

47 P.3d 1266

137 Idaho 296

STATE of Idaho, v. Jonathan A. PIERCE.

No. 27200.

Court of Appeals of Idaho.

March 4, 2002.

Rehearing Denied April 10, 2002.

Review Denied June 13, 2002.

Hon. Alan G. Lance, Attorney General; Kenneth K. Jorgensen, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for appellant. Kenneth K. Jorgensen argued.

John M. Adams, Kootenai County Public Defender; Dennis Dale Reuter, Deputy Public Defender, Coeur d'Alene, for respondent. Dennis Dale Reuter argued.

PERRY, Chief Judge.

The state appeals from an order of the district court granting Jonathan A. Pierce's motion to suppress evidence obtained during the execution of a no-knock search warrant. We reverse.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURE

On August 4, 2000, at approximately 7:00 a.m., officers executed a no-knock search warrant at premises believed to be the location of a methamphetamine lab. The search warrant authorized the officers to search the home, a barn located to the east of the home, and a stable located to the north of the barn. In addition, the search warrant authorized the officers to search certain vehicles located on the premises which were believed to be involved in transporting methamphetamine. As they approached the premises, the officers encountered Pierce standing in a driveway approximately fifteen to twenty feet from the home. The officers did not know Pierce and did not know whether Pierce was arriving at or leaving the premises. Pierce was ordered to get down on the ground and was handcuffed. During the search of the premises, items consistent with the production of methamphetamine were found inside the home and barn. The lead investigating officer found documents containing Pierce's name on them in the barn, and the officer noted that the barn contained a living area. Approximately ten minutes after Pierce was handcuffed, the officer contacted Pierce and observed that Pierce had orangish-brown stains on his hands. The officer also smelled an odor on Pierce that the officer associated with the processing of methamphetamine. Pierce was placed under arrest for being present at a place where illegal controlled substances were being manufactured. However, Pierce was not searched at any time during the execution of the search warrant. Pierce was subsequently charged with trafficking in methamphetamine by manufacture. I.C. § 37-2732B(a)(3).

Pierce filed a motion to suppress evidence obtained during execution of the search warrant. Claiming that his initial detention was illegal, Pierce sought to suppress any testimony concerning the officer's observation of the stains on Pierce's hands and detection of an odor consistent with methamphetamine production on Pierce. After a hearing, the district court granted Pierce's motion. The district court concluded that the state had failed to establish that Pierce was an occupant of the premises, was involved in criminal activity, or was armed or dangerous. Therefore, the district court held that Pierce's initial detention while the search warrant was executed was not justified. The state appeals.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, we accept the trial court's findings of fact which are supported by substantial evidence, but we freely review the application of constitutional principles to the facts as found. State v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559, 561, 916 P.2d 1284, 1286 (Ct.App.1996). At a suppression hearing, the power to assess the credibility of witnesses, resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw factual inferences is vested in the trial court. State v. Valdez-Molina, 127 Idaho 102, 106, 897 P.2d 993, 997 (1995); State v. Schevers, 132 Idaho 786, 789, 979 P.2d 659, 662 (Ct.App.1999).

III. ANALYSIS

The ruling challenged in the instant case centered on Pierce's connection to the premises to be searched pursuant to the warrant. The district court found that Pierce was standing outside, approximately fifteen to twenty feet from the home. Further, the district court found that there was no indication that Pierce was entering or exiting the premises nor was he identified as a resident. Distinguishing Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 101 S.Ct. 2587, 69 L.Ed.2d 340 (1981), the district court held that Pierce was not an occupant of the premises searched and that Summers did not apply to justify Pierce's initial detention. Additionally, the district court found that there were no facts indicating that Pierce was involved in the suspected criminal activity at the premises or that he was armed or dangerous. Thus, pursuant to Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 100 S.Ct. 338, 62 L.Ed.2d 238 (1979), the district court held that Pierce's mere presence on the premises subject to search, without more, did not justify his initial detention.

