State v. Pitman
Citation | 427 N.W.2d 337 |
Decision Date | 19 July 1988 |
Docket Number | No. 870388,870388 |
Parties | STATE of North Dakota, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Michael J. PITMAN, Defendant and Appellant. Crim. |
Court | United States State Supreme Court of North Dakota |
William Kirschner & Associates, Fargo, for defendant and appellant; William Kirschner (argued).
Melody R.J. Jensen (argued), Asst. States Atty., Fargo, for plaintiff and appellee.
Michael J. Pitman appeals from a judgment of conviction for driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor in violation of section 39-08-01(1)(b), N.D.C.C. 1 We affirm.
On October 2, 1987, at approximately 7:05 a.m., Officer Brumfield of the North Dakota Highway Patrol discovered a one-car accident on Interstate Highway No. 94 near Fargo, North Dakota. Officer Brumfield was not summoned to the accident, but an ambulance unit and fire truck were at the scene when he arrived.
In his deposition Officer Brumfield described the accident scene as follows:
Brumfield then questioned Pitman about the accident inside his police vehicle. Pursuant to a preprinted accident report form, 2 Brumfield asked Pitman when the accident occurred. Pitman told Brumfield that the accident occurred at approximately 6:50 a.m.
As Officer Brumfield completed the report he detected an odor of alcohol and noticed Pitman's eyes were bloodshot and that Pitman had difficulty speaking. Suspecting that Pitman was intoxicated, Brumfield gave Pitman a preliminary screening test known as an alcohol level evaluation roadside test (A.L.E.R.T.). Pitman failed the test. Pitman was then placed under arrest for driving under the influence of an intoxicating liquor. An intoxilyzer test administered at a Cass County law enforcement facility indicated Pitman's blood alcohol content was .17%. At no time did Officer Brumfield recite to Pitman his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).
Pitman was charged alternatively with driving under the influence of an intoxicating liquor or driving with a blood-alcohol concentration of at least ten one-hundredths of one percent (.10%), in violation of section 39-08-01(1)(a) or (1)(b). Pitman filed a pre-trial motion:
The Cass County court denied all parts of Pitman's pre-trial motion. With court approval Pitman then entered a conditional plea of guilty for driving while under the influence of an intoxicating liquor pursuant to Rule 11(a)(2) of the North Dakota Rules of Criminal Procedure. 3 We address all of Pitman's contentions in the order in which they appear in his pre-trial motion.
Pitman first contends his pre-arrest statement in which he admitted that he was the driver of the vehicle must be suppressed because he was not given his Miranda warnings. We disagree.
Pitman's principal objection involves the questioning in the police vehicle:
We need not consider the admissibility of the incriminating statement made in the patrol car because, as Officer Brumfield's deposition reflects, Pitman was identified as the driver of the vehicle before Officer Brumfield came upon the scene and apparently admitted being the driver before entering the patrol car. As Miranda warnings were not necessary when Brumfield initially questioned Pitman outside the patrol car and confirmed that he was the driver, we need not consider whether or not Miranda warnings should have been given inside the patrol car when Officer Brumfield asked the same question.
Miranda warnings are required when, and only when, the defendant is being subjected to a custodial interrogation. Custodial interrogation was defined in Miranda as "questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." Miranda, 86 S.Ct. at 1612. The Miranda holding does not affect "[g]eneral on-the-scene questioning as to facts surrounding a crime or other general questioning of citizens in the fact-finding process...." Miranda, supra, 86 S.Ct. at 1629. See also State v. Skjonsby, 319 N.W.2d 764, 786 (N.D.1982).
The Miranda court left to the courts of each jurisdiction the duty to define when a defendant is "otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." 86 S.Ct. at 1612. See, e.g., State v. Tellez, 6 Ariz.App. 251, 431 P.2d 691, 696 (1967) ( ); Newberry v. State, 552 S.W.2d 457, 461 (Tex.Crim.App.1977) ( ); State v. Sykes, 285 N.C. 202, 203 S.E.2d 849, 850 (1974) ( ); United States v. Alvarado Garcia, 781 F.2d 422 (5th Cir.1986) ( ).
We have confronted the question of when Miranda applies in several cases. See State v. Berger, 329 N.W.2d 374, 376 (N.D.1983); State v. Skjonsby, 319 N.W.2d 764 (N.D.1982); and State v. Fields, 294 N.W.2d 404 (N.D.1980). In these cases we have distinguished "custodial interrogation" from "general on-the-scene" investigatory questioning.
In State v. Fields, supra, we rejected the principle that Miranda warnings are triggered when the investigation of an offense focuses on the defendant. The defendant in Fields was questioned by an officer at the hospital. The officer asked the defendant if he was the driver of the vehicle at the time of the accident. The defendant responded yes.
We analyzed the need for Miranda warnings in Fields as follows:
In essence the only significant factual distinction between the facts in Fields and the facts pertaining to what occurred outside the patrol car of this appeal is that Pitman was asked whether or not he was the driver at the scene of the accident rather than at a hospital. We do not believe this factual distinction has any legal significance for purposes...
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