State v. Pogue

Decision Date25 August 2015
Docket NumberNo. 20140355.,20140355.
Citation868 N.W.2d 522
PartiesSTATE of North Dakota, Plaintiff and Appellant v. Rebekah Maxine POGUE, Defendant and Appellee.
CourtNorth Dakota Supreme Court

Jacob T. Rodenbiker, State's Attorney, Watford City, ND, for plaintiff and appellant.

Daniel S. El–Dweek, Williston Public Defender Office, Williston, ND, for defendant and appellee.

Opinion

McEVERS, Justice.

[¶ 1] The State appeals from a district court order granting Rebekah Maxine Pogue's motion to suppress evidence. We affirm the district court's order because the State did not satisfy its burden to show law enforcement's warrantless search of Pogue's vehicle qualified as a valid inventory search, an exception to the warrant requirement, or that the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies.

I

[¶ 2] Officer Andrew Langowski, a Watford City police officer, initiated a traffic stop of a vehicle for exceeding the speed limit. The driver of the vehicle could not produce any form of identification, proof of insurance, or registration, but identified herself as Sarah Hernandez. The officer detected an odor of alcohol coming from the vehicle and noticed the driver had bloodshot, watery eyes, slurred speech and displayed slow, sluggish movements. After the driver submitted to field sobriety testing and an onsite screening test, she was arrested for driving under the influence. The officer received the driver's permission to move the vehicle out of a private driveway, across the street. The driver submitted to a chemical blood test and was taken to jail for booking.

[¶ 3] During the booking process, law enforcement realized the driver had provided false identification information. When confronted by law enforcement, the driver identified herself as Pogue and admitted she had initially provided a false name. According to Pogue's arrest report, law enforcement then impounded the vehicle Pogue had been driving and performed an inventory search of it due to “the vehicle not belonging to her, expired registration, and False Information charge....” During the search, law enforcement found a black cloth bag containing drug paraphernalia items and methamphetamine. The officer applied for a warrant to further search the vehicle and submitted an affidavit in support of the application. In the affidavit, the officer stated he impounded the vehicle “due to no current registration, false information to a police officer, and obstruction of a private driveway.” The officer also stated [u]pon completing an impound inventory, per department directive,” he found a black cloth bag containing multiple items of drug paraphernalia and a clear plastic container of a white crystalline substance, which tested positive for the presence of methamphetamine. The district court issued a search warrant for the vehicle based upon the affidavit. The officer executed the search warrant and found additional used syringes and what resembled a drug transaction ledger.

[¶ 4] Pogue was charged with four counts of possession of a controlled substance and two counts of possession of drug paraphernalia. Pogue moved to suppress the evidence found as a result of the inventory search. Neither party requested a hearing, and no hearing was held. The district court granted Pogue's suppression motion, concluding the vehicle was not impounded for caretaking or safety concerns, therefore, the inventory search exception did not apply. The State moved the district court to reconsider. Pogue responded arguing a motion to reconsider is not an available remedy under North Dakota law and the appropriate remedy is to appeal.

[¶ 5] The State appealed the district court's order granting Pogue's suppression motion, before the district court ruled on its motion to reconsider. The State argues the district court erred when it granted Pogue's motion to suppress because the initial warrantless search qualified as an inventory search, an exception to the warrant requirement. Alternatively, the State argues the district court's order granting Pogue's motion to suppress should be reversed because the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies. Pogue argues the State's appeal is not ripe for review because the State appealed before the district court ruled on its motion to reconsider.

II

[¶ 6] As a preliminary matter, we address Pogue's argument that the State's appeal is not ripe for review because the State filed its notice of appeal before the district court ruled on its motion to reconsider. Under N.D.R.App.P. 4(b)(1)(B), the State must file the notice of appeal within 30 days after entry of the order being appealed. A motion for reconsideration does not toll the time for filing a notice of appeal. See State, ex rel. Harris v. Lee, 2010 ND 88, 782 N.W.2d 626 (granting a supervisory writ to address the jurisdiction of the district court where the State failed to timely file an appeal when the district court denied the motion for reconsideration after the deadline to appeal had passed). The State could have lost its opportunity to file a timely notice of appeal, had it waited for the district court to rule on its motion to reconsider because the State's motion to reconsider would not have tolled the time for filing a notice of appeal from the district court's order suppressing evidence. Therefore, the State properly filed a notice of appeal in order to avoid losing the opportunity to appeal. As such, we conclude the appeal is ripe for review.

III

[¶ 7] The State argues the district court erred by granting Pogue's motion to suppress because the initial warrantless search of Pogue's vehicle qualified as an inventory search, which is an exception to the warrant requirement. Pogue argues the initial warrantless search of Pogue's vehicle does not qualify as a valid inventory search because 1) law enforcement did not impound Pogue's vehicle under its caretaking function, and 2) law enforcement failed to follow its written directive for impounding and inventorying vehicles.

