State v. Pike, 19518
| Decision Date | 30 December 1985 |
| Docket Number | No. 19518,19518 |
| Citation | 712 P.2d 277 |
| Parties | STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. David Stanley PIKE, Defendant and Appellant. |
| Court | Utah Supreme Court |
Mark S. Miner, Salt Lake City, for defendant and appellant.
David L. Wilkinson, Atty. Gen., J. Stephen Mikita, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and respondent.
Defendant David Stanley Pike was charged with three counts of aggravated assault in violation of U.C.A., 1953, § 76-5-102. The jury convicted Pike on all three counts, and he was sentenced to an indeterminate term of zero to five years. On appeal, Pike claims that he was prejudiced because (1) the prosecutor incorrectly told the jury that Pike had used a "sawed-off" shotgun; (2) the complaining witness, a deputy sheriff, improperly mingled with the jury during a court recess; and (3) the trial judge improperly excluded the arresting officer's report.
On April 2, 1983, three intoxicated young men "crashed" a keg party at the Duckworth residence. The host of the party, Jerry Duckworth, a minor, was upset by their presence and rowdiness, and called his neighbor, the defendant, David Pike, for help in getting rid of the men.
Pike had his wife call the sheriff before he went across the street to the Duckworth residence. Pike's knock on the front door was answered by one of the uninvited men, Joe Doutis. Pike informed the three men that they were unwanted intruders and told them to leave. After a heated discussion the men left for a while.
The sheriff arrived shortly thereafter and was informed of what had happened. The sheriff left after instructing the residents to call him again if the men returned. When the three men eventually returned, Mrs. Pike immediately called the sheriff. Duckworth's parents, who had been summoned home, refused to allow the men into the home. One of the men shouted obscenities at Mrs. Duckworth, but took no other action. Two sheriff's patrol cars arrived. After a brief examination of the men's car, one officer left. The second officer, Officer Fleming, told the men to leave the area, and was himself preparing to leave when Pike approached him to ask why he had not arrested the three intruders. Officer Fleming assured Pike that everything was under control and that the three were preparing to leave. Officer Fleming testified that Pike then said that he would take care of the intruders if the officers did not. On cross examination Fleming admitted that Pike's alleged statements had not been included in his police report, although they should have been. Pike then returned to his home. The three intruders informed Officer Fleming that they had trouble starting their car and asked him to move his car so they could start their car by pushing. At that point, Officer Fleming drove off. The men started the car, and then taunted and threatened Pike while the car engine was running.
The testimony concerning what ensued is conflicting. The evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict, is that when the three started taunting him, Pike grabbed a shotgun which had been placed within easy reach of the front door and fired it in their direction, hitting the back window and near the front tire of the car. The men sped away and located Officer Fleming who returned and arrested Pike.
During trial, the prosecutor posed a question to Pike about using a "sawed-off" shotgun during the altercation. On defense counsel's objection, the question was reformulated to eliminate the reference. Later that day, after the court had taken a short recess, the trial judge questioned Officer Fleming in chambers as to whether he had spoken to any jurors during the recess. Officer Fleming admitted that a juror had asked him why he was limping. Fleming replied: At this point, the judge interrupted Fleming's narrative of the conversation. The judge and counsel agreed to let the incident go until after the verdict was in and then to question the jurors involved in the conversation. After the trial, the judge questioned the jurors involved and apparently determined that the conversation was innocuous. The trial judge also refused to admit Officer Fleming's report of the incident and ruled that it could be used only for cross-examination.
After the verdicts were returned, Pike made a motion for a new trial based on supporting affidavits asserting that 1) he was prejudiced by the prosecutor's statement that he had used a "sawed-off shotgun," 2) Fleming's mingling with the jury was in violation of the trial judge's instructions and was prejudicial, and 3) the court's improper refusal to admit Officer Fleming's arrest report into evidence was error. Pike appeals the denial of that motion.
Defendant's first assignment of error is the prosecutor's reference to Pike's use of a sawed-off shotgun. The witnesses at trial testified that the defendant used an ordinary shotgun. The reference to a sawed-off shotgun occurred during the cross-examination of Pike, and was immediately retracted. On this record the one, apparently inadvertent, reference to a sawed-off shotgun was not prejudicial.
The second issue is whether Officer Fleming's mingling and conversing with the jurors during a recess in the trial deprived Pike of his right to trial by an impartial jury. We have long taken a strict approach in assuring that the constitutional guarantee of a fair trial not be compromised by improper contacts between jurors and witnesses, attorneys, or court personnel. State v. Crank, 105 Utah 332, 142 P.2d 178 (1943); Glazier v. Cram, 71 Utah 465, 267 P. 188 (1928); State v. Anderson, 65 Utah 415, 237 P. 941 (1925).
Both the Utah and the United States Constitutions guarantee trial by an impartial jury. United States Constitution, Amendments VI and XIV; Utah Constitution Art. 1, section 10. Anything more than the most incidental contact during the trial between witnesses and jurors casts doubt upon the impartiality of the jury and at best...
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State v. Soto
...the jury occurs, the defendant is entitled to a rebuttable presumption that the contact has prejudiced him or her. See State v. Pike , 712 P.2d 277, 280 (Utah 1985).¶5 The regretful contact in this case violated Soto's right to an impartial jury and triggered a rebuttable presumption that S......
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Jenkins v. State
...District Court for further proceedings." Simants v. State, 202 Neb. at 839, 277 N.W.2d at 223. The Utah Supreme Court, in State v. Pike, 712 P.2d 277, 280 (Utah 1985), used a rebuttable presumption of prejudice when the rule against improper juror contact with witnesses was violated because......
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State v. Soto
...as to likely violate the guarantee of an impartial jury. See id. at 943 ; State v. Crank, 142 P.2d 178, 194 (Utah 1943) ; see also Pike, 712 P.2d at 280 contacts may influence a juror in ways he or she may not even be able to recognize . . . ."). ¶26 Our view of improper jury contacts und......
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Parsons v. Galetka
...on collateral review, the Utah Supreme Court said it could find no substantive error occurred under the standard of State v. Pike, 712 P.2d 277, 279-81 (Utah 1985). Because no error resulted, the action of counsel could not be considered ineffective and below the standard of Improper contac......
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ICEBERG AHEAD: WHY COURTS SHOULD PRESUME BIAS IN CASES OF EXTRANEOUS JUROR CONTACTS.
...v. Allen, 2005 UT 11, 51, 108 P.3d 730 (emphasis omitted). (235.) Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140, 142 (1892). (236.) State v. Pike, 712 P.2d 277, 280 (Utah 1985) (noting that these contacts have a "deleterious effect upon the judicial (237.) Id. (quoting Glazier v. Cram, 267 P. 188, ......