State v. Pittman
| Decision Date | 27 January 2015 |
| Docket Number | No. 44652–9–II.,44652–9–II. |
| Citation | 185 Wash.App. 614,341 P.3d 1024 |
| Parties | STATE of Washington, Appellant. v. Leldon R. PITTMAN, Respondent. |
| Court | Washington Court of Appeals |
Jennifer M. Winkler, Nielson, Broman & Koch, PLLC, Seattle, WA, for Appellant.
Jason Ruyf, Pierce County Prosecutor's Office, Tacoma, WA, for Respondent.
¶ 1 Leldon R. Pittman appeals his convictions for attempting to elude a police vehicle and for driving under the influence of intoxicants. Pittman claims that the charging information omitted essential elements from the charge of attempting to elude a police vehicle and that the parties' exercise of their peremptory challenges on paper violated his right to a public trial. In a pro se statement of additional grounds, Pittman claims that his trial was untimely, requiring dismissal under CrR 3.3, and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. We conclude in the published portion of this opinion that the charging information was adequate, and we address and reject Pittman's additional arguments in the unpublished portion. We affirm.
¶ 2 In January 2012, Pittman returned home after a night out and fought with his mother and stepfather. After Pittman and his girl friend drove off, his mother called 911 to report the altercation and gave a description of Pittman's car.
¶ 3 Police dispatch reported the incident as a vehicular assault involving a dark colored vehicle with a broken front windshield, and units from the Fife and Milton police departments responded. One of these units saw a car matching that description driving erratically away from the scene of the altercation. As the uniformed officer pulled behind the car to initiate a traffic stop, the car sped away. The car, later determined to be the one driven by Pittman, led officers on a chase at speeds between 30 and 80 m.p.h. During this chase, the sirens and emergency lights of the police vehicles were in use.
¶ 4 The chase ended when Pittman's car crashed. As police officers approached the crashed vehicle, Pittman got out of it, saw the officers and, despite verbal commands that he stop, attempted to flee. Officers ultimately had to taser Pittman to subdue him.
¶ 6 After trial, the jury convicted Pittman of the driving under the influence and attempting to elude offenses. The jury also found that Pittman had endangered persons other than himself or the pursuing police when he attempted to elude a police vehicle, constituting the aggravating circumstance for sentencing.
¶ 7 Pittman timely appeals.
¶ 8 Pittman argues that the information omitted an essential element of the crime of attempting to elude a police officer. Specifically, he contends that the charging document omitted any mention that police signaled by hand, voice, emergency light, or siren that he should stop. We hold that the method by which police officers signal to stop is not an essential element of the crime of attempting to elude a police vehicle and that the information did not need to include this language.
¶ 9 An information is constitutionally defective if it fails to list the essential elements of a crime. State v. Zillyette, 178 Wash.2d 153, 158, 307 P.3d 712 (2013). The essential elements of a crime are those “ ‘whose specification is necessary to establish the very illegality of the behavior’ charged.”2 Zillyette, 178 Wash.2d at 158, 307 P.3d 712 (quoting State v. Ward, 148 Wash.2d 803, 811, 64 P.3d 640 (2003) ).
Requiring the State to list the essential elements in the information protects the defendant's right to notice of the nature of the criminal accusation guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 22 of the Washington State Constitution. Zillyette, 178 Wash.2d at 158, 307 P.3d 712. Due to the constitutional nature of the challenge to the sufficiency of an information, we review de novo claims that it omitted essential elements of a charged crime. State v. Williams, 133 Wash.App. 714, 717, 136 P.3d 792 (2006).
¶ 10 In a challenge to the sufficiency of an information, we must first decide whether the allegedly missing element is, in fact, an essential element. See State v. Tinker, 155 Wash.2d 219, 220, 118 P.3d 885 (2005), If so, and where the defendant challenges, as here, the sufficiency of the information for the first time on appeal, we must then “liberally construe the language of the charging document in favor of validity.” Zillyette, 178 Wash.2d at 161, 307 P.3d 712. Liberal construction requires that we determine whether “the necessary elements appear in any form, or by fair construction, on the face of the document and, if so,” whether “the defendant [can] show he or she was actually prejudiced by the unartful language.” Zillyette, 178 Wash.2d at 162, 307 P.3d 712 (citing Kjorsvik, 117 Wash.2d at 105–06, 812 P.2d 86 ).
