State v. Pires

Decision Date08 October 2013
Docket NumberSC 18742
CourtConnecticut Supreme Court
PartiesSTATE OF CONNECTICUT v. MICHAEL D. PIRES, SR.

The "officially released" date that appears near the beginning of each opinion is the date the opinion will be published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it was released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the beginning of all time periods for filing postopinion motions and petitions for certification is the "officially released" date appearing in the opinion. In no event will any such motions be accepted before the "officially released" date.

All opinions are subject to modification and technical correction prior to official publication in the Connecticut Reports and Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the event of discrepancies between the electronic version of an opinion and the print version appearing in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the latest print version is to be considered authoritative.

The syllabus and procedural history accompanying the opinion as it appears on the Commission on Official Legal Publications Electronic Bulletin Board Service and in the Connecticut Law Journal and bound volumes of official reports are copyrighted by the Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may not be reproduced and distributed without the express written permission of the Commission on Official Legal Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut.Rogers, C. J., and Norcott, Palmer, Zarella, Eveleigh, McDonald and

Espinosa, Js.

April E. Brodeur, special public defender, for the appellant (defendant).

Paul J. Narducci, senior assistant state's attorney, with whom was John P. Gravalec-Pannone, former senior assistant state's attorney, and, on the brief, was Michael L. Regan, state's attorney, for the appellee (state).

Opinion

NORCOTT, J. This certified appeal presents us with another opportunity to determine whether, pursuant to Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S. Ct. 2525, 45 L. Ed. 2d 562 (1975), statements made by a defendant indicating dissatisfaction with the performance of his appointed counsel developed into a clear and unequivocal request invoking the right to self-representation under the sixth amendment to the United States constitution. The defendant, Michael D. Pires, Sr., appeals, upon our grant of his petition for certification,1 from the judgment of the Appellate Court affirming the judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of murder in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54a. See State v. Pires, 122 Conn. App. 729, 731, 2 A.3d 914 (2010). On appeal, the defendant claims that, on several occasions throughout these proceedings, the trial court improperly failed to (1) canvass him pursuant to Practice Book § 44-32 in response to his invocations of his right to self-representation, made both personally and through counsel, and (2) expressly inform him of his right to self-representation while advising him of his right to counsel. Guided by, inter alia, our decisions in State v. Jordan, 305 Conn. 1, 44 A.3d 794 (2012), and State v. Flanagan, 293 Conn. 406, 978 A.2d 64 (2009), we conclude that the trial court did not violate the defendant's right to self-representation, which he claimed to have invoked at a pretrial hearing and at sentencing. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court.

The record and the Appellate Court's opinion reveal the following relevant facts and procedural history. The defendant, along with Michael D. Pires, Jr., and Tamir Dixon, were charged with murder in violation of § 53a-54a in connection with a 2004 drug related homicide in Norwich.3 See State v. Pires, supra, 122 Conn. App. 731-33. The case was tried to a jury, which found the defendant guilty of murder, and the trial court, Schimelman, J., rendered a judgment of conviction in accordance with the jury's verdict, sentencing the defendant to sixty years imprisonment. See id., 731.

"Prior to the commencement of trial, the defendant made several requests to the court to remove defense counsel, [S]pecial [P]ublic [D]efender Linda Sullivan, from the case. On May 25, 2005, the defendant requested that the court, Clifford, J., remove Sullivan from the case. The court found no cause to do so. Similar exchanges occurred on October 12, 2005, and November 15, 2005, in appearances before [the court, Handy, J.] On December 20, 2005, the defendant renewed his request, and [Judge Handy]4 also denied the request. When the defendant mentioned his constitutional rights, the court informed him that as an indigent defendant, he had the right to counsel but not the right to choose his own counsel. After a recess granted by the court so that the defendant could discuss strategy withSullivan, the court reconvened and Sullivan reported that the defendant had not discussed strategy but had told her that he wanted to represent himself.5 The court ordered the case to the firm trial list, and the hearing concluded.

