State v. Poffenbarger, No. 48811

• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Iowa
• Writing for the Court: GARFIELD
• Citation: 74 N.W.2d 585,247 Iowa 552
• Parties: STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Ed. A. POFFENBARGER, Appellant.
• Docket Number: No. 48811
• Decision Date: 06 February 1956

Page 585

74 N.W.2d 585 247 Iowa 552 STATE of Iowa, Appellee,
v.
Ed. A. POFFENBARGER, Appellant. No. 48811. Supreme Court of Iowa. Feb. 6, 1956.

Page 586

[247 Iowa 553] Thomas O. Tacy, Council Bluffs, for appellant.

Dayton Countryman, Atty. Gen., Raphael R. R. Dvorak, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Matt J. Walsh, Council Bluffs, County Atty., for appellee.

[247 Iowa 554] GARFIELD, Justice.

Defendant has appealed from a judgment imposing a fine of $1,000 following a jury verdict of guilty of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated, second offense, in violation of section 321.281, Code 1954, I.C.A. He urges two grounds for reversal. First, the evidence he was driving his automobile at the time in question is insufficient; second, misconduct of the bailiff in charge of the jury during its deliberations. We hold the judgment should not be reversed on either ground.

I. Defendant's experienced counsel did not contend in the court below the evidence he was driving his car was insufficient. And the contention now made directly conflicts with some statements in defendant's brief. In this state of the record perhaps we might disregard defendant's first contention. However we are disposed to consider it.

We have held we cannot permit a verdict of guilty to stand where there is absence of proof of any of the essential elements of the crime charged. State v. Burns, 181 Iowa 1098, 1102, 165 N.W. 346. A conviction notwithstanding such absence of proof amounts to denial of a fair trial. State v. Higgins, 192 Iowa 201, 204, 182 N.W. 887; State v. Anderson, 240 Iowa 1090, 1098, 38 N.W.2d 662, 666.

II. We have stated so many times the rules governing our consideration of a claim of insufficient evidence in a criminal case it should hardly be necessary to mention them again. Of course the evidence should be viewed in the light most favorable to the state. It is necessary to refer only to the testimony which tends to support the verdict. We do not decide disputed fact questions in a criminal case. That is the jury's function and its verdict is binding upon us unless we are satisfied it is without substantial support in the evidence or it is clearly against the weight thereof.

Recent decisions which support what we have just said include State v. Kneedy, 232 Iowa 21, 27, 3 N.W.2d 611, 615, and citations; State v. Williams, 245 Iowa 401, 403, 62 N.W.2d 241, 242, and citations; State v. Miskell, Iowa, 73 N.W.2d 36, 41, and citations.

[247 Iowa 555] Just before defendant was arrested his car was involved in a minor collision with one driven by a Mrs. Ward. As a witness this lady pointed out defendant as the driver of the other car. Police officer Smith testified he knew defendant and his car and at the time in question was following defendant, with another car in between, he looked at the driver of defendant's car and saw it was defendant. It is true on cross-examination he said 'I could be mistaken, but I believe it was Mr. Poffenbarger driving the car.' Another officer who arrested defendant testified he found defendant hiding between two parked cars and that when apprehended defendant said 'I made a turn in front of her (Mrs. Ward).' A pedestrian who observed the minor collision testified he saw only one person in defendant's car and 'The man the police placed under arrest was the same man I saw under the wheel of the car.'

Defendant claimed on the trial that his friend Fador drove defendant's car and he accompanied Fador. Both defendant and

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Fador so testified. And a physician who examined defendant after he was arrested said defendant denied to him he operated his automobile. Evidently the jury did not believe defendant and Fador. Of course it was not compelled to do so in the face of substantial testimony for the state to which we have referred. Defendant had twice been convicted of a felony and Fador had been convicted once.

Further discussion of the evidence is unnecessary. It seems to be conceded there is sufficient testimony defendant was intoxicated. There is clearly sufficient evidence he was the driver of the car. While Officer Smith's direct testimony was somewhat weakened on cross-examination its effect was not thereby destroyed. See State v. Hammer, 246 Iowa ----, 66 N.W.2d 490, 492.

This is simply a case of conflicting evidence and the verdict based thereon is binding upon us. State v. Franklin, 242 Iowa 726, 734-735, 46 N.W.2d 710, 714-5, and citations; State v. Williams, supra, 245 Iowa 401, 404, 62 N.W.2d 241, 242, and citations; State v. Miskell, supra, Iowa, 73 N.W.2d 36, 41, and citations.

III. Defendant's second ground for reversal was first raised in his motion for new trial and affidavit attached thereto [247 Iowa 556] which states: 'About 9 p. m. I saw the bailiff in charge of the jury go to the bottom of the stairway leading to the room where the jury was deliberating. He shouted to the jury or its foreman in a loud voice in substance 'Tell him to make up his mind one way or the other.' After further conversation with the jury or the foreman the bailiff shouted in a loud voice in substance 'Tell him I can stay here as long as he can.''

No other showing was made in support of...