State v. Pittam

• Decision Date: 27 June 1903
• Citation: 32 Wash. 137,72 P. 1042
• Parties: STATE v. PITTAM.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

72 P. 1042

32 Wash. 137

STATE v. PITTAM.

Supreme Court of Washington

June 27, 1903

Appeal from Superior Court, Spokane County; W. E. Richardson, Judge.

Thomas H. Pittam was convicted of crime, and appeals. Affirmed.

Harris Baldwin, for appellant.

Horace Kimball and R. M. Barnhart, for respondent.

DUNBAR, J.

The appellant was tried and convicted on an information filed against him under the provisions of section 7119, 2 Ballinger's Ann. Codes & St. The information charged him with willfully, unlawfully, feloniously, and fraudulently converting to his own use the money and property intrusted to him by the McCormick Harvesting Machine Company, a corporation, while he was acting as agent for said company. The errors alleged on this appeal are: (1) Allowing the state, over the objection of the appellant, to prove by oral testimony that the McCormick Harvesting Machine Company was a corporation; (2) permitting the state, against the objection of the appellant, to adduce against the appellant at the trial evidence of other offenses. The third assignment is in substance that the evidence does not warrant the verdict.

As to the first assignment, E. F. Waggoner testified on direct examination as follows: 'Q. You may state what the nature of that company is, as being a company or corporation. A. It is a corporation existing under the laws of the state of Illinois. Q. Doing business in the state of Washington? A. Yes, sir. Mr. Baldwin: I object to proving the corporation in that way. (Objection overruled.)' It will be seen that the objection is very general, but that the testimony went in without objection of any kind, that no further testimony of that character was introduced after the objection, and that there was no motion or request made by the appellant to strike the testimony. So that we think under the circumstances as shown by the state of the record that this objection is not available to the appellant. However, the testimony most certainly was material, relevant and competent. It is true the law provides that certified copies of certain instruments shall be considered prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated, but there is no provision of the law excluding other proof of the existence of the corporation. Proof of the de facto existence of a corporation under the name alleged in the information is admissible, and in some jurisdictions the existence of the corporation is proven by any one having knowledge of its existence, or even by general reputation.

The argument on the second assignment is as follows: 'The trial court, over the objection of the appellant, allowed the witness F. D. Banks to testify as to other offenses which the witness said the appellant had committed. This was error.' The particular testimony is not pointed out nor mentioned by the appellant, and no further comment is made on its admission, except the citing of State v. Bokien, 14 Wash. 403, 44 P. 889. A perusal of the record, however shows (what we presume are the facts referred to by the appellant) that the state proved that the defendant, the agent and cashier of the corporation, who transacted its business and kept its books, had given receipts to one Nuzum and other...