State v. Pippin, Cr. N

Citation496 N.W.2d 50
Decision Date23 February 1993
Docket NumberCr. N
PartiesSTATE of North Dakota, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Joan PIPPIN, Defendant and Appellant. o. 920243.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of North Dakota

John A. Thelen of Spaeth, Thelen, Johnson & Dearstyne, Grand Forks, for defendant and appellant; submitted on briefs.

Thomas H. Falck, Jr., Asst. State's Atty., Grand Forks; submitted on briefs.

LEVINE, Justice.

Joan Pippin appeals from a restitution order entered following her conviction of possession of stolen property. We reverse and remand.

Joan's home was searched in connection with an investigation of fifteen burglaries which had been committed in Grand Forks. During that search, investigators discovered and seized numerous items which had been stolen from the homes of the burglary victims. Joan's former husband, Randy H. Pippin, eventually pleaded guilty to fifteen counts of burglary and Joan ultimately entered an open plea of guilty to an amended information charging her with possession of stolen property.

The trial court entered judgment of conviction against Joan and sentenced her to the State Penitentiary for three years, with one year suspended for a period of five years, and specified that restitution would be determined separately at a subsequent hearing as required by NDCC Sec. 12.1-32-08(1), which says, in pertinent part:

"1. Prior to imposing restitution or reparation as a sentence or condition of probation, the court shall hold a hearing on the matter with notice to the prosecuting attorney and to the defendant as to the nature and amount thereof. The court, when sentencing a person adjudged guilty of criminal activities which have resulted in pecuniary damages, in addition to any other sentence it may impose, shall order that the defendant make restitution to the victim or other recipient as determined by the court, unless the court states on the record, based upon the criteria in this subsection, the reason it does not order restitution or orders only partial restitution. In determining whether to order restitution the court shall take into account:

a. The reasonable damages sustained by the victim or victims of the criminal offense, which damages must be limited to those directly related to the criminal offense and expenses actually incurred as a direct result of the defendant's criminal action. This can include an amount equal to the cost of necessary and related professional services and devices relating to physical, psychiatric, and psychological care. The defendant may be required as part of the sentence imposed by the court to pay the prescribed treatment costs for a victim of a sexual offense as defined in chapters 12.1-20 and 12.1-27.2." (Emphasis added.)

After a hearing, the trial court entered an order requiring that Joan and Randy, jointly and severally, make restitution of $106,105.54 to the burglary victims. The damage award represented, in proportions not discernible from the record, the combined losses of the victims attributable to expenses incurred repairing and cleaning their homes, as well as unrecovered cash and personal property. Joan appealed.

On appeal, Joan contends that the restitution order is unlawful and should be reversed as it relates to her. She asserts the damages incurred by the burglary victims were not "directly related" to her crime of possession of stolen property and their expenses were not a "direct result" of her commission of that crime. See NDCC Sec. 12.1-32-08(1)(a); see also, infra, NDCC Sec. 12.1-32-02(1)(e). Joan contends, in the alternative, that the restitution order should be remanded for another hearing so that the court can fashion a new order which requires that she make restitution only for those damages directly related to her crime. She argues, in that regard, that because all the property she pleaded guilty to possessing was recovered and returned to the victims, the only damages directly attributable to her crime "may be a minimal loss of use value to the victims while the items were actually in [her] house," and that any other damages are directly related to Randy's offense.

Our resolution of this dispute is based upon the scope and meaning of the operative phrases within section 12.1-32-08(1)(a): "directly related" and "direct result." Statutory construction is a question of law, fully reviewable by this court. State v. Rambousek, 479 N.W.2d 832 (N.D.1992). The primary objective of statutory construction is to ascertain the intent of the legislature, id., and we do so by looking at the language of the statute itself and giving it its plain, ordinary and commonly understood meaning. Van Klootwyk v. Arman, 477 N.W.2d 590 (N.D.1991); NDCC Sec. 1-02-02. In addition, we read statutes in context and in relation to others on the same subject in order to give meaning to each without rendering one or the other useless. Ebach v. Ralston, 469 N.W.2d 801 (N.D.1991). Criminal statutes are construed against the government and in favor of the accused. Rambousek, supra.

Ordinarily understood, the term "directly" means "without a person or thing coming between; immediately." Webster's New World Dictionary (2d College ...

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20 cases
  • State v. Rogers
    • United States
    • North Dakota Supreme Court
    • November 6, 2018
    ...intimate causal connection between the criminal conduct and the damages or expenses for which restitution is ordered." State v. Pippin , 496 N.W.2d 50, 53 (N.D. 1993). A defendant cannot be assessed restitution for damages resulting from a separate crime, not committed by the defendant, eve......
  • State v. Gill
    • United States
    • North Dakota Supreme Court
    • June 30, 2004
    ...intimate causal connection between the criminal conduct and the damages or expenses for which restitution is ordered," State v. Pippin, 496 N.W.2d 50, 53 (N.D.1993), N.D.C.C. § 12.1-32-08 does not specify the burden of proof required to establish restitution, and we have not addressed the q......
  • Trinity Medical Center, Inc. v. Holum
    • United States
    • North Dakota Supreme Court
    • February 28, 1996
    ...to reevaluate those policy arguments, but to ascertain the legislature's intent from the language of the statute. E.g., State v. Pippin, 496 N.W.2d 50, 52 (N.D.1993). We are not free to disregard the letter of the statute under the pretext of pursuing its spirit. See Section 1-02-05, N.D.C.......
  • State v. Lewis
    • United States
    • North Dakota Supreme Court
    • February 8, 1995
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