¶ 11 The elements of the crime of attempting to elude a police vehicle are fixed in RCW 46.61.024(1), which states:
Any driver of a motor vehicle who willfully fails or refuses to immediately bring his or her vehicle to a stop and who drives his or her vehicle in a reckless manner while attempting to elude a pursuing police vehicle, after being given a visual or audible signal to bring the vehicle to a stop, shall be guilty of a class C felony. The signal given by the police officer may be by hand, voice, emergency light, or siren. The officer giving such a signal shall be in uniform and the vehicle shall be equipped with lights and sirens.
The information, set out above, omits any mention of making the signal by hand, voice, emergency light, or siren.
The issue, then, is whether making the signal by one of those four means is an essential element of the crime.
¶ 12 To make such a determination, we must engage in statutory interpretation. Tinker, 155 Wash.2d at 221, 118 P.3d 885 ; State v. Caton, 163 Wash.App. 659, 668, 260 P.3d 946 (2011), reversed on other grounds by 174 Wash.2d 239, 273 P.3d 980 (2012). When interpreting a statute, we attempt to ascertain and give effect to the legislature's intent. Dep't of Ecology v. Campbell & Gwinn, LLC, 146 Wash.2d 1, 9–10, 43 P.3d 4 (2002). We ascertain the legislature's intent using the plain meaning imparted by the text of the provision and that of any related provisions. Campbell & Gwinn, 146 Wash.2d at 11–12, 43 P.3d 4. Where a statute is susceptible of multiple reasonable interpretations after the plain meaning analysis, it is ambiguous, and we must turn to extrinsic evidence such as legislative history, common law precedent, or canons of construction to determine the legislature's intent. Campbell & Gwinn, 146 Wash.2d at 12, 43 P.3d 4.
¶ 13 The first sentence of RCW 46.61.024(1), quoted above, plainly sets out essential elements of the crime: those elements which are necessary to establish illegality. Zillyette, 178 Wash.2d at 158, 307 P.3d 712. One of those elements is that the defendant must have been given a visual or audible signal to bring the vehicle to a stop. The second sentence then specifies further that the signal must have been given by “the police officer” and that it “may be by hand, voice, emergency light, or siren.” RCW 46.61.024(1). The third sentence of RCW 46.61.024(1) adds to this by requiring that the officer giving the signal be in uniform.
¶ 14 The requirements in the second and third sentences that the signal be given by a police officer in uniform are also necessary to establish illegality and are thus essential elements under Zillyette. 178 Wash.2d at 158, 307 P.3d 712. The statement in the second sentence, though, that the police “may” signal “by hand, voice, emergency light, or siren,” is not so easily characterized. RCW 46.61.024(1). “May” in this context could reasonably be read as requiring the police to use any one of the four enumerated means of signaling to a defendant. RCW 46.61.024(1). The defendant would not act criminally unless he or she disregarded one of the specified signal types. However, as the State notes, the legislature's use of “may” in RCW 46.61.024(1) could also reasonably be read to permit, but not require, one of the enumerated types of signals. Under this reading of the statute, the manner in which police give the signal does not establish the criminality of the defendant's actions. Instead the State would only need to prove that the defendant disregarded some type of police signal to stop to show criminal behavior.3 Under the former reading, the manner in which police signal would be an essential element of the crime. Cf. Zillyette, 178 Wash.2d at 160, 307 P.3d 712 (). Under the latter reading, it would not be an essential element.
¶ 15 Under its plain meaning, then, RCW 46.61.024(1) is susceptible of multiple reasonable interpretations and is therefore ambiguous. Campbell & Gwinn, 146 Wash.2d at 12, 43 P.3d 4. With that ambiguity, we must turn to legislative history, common law...
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