[¶ 8] This Court reviews a trial court's decision on a motion to suppress as follows:

[W]e give deference to the district court's findings of fact and we resolve conflicts in testimony in favor of affirmance. State v. Tognotti, 2003 ND 99, ¶ 5, 663 N.W.2d 642. We “will not reverse a district court decision on a motion to suppress ... if there is sufficient competent evidence capable of supporting the court's findings, and if the decision is not contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence.” State v. Gefroh, 2011 ND 153, ¶ 7, 801 N.W.2d 429. Questions of law are fully reviewable on appeal, and whether a finding of fact meets a legal standard is a question of law. Id. State v. Reis, 2014 ND 30, ¶ 8, 842 N.W.2d 845. Whether law enforcement violated constitutional prohibitions against unreasonable search and seizure is a question of law. State v. Uran, 2008 ND 223, ¶ 5, 758 N.W.2d 727.

[¶ 9] The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution protects against unreasonable searches and seizures. State v. Holly, 2013 ND 94, ¶ 12, 833 N.W.2d 15. A search, within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, is an intrusion into a person's reasonable expectation of privacy. State v. Gregg, 2000 ND 154, ¶ 22, 615 N.W.2d 515. “When an individual reasonably expects privacy in an area, the government, under the Fourth Amendment, must obtain a search warrant unless the intrusion falls within a recognized exception to the warrant requirement.” Gregg, 2000 ND 154, ¶ 23, 615 N.W.2d 515. If no exception applies, the evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment must be suppressed as inadmissible under the exclusionary rule. Id.

[¶ 10] “A person alleging his rights have been violated under the Fourth Amendment has an initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of illegal seizure. However, after the defendant has made a prima facie case, the burden of persuasion is shifted to the State to justify its actions.” City of Fargo v. Sivertson, 1997 ND 204, ¶ 6, 571 N.W.2d 137 (citation omitted). The movant initially has the burden to make specific allegations of illegality and to produce evidence to persuade the court the evidence should be suppressed. State v. Glaesman, 545 N.W.2d 178, 182 n. 1 (N.D.1996).

[¶ 11] Here, Pogue satisfied her burden to establish a prima facie case of an illegal seizure when she moved to suppress all evidence obtained as a result of the initial warrantless search of her vehicle and attached a portion of the arrest report discussing the reasons for the impound of the vehicle and describing the searches. The State conceded as much by generally agreeing to the facts set forth in Pogue's exhibit in its response to the motion. The burden of persuasion then shifted to the State to justify its actions, by showing an exception to the warrant requirement applied. State v. Lanctot, 1998 ND 216, ¶ 8, 587 N.W.2d 568.

[¶ 12] In its response to Pogue's motion to suppress, the State argued the initial warrantless search of Pogue's vehicle qualified as an inventory search. The only evidence produced by the State was four exhibits to its response to Pogue's motion: 1) Watford City Police Department's Written Directive for Impounding Vehicles; 2) Officer Langowski's Affidavit in Support of the Application for the Search Warrant; 3) the Search Warrant; and 4) the Search Warrant Receipt and Inventory.

[¶ 13] A valid inventory search qualifies as an exception to the warrant requirement. Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 371, 107 S.Ct. 738, 93 L.Ed.2d 739 (1987). Three needs may justify local police departments' routine practice of securing and inventorying an impounded automobile's contents: (1) the protection of the owner's property while it remains in police custody; (2) the protection of the police against claims or disputes over lost or stolen property; and (3) the protection of the police from potential danger.” State v. Muralt, 376 N.W.2d 25, 26 (N.D.1985). This Court has explained the analysis applied in automobile inventory search cas...

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8 cases
  • State v. Schmidt
    • United States
    • North Dakota Supreme Court
    • September 15, 2016
    ...of illegality and to produce evidence to persuade the court the evidence should be suppressed.” State v. Pogue, 2015 N.D. 211, ¶ 10, 868 N.W.2d 522 (citing State v. Glaesman, 545 N.W.2d 178, 182 n. 1 (N.D.1996) ). Whether law enforcement violated constitutional prohibitions against unreason......
  • State v. Gardner
    • United States
    • North Dakota Supreme Court
    • May 16, 2019
    ...the burden of overcoming the presumption that a warrantless search or seizure is unreasonable. State v. Pogue , 2015 ND 211, ¶¶ 10-11, 868 N.W.2d 522 ; 5 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 11.2(b), p. 38 (3d ed. 1996) (stating "if the search or seizure was pursuant to a warrant, the defe......
  • State v. Valles
    • United States
    • North Dakota Supreme Court
    • April 11, 2019
    ...182 n.1 (N.D. 1996) ). The State then bears the burden to justify a warrantless search or seizure. State v. Pogue , 2015 ND 211, ¶ 10, 868 N.W.2d 522. [¶6] Valles argued in his motion to suppress that his cell phone had been searched by Devils Lake police officers without a warrant. The Sta......
  • State v. Miller
    • United States
    • South Carolina Supreme Court
    • May 9, 2018
    ...lots," even though it "explicitly authorizes the impoundment of vehicles from public property." 796 F.3d at 1250.In State v. Pogue , 868 N.W.2d 522 (N.D. 2015), a case relied on by the dissent, the Supreme Court of North Dakota stated,The impounding of a vehicle passes constitutional muster......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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