State v. Pinder
| Decision Date | 24 August 1999 |
| Docket Number | (SC 15750) |
| Citation | 736 A.2d 857,250 Conn. 385 |
| Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
| Parties | STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. JAMES PINDER |
Callahan, C. J., and Borden, Berdon, Norcott, Palmer, McDonald and Peters, JS. Eugene J. Riccio, special public defender, with whom, on the brief, was Margaret M. Wynne, for the appellant (defendant).
Ellen A. Jawitz, deputy assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Walter D. Flanagan, state's attorney, and David M. Holzbach, assistant state's attorney, for the appellee (state).
After a jury trial, the defendant, James Pinder, was found guilty of the crime of murder in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54a.1 The trial court rendered judgment in accordance with the jury verdict and sentenced the defendant to a term of imprisonment of forty years. The defendant appeals from the judgment of conviction, claiming that the trial court improperly: (1) concluded that the defendant's inculpatory statements were not obtained in violation of his right not to incriminate himself;2 (2) concluded that, under the circumstances of the case, the defendant's statement— "What about a public defender?"—was not an equivocal request for counsel that, under article first, § 8, of the Connecticut constitution, required that the police clarify the statement before resuming questioning; (3) concluded that the defendant's inculpatory statements were made voluntarily; and (4) deprived the defendant of his right to a fair trial by coercing the jury into continuing their deliberations over the objections of both the state and the defendant. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The record discloses the following facts. The defendant and the victim, Brian Altvater, had been close friends for twelve years, and both were twenty years old at the time of the victim's death. For the preceding two years, they had lived as roommates in the basement of the victim's parents' home. The two men often sought employment at the same jobs, and had talked of starting a computer company together. Until shortly before the victim's death, both worked as salesmen at an area car dealership.
On the night of November 15, 1994, the victim's mother discovered the body of her deceased son in his bedroom in the basement. The victim was found on his bed with the covers pulled up to his chin and his arms at his side, underneath the covers. The victim had suffered a gunshot wound to the back of the head.3 A .22 caliber semiautomatic pistol and its holster were found on the combination headboard/bookcase of the victim's bed. A shell casing was lodged in the ejector port of the gun, indicating that the gun had been fired. The victim's father contacted the police, and an officer immediately responded to the Altvater home. That officer subsequently was followed by members of the state police major crime squad.
The police conducted an initial investigation at the scene, and interviewed both of the victim's parents. Upon learning that the defendant shared a residence in the basement with the victim and likely would have been the last person to have seen the victim alive, a member of the state police located the defendant by telephone at his mother's house at 1 a.m. An interview was scheduled, and two detectives went to the defendant's mother's house and spoke with him for approximately one hour and fifteen minutes at 4:30 a.m. During that interview, the defendant provided a written statement concerning the events of the past day.
During the day on November 16, 1994, one of the detectives requested that the defendant come to the state police Troop A barracks for another interview, based on certain details in the defendant's statement, particularly a discrepancy between the defendant's time line of the events of the preceding morning and the time line given by the victim's father. At the conclusion of that interview, because the detectives believed that the defendant was withholding information about the victim's death, they asked the defendant if he would be willing to take a polygraph examination in order to support his statements. The defendant agreed to do so. An unexpected opening in the testing schedule at the state police polygraph unit enabled the defendant to be scheduled for a polygraph examination the next day. On November 17, 1994, the defendant again met the two detectives at the Troop A barracks. He was given the option of driving to the polygraph unit in his own car or with the detectives, and he elected to travel with the detectives. During the drive, the two officers and the defendant had a casual conversation about computers.
At the polygraph unit, the defendant underwent a preliminary interview with a secondary polygraph examiner, followed by the polygraph examination itself with the primary examiner. As a result of the defendant's performance on the polygraph examination, the two examiners believed that he had been deceptive in his statements that he knew nothing about the victim's death. During postexamination questioning to determine the nature of the perceived deception, the defendant made the admissions at issue in this appeal, wherein he confessed to shooting and killing the victim. The defendant subsequently was charged with the murder of the victim. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.
The defendant moved to suppress several incriminating oral statements that he had given to the polygraph examiners on November 17, 1994, claiming that his federal and state constitutional rights had been violated.4 Relevant to this appeal, the defendant raised three grounds for suppression: (1) the statements were made without the assistance of counsel and, therefore, in violation of the defendant's Miranda rights; (2) the defendant's inquiry—"What about a public defender?"—constituted either an unequivocal request for counsel or an equivocal request for counsel that the polygraph examiners were required to clarify before continuing to question him; and (3) the defendant's statements were not made voluntarily. The trial court rejected all three claims concluding: (1) that the defendant was not in custody and, therefore, that a fifth amendment right against self-incrimination had not yet attached; (2) that the defendant's inquiry—"What about a public defender?"—did not constitute an unequivocal request for counsel; and (3) that the defendant's statements were made voluntarily. We agree with the conclusions of the trial court.
At the suppression hearing and the trial, the following evidence was presented.5 The defendant's first contact with the police occurred at 1 a.m. on November 16, 1994, approximately four hours after the victim's body had been discovered. After the victim's parents informed the police that the defendant was the victim's roommate, the police telephoned the defendant at his mother's house. This call was made both to notify the defendant of the victim's death, and to request an interview with him in order to investigate the circumstances of the victim's death. The police did not consider the defendant to be a suspect at this time, and had not reached a conclusion as to whether the death was a suicide or a homicide.
Between 4:30 a.m. and 5 a.m. on November 16, members of the state police went to the defendant's mother's house and spoke with the defendant. Although upset regarding the death of his friend, the defendant was cooperative, coherent and appeared to be very intelligent over the course of the interview. He both volunteered information and answered questions, as the police sought to obtain as much background information as possible regarding the victim who, at that time, was considered to be a possible suicide. The defendant signed a written statement at the conclusion of the interview, which detailed, among other things, his contact with the victim over the course of the preceding day.6
After obtaining the defendant's written statement, Detective James Bleidner, one of the detectives who had interviewed him, had concerns about the time line of events as described by the defendant. Specifically, the defendant had stated that he left the residence at 8:20 or 8:25 a.m. on November 15, although the victim's father had told the police that he had passed the defendant in his car near the home at 8:55 a.m. The police also recovered a towel from the defendant's bedroom that was owned by the victim's family and not normally used by the defendant. Later that afternoon, on November 16, 1994, Bleidner asked the defendant to go to the state police barracks to discuss the case further. At this time, the victim's death was still considered a possible suicide. Besides clarification of inconsistencies in the defendant's statement, the police also sought to ask further general questions about whether the defendant thought the death could have been a suicide. The defendant agreed to meet them again. The police met the defendant in Danbury and he followed them in his own car to the barracks for the interview, which lasted approximately one hour. Toward the conclusion of the interview, while discussing his friend's death, the defendant became emotional and began crying.
At the end of that meeting, Bleidner remained concerned about the time line discrepancies, told the defendant that he thought that the defendant was not being completely truthful, and offered the defendant the opportunity to take a polygraph examination to support his statement. Bleidner told the defendant at the time of this offer that he had the right to refuse to take the polygraph examination. The defendant agreed to take the examination, indicating that he had done a study on polygraphs in school and was familiar with them. Although the defendant stated that he was willing to take a polygraph test that afternoon, an appointment was not available at the polygraph unit at that time. Accordingly, an appointment was made for the following day.7
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