State v. Pippi

• Decision Date: 10 February 1921
• Docket Number: 4261.
• Citation: 195 P. 556,59 Mont. 116
• Parties: STATE v. PIPPI.
• Court: Montana Supreme Court

195 P. 556

59 Mont. 116

STATE v. PIPPI.

No. 4261.

Supreme Court of Montana

February 10, 1921

Appeal from District Court, Missoula County; Asa L. Duncan, Judge.

Pellegro Pippi was convicted of having received and accepted money without consideration from the earnings of a woman engaged in prostitution, and from order denying his motion for a new trial he appeals. Affirmed.

Chas A. Russell, of Missoula, for appellant.

Fred R Angevine, of Missoula, and S. C. Ford, Atty. Gen., for the State.

HOLLOWAY J.

The defendant was convicted of violating the provisions of section 8, chapter 1, Laws of 1911, and has appealed from an order denying his motion for a new trial.

When this cause was called for trial it appeared that there were not enough names of qualified jurors in jury box No. 1, and in the opinion of the court expressed in a minute entry, a sufficient number could not be obtained without great delay and expense. The clerk was thereupon directed to draw 40 names from jury box No. 3, which was done. Counsel for defendant objected to the trial before a jury thus drawn, and assigns as error the adverse ruling of the court, relying for support of his contention upon the decision in State v. Landry, 29 Mont. 218, 74 P. 418. In the Landry Case, however, we went no further than to hold that the court is not authorized to resort to jury box No. 3 until the emergency mentioned in section 6357, Revised Codes, arises. But whenever that emergency does arise--whenever the names in jury box No. 1 have been so depleted that a sufficient number does not remain from which to secure a jury, and it appears further that a sufficient number cannot be procured without great delay or expense--the court is clothed with discretion to direct the clerk to resort to jury box No. 3, as was done in this instance. In the absence of any showing of abuse of discretion the trial court's ruling will be upheld.

Objection was made to the introduction of any evidence on the ground that chapter 1, above, is unconstitutional, in that more than one subject is embraced in the title of the act. The title reads as follows:

"An act to prevent the seduction and prostitution of women and girls, and providing punishment therefor; and to prevent the receipt of money or other valuable thing, from women engaged in prostitution, and prescribing punishment therefor; and to repeal sections 8341 and 8342 of the Revised Codes of 1907."

An analysis of the statute discloses that its purpose is to prevent the seduction and prostitution of women and girls, and that nine distinct provisions are made for accomplishing that purpose, or, stating the same thing differently, the Legislature determined that the commission of any one of the nine enumerated acts would constitute a violation of the statute and defeat the primary purpose intended to be served.

The several prosecutions authorized by the act are but the means for the effective enforcement of the statute, and the fact that one of these means is mentioned in the title does not render the act obnoxious to the provisions of section 23, article 5, of the Constitution. State v. McKinney, 29 Mont. 375, 74 P. 1095, 1 Ann. Cas. 579. In Evers v. Hudson, 36 Mont. 135, 92 P. 462, this court construed the section above and said:

"The object of the constitutional provision now under consideration is not to embarrass honest legislation, but to prevent the vicious practice, which prevailed in states which did not have such inhibitions, of joining in one act incongruous and unrelated matters. The rule of interpretation now quite generally adopted is that, if all parts of the statutes have a natural connection and can reasonably be said to relate, directly or indirectly, to one general and legitimate subject of legislation, the act is not open to the charge that it violates this constitutional provision; and this is true no matter how extensively or minutely it deals with the details looking to the accomplishment of the main legislative purpose. 25 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, 2d Ed., 575. Or stating the converse of the proposition, it may be said that if, after giving the act the benefit of all reasonable doubts, it is apparent that two or more independent and incongruous subjects are embraced in its provisions, the act will be held to transgress the constitutional provision, and to be void by reason thereof."

The defendant was charged with having received and accepted money, without consideration, from the earnings of one Marie Champagne, a woman engaged in prostitution. Upon the trial, and over the objection of defendant, the state was permitted to prove that at the same time and place defendant also received and accepted money from the earnings of one Elsie Leonard, a common prostitute.

It is the general rule that upon the trial of one accused of crime, evidence of a distinct and independent offense is not admissible; but the rule is equally well settled that the state may introduce evidence tending to prove a uniform plan or course of action on the part of the accused for the purpose of identification, of disclosing guilty knowledge or criminal intent, and to negative the idea that the particular act charged was merely the result of inadvertence or mistake; and, if such evidence also tends to establish the commission of another offense, it is not for that reason inadmissible. State v. Newman, 34 Mont. 434, 87 P. 462; State v. Hill, 46 Mont. 24, 126 P. 41.

Section 8 of chapter 1, above, under which this prosecution was conducted, provides that upon the trial of one accused of violating its provisions the acceptance, receipt, levy, or appropriation of money from the earnings of a fallen woman shall be presumptive evidence of lack of consideration. The court so advised the jury in instruction No. 2, and exception is taken by defendant.

It is the general rule in criminal cases that every presumption in favor of the defendant's innocence shall be indulged until the evidence establishes his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt; but the rules of evidence are subject to legislative control, except in so far as it is restrained by constitutional limitations (1 Wigmore on Evidence, sec. 7), and so long as the defendant is secured a fair and impartial trial.

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