The state argues that the district court erroneously concluded that Pierce was not an occupant of the premises searched. The state asserts that Pierce was an occupant of the premises to be searched because of his mere presence there and, therefore, his detention was reasonable pursuant to Summers. In addition, the state contends that the district court erroneously applied the standard enunciated in Ybarra because Ybarra is limited to situations in which a person is searched merely because of his or her presence on the premises subject to search pursuant to a warrant.¹ Alternatively, the state claims that, even if Pierce's detention was unreasonable, the evidence Pierce sought to suppress was not suppressible.

A warrant to search for contraband founded on probable cause implicitly carries with it the limited authority to detain the occupants of the premises while a proper search is conducted. Summers, 452 U.S. at 705, 101 S.Ct. at 2595, 69 L.Ed.2d at 351; State v. Slater, 133 Idaho 882, 889, 994 P.2d 625, 632 (Ct.App.1999). Application of this rule involves an assessment of the character of the intrusion and its justification. Summers, 452 U.S. at 701, 101 S.Ct. at 2593, 69 L.Ed.2d at 348.

Although the factual posture in Summers involved the detention of a resident of the home searched, the Summers opinion does not suggest that the rule cannot be applied to persons found on the premises to be searched who are not readily ascertainable as residents or occupants. The California Supreme Court dealt with such a similar situation in People v. Glaser, 11 Cal.4th 354, 45 Cal.Rptr.2d 425, 902 P.2d 729 (1995). In Glaser, officers arrived at a home to execute a search warrant for illegal drugs or related items. They encountered Glaser just as he was about to enter a backyard gate. It was dark at the time and the weather was stormy. Glaser was ordered at gunpoint to lie face down but, due to the noise of the storm, was unable to hear what he was being ordered to do and it took him approximately two minutes to obey. Once Glaser was on the ground, he was handcuffed. The two officers who detained Glaser did not know at the time whether he was a resident of the home. Approximately two minutes after he was handcuffed, a third officer contacted Glaser and identified him as a nonresident.

On appeal, the court analyzed the case according to the framework set forth in Summers. First, it examined the character of the intrusion. Although Glaser was detained at gunpoint, the court noted several circumstances diminishing the intrusiveness of Glaser's initial detention. The length of the detention was brief—only two minutes. Glaser was not detained in a public place, but rather at the back gate of a private residence. Finally, the detention was incidental to the execution of the search warrant, as opposed to an independent investigatory purpose, thus reducing the likelihood that the detention would be exploited by the officers.

Second, the court examined the justifications for the detention. The court found two interrelated justifications—the officers' concern for security while executing the search warrant and their interest in determining what connection, if any, Glaser had with the premises being searched. The court noted that the threat of violence was potentially greater because of the private nature of the surroundings and the recognized propensity of persons engaged in selling narcotics to carry firearms. Additionally, the interest in determining the identity of a person entering the premises being searched was related to the officers' need for security. Further, the risk posed by residents or familiars of the household, who may be involved in criminal activities therein, was greater than that posed by mere visitors who happen unwittingly upon the scene. The court also stated that determining the identity and connection to the premises of a person who was already present on the search site, or who entered during the search, allowed officers to ascertain whether the other interests identified in Summers warrant detention of the person during the search.

Finally, the court examined the nature of the specific and articulable facts which reasonably warranted Glaser's detention. The officers, who arrived after dark on a stormy night, encountered Glaser standing in an unlit spot in the driveway. None of the officers immediately recognized him. He was about to pass through a gate into the backyard of the house being searched. Glaser's apparent familiarity with the premises suggested that he was not a stranger or chance visitor but his connection with the premises was not immediately clear. In addition, when officers instructed Glaser to get down on the ground, he did not immediately obey and it took approximately two minutes before Glaser understood what he was being instructed to do.

The court rejected the state's contention that as a general rule, when police have a warrant to search a home, the mere arrival or presence of someone at the warranted premises, alone, justifies a detention for the purpose of determining the identity and connection to the searched...