State v. Pinkard, No. 2008AP1204-CR.
Court | United States State Supreme Court of Wisconsin |
Writing for the Court | PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK |
Citation | 327 Wis.2d 346,785 N.W.2d 592,2010 WI 81 |
Parties | STATE of Wisconsin, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Juiquin Anthony PINKARD, Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. |
Docket Number | No. 2008AP1204-CR. |
Decision Date | 15 July 2010 |
785 N.W.2d 592
2010 WI 81
STATE of Wisconsin, Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
Juiquin Anthony PINKARD, Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner.
No. 2008AP1204-CR.
Supreme Court of Wisconsin.
Argued Jan. 7, 2010.
Decided July 15, 2010.
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner there were briefs by Richard L. Zaffiro, Wauwatosa, and oral argument by Richard L. Zaffiro.
For the plaintiff-appellant the cause was argued by James M. Freimuth, assistant attorney general, with whom on the brief was J.B. Van Hollen, attorney general.
PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, J.
¶ 1 We review a decision of the court of appeals 1 affirming the circuit court's 2 amended judgment convicting Juiquin Anthony Pinkard (Pinkard) of possession of cocaine with intent to deliver. In upholding the judgment of conviction, the court of appeals affirmed the circuit
I. BACKGROUND
¶ 2 On August 24, 2006 at 8:55 a.m., City of Milwaukee Police Officer Mike Lopez (Lopez), received an anonymous tip in which the caller stated that he had just left 2439 South 7th Street, Pinkard's residence,
¶ 3 Osowski received Lopez's call at 9:00 a.m. and afterward responded to Pinkard's residence,3 which he admitted "sounded like a drug house," with four other police officers from the Gang Crimes Unit. Pinkard's residence is the rear unit of a three-family house. The officers went to the back entrance that Osowski explained is the "main door" to Pinkard's residence that leads exclusively to Pinkard's unit. This entrance had one heavy, aluminum door that was standing three-quarters open. Remaining outside Pinkard's residence, the officers knocked on the open door and announced their presence.
¶ 4 After waiting 30-45 seconds and receiving no response, the officers then entered Pinkard's residence to "check the welfare of the occupants." Specifically, Osowski testified that they entered "[t]o make sure that the occupants that the caller had referred us were not the victims of any type of crime; that they weren't injured; that they weren't the victims of like a home invasion, robbery; that they were okay, and to safeguard any life or property in the residence."
¶ 5 From the officers' position just inside the rear door, they could see a bedroom directly to their left. That bedroom door also was standing open. The officers could see two people inside the bedroom, Pinkard and a woman, who "appeared to be sleeping." The officers entered the bedroom "just to see if [they] could awake [the occupants]" and again loudly announced themselves as the police. Neither of the occupants in the bed
¶ 6 Pinkard was charged with possessing a firearm as a felon, possession of cocaine with intent to deliver as a second or subsequent offense and felony bail-jumping. Pinkard waived his preliminary hearing. He then filed a motion to suppress all of the evidence the officers seized from his residence arguing that the officers' warrantless entry into his residence violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment and Article I, Section 11 of the federal and state constitutions, respectively.
¶ 7 At the suppression hearing, the circuit court implicitly found Osowski's testimony was credible because it found, as Osowski testified, that the officers arrived at Pinkard's residence "to inquire as to the health and safety of the individuals that were sleeping." The circuit court denied Pinkard's motion to suppress the evidence seized from in plain view, concluding that the officers' warrantless entry into Pinkard's
¶ 8 Pursuant to a plea agreement that encompassed three other pending cases against Pinkard, he pled guilty in the present case to the possession of
¶ 9 Pinkard moved for reconsideration of the circuit court's denial of his motion to suppress the evidence of drug possession seized from in plain view. In support of his motion, Pinkard attached two supplemental police reports, which he claimed demonstrated that the officers entered his residence "to commence a drug investigation, not because they were concerned about the occupants as community caretakers." The court denied Pinkard's motion, reiterating that the officers entered the residence as community caretakers.
¶ 10 Pinkard appealed the circuit court's "orders denying his suppression and related reconsideration motions." State v. Pinkard, No.2008AP1204-CR, 2009 WL 1048515, unpublished slip op., ¶ 4 (Wis.Ct.App. Apr. 21, 2009). The court of appeals affirmed. Id., ¶ 1. Following our recent decision in State v. Kramer, 2009 WI 14, 315 Wis.2d 414, 759 N.W.2d 598, the court of appeals concluded that the officers' actions based on the anonymous tip were "sufficient pursuant to Kramer to satisfy an articulation of an objectively reasonable basis to engage in a community caretaker function even if there [also] was a potential to exercise law enforcement functions during that investigation." Pinkard, No.2008AP1204-CR, 2009 WL 1048515, unpublished slip op., ¶ 10 (Wis.Ct.App. Apr. 21, 2009).