"The next time the defendant appeared before the court, in March, 2006, Sullivan filed a motion to withdraw as counsel, and attorneys Kevin Barrs and Bruce Sturman asked to be appointed due to the conflict between Sullivan and the defendant. The court [Handy, J.] granted the motion to withdraw and appointed Barrs and Sturman with the proviso that it did not want the defendant to continue requesting a new attorney at every hearing. The defendant did not make another request to replace counsel until August 2, 2006, at the start of trial, when he filed a pro se motion to dismiss counsel. At a hearing on August 3, 2006, the defendant withdrew that motion. The defendant filed another motion at the time of sentencing, titled 'motion to dismiss' that the court [Schimelman, J.] treated as a motion to dismiss counsel, and the court denied the motion." (Footnote added.) Id., 733.

The defendant appealed from the judgment of conviction to the Appellate Court, contending, inter alia,6 that "he was denied the right to self-representation because the court failed to canvass him pursuant to the federal and state constitutions and Practice Book § 44-3, thereby violating his sixth amendment right to self-representation and his right to due process." (Footnote omitted.) Id., 734. In a divided opinion, the Appellate Court disagreed with this claim, concluding that the defendant had never made the "clear and unequivocal assertion" of his right to self-representation required by, inter alia, Faretta v. California, supra, 422 U.S. 835, and State v. Carter, 200 Conn. 607, 611-13, 513 A.2d 47 (1986). See State v. Pires, supra, 122 Conn. App. 735-36. In so concluding, the Appellate Court rejected, in particular, the defendant's reliance on colloquies during the pretrial hearing held on December 20, 2005 (December 20 hearing), and the sentencing hearing held on October 13, 2006 (sentencing hearing). See id., 736, 741-43.

With respect to the December 20 hearing, the Appellate Court concluded that "any pretrial request by the defendant to represent himself was not clear and unequivocal such that it would trigger the trial court's responsibility to engage in an inquiry under Practice Book § 44-3 . . . ." Id., 739. The Appellate Court stated that, although "Sullivan did inform the court that the defendant had expressed to her a desire to represent himself . . . she immediately qualified that statement by telling the court that she had advised him that the court was not likely to grant the request. The court reasonably could have interpreted counsel's statement to mean that the defendant did not want to pursue self-representation as an option."7 Id. The Appellate Courtthen concluded that the trial court's "discuss[ion of] the constitutional right to counsel without noting self-representation as an option" was not "a denial of the defendant's right to self-representation. The court is not obligated to suggest self-representation to a defendant as an option simply because the defendant repeatedly expressed dissatisfaction with his court-appointed counsel."8 Id., 739.

The Appellate Court then concluded that the defendant's comments at the sentencing hearing did not constitute a "clear and unequivocal request to proceed with self-representation." Id., 742. The Appellate Court rejected the defendant's argument "that his request was one for self-representation because the court stated that granting his request to dismiss counsel would result in either him proceeding pro se or in delaying the hearing. Such an acknowledgement, however, simply stated the possible outcomes of a dismissal of counsel at that point in time. At no time was the issue of self-representation ever raised by the defendant in either the motion or in his statements to the court."9 (Emphasis omitted.) Id., 742-43. Accordingly, the Appellate Court rendered judgment affirming the defendant's conviction.10 Id., 750. This certified appeal followed. See footnote 1 of this opinion.

On appeal, the defendant contends that (1) he clearly and unequivocally invoked his unqualified11 right to self-representation through Sullivan's comment to the trial court at the December 20 hearing, (2) the trial court was obligated to inform him of his right to represent himself, and (3) he again clearly and unequivocally invoked his right of self-representation through a written motion and oral argument at the sentencing hearing. We address each claim in turn.

Before turning to the defendant's specific claims in this certified appeal, "[w]e begin with general principles. The sixth amendment to the United States constitution provides in relevant part: In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the assistance of counsel for his defense. The sixth amendment right to counsel is made applicable to state prosecutions through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. . . . In Faretta v. California, [supra, 422 U.S. 807] the ...

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