State v. Plaisance
| Decision Date | 29 April 1968 |
| Docket Number | No. 48983,48983 |
| Citation | 252 La. 212,210 So.2d 323 |
| Parties | STATE of Louisiana v. Kenneth PLAISANCE. |
| Court | Louisiana Supreme Court |
Jack Peebles, New Orleans, for appellant.
Jack P. F. Gremillion, Atty. Gen., William P. Schuler, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jim Garrison, Dist. Atty., Louise Korns, Asst. Dist. Atty., for appellee.
The defendant, Kenneth Plaisance, having been convicted and sentenced to imprisonment in the Louisiana State Penitentiary at hard labor for the balance of his natural life on an indictment charging him with aggravated rape prosecutes this appeal, relying for the reversal thereof on six errors allegedly committed during the course of the trial to which objections were made and bills of exception timely made and perfected.
The first bill was reserved when the trial judge ruled the defendant, being able to understand the nature of the proceedings against him and assist counsel in his defense, was sane and, the second bill was reserved when the trial judge overruled the defendant's application for a lunacy commission to inquire into defendant's sanity at the time of the offense.
In order that these two bills may be property disposed of it will be necessary to go into some details regarding the facts of the case as disclosed by the record. It appears that on January 26, 1963 the accused, a twenty-three year old white man, broke into the home of Mrs. Jones, going first into the bedroom of her 14 year old son, whom he struck in the neck, but prior thereto the boy, having heard someone breaking into the house called to his mother who was sleeping in the adjoining room and she telephoned the police. Immediately thereafter the defendant broke down the door to Mrs. Jones' room where she was with her 11 year old daughter and he beat, robbed and raped Mrs. Jones. The police arrived as the accused was leaving the home and while scuffling with the officer in an attempt to escape defendant was shot. On February 14, 1963 the grand jury returned an indictment against Plaisance charging him with aggravated rape. On July 1, 19631 the court, upon finding that the accused was unable to understand the nature of the proceedings against him and assist counsel in his defense, committed him to East Louisiana State Hospital. Subsequently, authorities of the hospital notified the trial judge that the accused was legally sane and he was returned to the parish prison whereupon the trial judge in compliance with R.S. 15:267 ordered another lunacy commission comprised of the same physicians appointed to the first to inquire into his present mental condition. On the 28th of September, 1964 the doctors again reported at the hearing held by the court that Plaisance was not capable of understanding the nature of the proceedings against him and would be unable to assist in his defense and was accordingly recommitted to the hospital. The hospital authorities in June, 1965 notified the trial judge again that the accused was sufficiently recovered to stand trial and by continued use of the proper medication would remain in that condition, whereupon the trial judge ordered a third lunacy commission composed of the same doctors as previously appointed. After full hearing on March 4, 1966 the court concluded the defendant was sane and able to stand trial which was fixed for March 28, 1966. At the hearing counsel, who had in the meantime been employed by the defendant, objected to the ruling and reserved the first bill of exception. The next bill was reserved when the trial judge overruled defense counsel's application for appointment of a lunacy commission to inquire into defendant's sanity at the time of the offense. On the day set for trial defendant was re-arraigned, plead not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity.
The basis for the first bill of exception is that 'the evidence produced at this lunacy hearing was to the effect that the defendant, although at the time sane and able to assist in his defense, was still under sedation prescribed by physicians, and if it were not for the said sedatives defendant would not have been legally sane and able to stand trial', and, 'further, that at the time of said hearing and at the time of trial defendant was being administered sedation and was under the influence of drugs, being in a state of remission due only to the influence of said drugs.' Counsel, orally and in brief, sets forth, as an additional basis in support of the argument that defendant should not be tried while in a state of remission, the contention that if found not guilty the defendant's release would be a constant menace to society.
We think the argument thus posed by counsel has been adversely disposed of by this court in State v. Swails, 223 La. 751, 66 So.2d 796, wherein this court observed, 'The apprehension and even the predictions of some physicians that appellant may be a menace to society, if he is ever released, affords no basis whatever for holding him presently insane, within the meaning of the law,' pointing out further, See also, State v. Estes, 212 La. 694, 33 So.2d 199.
On the merits of the bill we find the uncontradicted testimony of Drs. Sanchez and Chetta unequivocally establish that defendant is presently sane for he is able to understand the proceedings against him and assist in his defense being in a state of complete remission and will remain such by continued use of the prescribed medication. Dr. Sanchez testified even if the tranquilizer was temporarily discontinued he would not lapse into his prior state by the time of trial because of the medication in his system as well as resistance to stress and strain resulting from the past medication.
We, therefore, conclude that the bill is without merit for as aptly observed by this court in State v. Chinn, 229 La. 984, 87 So.2d 315, 'To warrant the sustaining of a plea of present insanity, thereby preventing the trial of a criminal action, it must appear by a preponderance of evidence that the accused is so mentally deficient that he lacks capacity to understand the nature and object of the proceedings against him and to assist in the conducting of his defense in a rational manner.'
The next bill of exception is equally without merit. From a perusal of the record it does not appear the trial judge has abused the discretion vested in him by R.S. 15:2682 in refusing the defendant's motion to appoint physicians to inquire into his sanity at the time of the commission of the offense of which he is charged. The trial judge in so ruling obviously felt from the information secured during the three prior lunacy hearings, another lunacy commission could serve no useful purpose and would merely serve to delay the trial of the case. The issue of insanity at the time of the commission of the crime involves a fact affecting the guilt or innocence of the accused and necessarily one to be tried and submitted on the merits to the jury the same as all other facts in the case. State v. Eisenhardt, 185 La. 308, 169 So. 417; State v. Cook, 215 La. 163, 39 So.2d 898; State v. Basco, 216 La. 365, 43 So.2d 761; State v. Chinn, supra.
Counsel's argument that because of his pecuniary circumstances he was deprived of expert testimony is belied by the record as the record reflects he was able to employ counsel to defend him and called Dr. Jack Chappuis, a psychiatrist of his choice who testified during the trial of the case. Moreover, he could have secured the testimony of the doctors from the East Louisiana State and Charity Hospitals who had treated him by simply asking that they be subpoenaed.
The next two bills were reserved to the trial judge's ruling declining certain special charges submitted by counsel--first, when he called attention to the judge that he had not included in his general charge 'on the law of insanity as pertaining to the Durham Rule,' and the trial judge refused to so charge the jury; and second, when the trial judge refused to give the following special charge; ...
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