¶ 11 We granted review and now affirm.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
¶ 12 In reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress evidence, we will uphold a circuit court's findings
B. Community Caretaker Function Exercised in a Residence
¶ 13 The federal and state constitutions do not protect against all searches and seizures, but only "unreasonable searches and seizures." Arias, 311 Wis.2d 358, ¶ 25, 752 N.W.2d 748 (citing U.S. Const. amend. IV; 4 Wis. Const. art. I, § 11).5 "The ultimate standard set forth
¶ 14 The United States Supreme Court and courts of this state have recognized that a police officer serving as a community caretaker to protect persons and property may be constitutionally permitted to perform warrantless searches and seizures. See Cady, 413 U.S. at 448, 93 S.Ct. 2523; State v. Ziedonis, 2005 WI App 249, ¶ 14, 287 Wis.2d 831, 707 N.W.2d 565. Because we "interpret the provisions of the Fourth Amendment and Article I, Section 11 as equivalent in regard to community caretaker analyses," we look to the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of the community caretaker exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement. Kramer, 315 Wis.2d 414, ¶ 18, 759 N.W.2d 598.
¶ 15 The community caretaker exception has its origins in Cady. In Cady, Dombrowski's car was...
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Sutterfield v. City of Milwaukee, No. 12–2272.
...view during the check for the girl, the court concluded that the marijuana should not be suppressed. Id. at 513–14. In State v. Pinkard, 327 Wis.2d 346, 785 N.W.2d 592 (2010), the Wisconsin Supreme [751 F.3d 575]Court—applying both the Fourth Amendment and its Wisconsin counterpart—likewise......
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State v. Moiduddin, NO. 14-18-15
...purposes. The community caretaking doctrine cannot be used to justify warrantless searches of a home.") with, e.g. , State v. Pinkard , 327 Wis.2d 346, 363, 785 N.W.2d 592 (2010) ("[U]nder certain circumstances a reasonably exercised community caretaker function may permit a warrantless ent......
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State v. McCormick, No. M2013–02189–SC–R11–CD
...Id. at 195–96 (Clark and Koch, JJ., dissenting) (citing Salinas v. State, 224 S.W.3d 752, 756 (Tex.Ct.App.2007) ; State v. Pinkard, 327 Wis.2d 346, 785 N.W.2d 592, 605 (2010) ). Having now fully reconsidered Cady, state and federal decisions applying it, and the majority and dissenting opin......
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State v. Moats, No. E2010–02013–SC–R11–CD.
...and the risk of danger if the officer provides no assistance. See Salinas v. State, 224 S.W.3d 752, 756 (Tex.App.2007); State v. Pinkard, 2010 WI 81, ¶ 42, 327 Wis.2d 346, 785 N.W.2d 592, 605 (2010). The proof in this record shows that Officer Bige saw a person sitting alone in the driver's......
-
Sutterfield v. City of Milwaukee, No. 12–2272.
...view during the check for the girl, the court concluded that the marijuana should not be suppressed. Id. at 513–14. In State v. Pinkard, 327 Wis.2d 346, 785 N.W.2d 592 (2010), the Wisconsin Supreme [751 F.3d 575]Court—applying both the Fourth Amendment and its Wisconsin counterpart—likewise......
-
State v. Moiduddin, NO. 14-18-15
...purposes. The community caretaking doctrine cannot be used to justify warrantless searches of a home.") with, e.g. , State v. Pinkard , 327 Wis.2d 346, 363, 785 N.W.2d 592 (2010) ("[U]nder certain circumstances a reasonably exercised community caretaker function may permit a warrantless ent......
-
State v. McCormick, No. M2013–02189–SC–R11–CD
...Id. at 195–96 (Clark and Koch, JJ., dissenting) (citing Salinas v. State, 224 S.W.3d 752, 756 (Tex.Ct.App.2007) ; State v. Pinkard, 327 Wis.2d 346, 785 N.W.2d 592, 605 (2010) ). Having now fully reconsidered Cady, state and federal decisions applying it, and the majority and dissenting opin......
-
State v. Moats, No. E2010–02013–SC–R11–CD.
...and the risk of danger if the officer provides no assistance. See Salinas v. State, 224 S.W.3d 752, 756 (Tex.App.2007); State v. Pinkard, 2010 WI 81, ¶ 42, 327 Wis.2d 346, 785 N.W.2d 592, 605 (2010). The proof in this record shows that Officer Bige saw a person sitting alone in the driver's......