State v. Pollard, 92-592
| Decision Date | 20 January 1995 |
| Docket Number | No. 92-592,92-592 |
| Court | Vermont Supreme Court |
| Parties | STATE of Vermont v. Minoca POLLARD, a/k/a Monica Pollard. |
Jo-Ann L. Gross, Franklin County Deputy State's Atty., St. Albans, for plaintiff-appellee.
T. Lamar Enzor, Rutland, for defendant-appellant.
Before ALLEN, C.J., and GIBSON, DOOLEY, MORSE and JOHNSON, JJ.
Defendant Monica Pollard, who pled guilty to second-degree murder and was sentenced to a term of fifty years to life imprisonment, appeals his conviction and sentence. We are called upon to review the trial court's rulings that defendant was competent to plead guilty and to waive counsel. Upon review of the record, we conclude that there was insufficient support for the court's competency determinations; accordingly, we reverse.
On July 9, 1985, defendant fatally stabbed a man in a department store in St. Albans, apparently, because the victim accused him of shoplifting a pair of shoes. Defendant admitted the stabbing at the crime scene, first to the store manager and then to police. Counsel was appointed, and defendant appeared the next day with two public defenders for arraignment on charges of second-degree murder.
Although the offense had occurred only the day before the arraignment, defendant insisted on entering a plea of guilty, contrary to the advice of his attorneys, who had urged him at least to wait twenty-four hours. After making the following observations, which it noted would not be revealed by the transcript, the court, sua sponte, ordered a competency evaluation.
The defendant appeared anxious and upset over the proceedings. He appeared eager to plead guilty and get the matter over with in a hurry. His eyes appeared to roll back on occasion as he talked. He smiled and grinned frequently when it was inappropriate to the occasion or to his situation. At other times, he appeared angry and hostile. He spoke in terms which suggested an intelligent vocabulary, but with words which did not always make sense in the context they were used. His conversation rambled at times. He appeared eager to talk, but unwilling to listen to either his attorneys or the Court. He frequently crossed his arms, and appeared to be holding his breath as though trying to control something inside himself or to restrain himself. His responses to questions from the Court were frequently inappropriate in context or unintelligible. While he insisted he understood the nature of the proceedings and his procedural and constitutional rights, it was apparent to the Court that he did not. He appeared defiant against the judicial system. He insisted he was not going to the State Hospital. He indicated that he did not mix well with people and demanded that he be held in "quarantine" at the correctional center.
The examination was undertaken by Dr. John O. Ives, who testified at a competency hearing on September 5, 1985, before a different judge. Based on his forty-five-minute examination of defendant, Dr. Ives testified that defendant was competent to stand trial. The doctor's direct testimony covered only eight pages of transcript. Dr. Ives noted that defendant had an unusual pattern of speech, particularly in his lengthy responses to questions about legal matters. From each such response, Dr. Ives stated, he was able to "extract from each paragraph a sentence" showing comprehension of the question. Dr. Ives did not believe that defendant's unusual speech pattern was a feature of any known psychiatric illness.
The doctor testified that he asked defendant "the usual questions regarding the offense ... and the functions of the court and its officers." When he was asked if he had talked to defendant about defendant's ability to communicate with his counsel, Dr. Ives replied that defendant said he would not cooperate with counsel regarding an insanity defense or a reduced charge because he considered himself sane and because he considered murder, not manslaughter, to be the appropriate charge. Dr. Ives also testified that defendant's desire to plead guilty may be explained by the fact that he was "institutionalized"--that he felt comfortable and secure in an institutional environment. On cross-examination, the doctor stated that he neither paid attention to, nor relied on, the interaction between defendant and his counsel during the interview. He indicated that his understanding of the competence evaluation was that the defendant must comprehend the offense with which he is charged and the functions of a court and its officers.
A curious event occurred following Dr. Ives's testimony. Apparently, defendant insisted to his counsel that he wanted to take the stand. Counsel informed the court that defendant was taking the stand against his advice. When defendant took the stand, his lawyer asked him to state his name, which he did. Counsel then stated he had no further questions. There were no questions on cross-examination. Defendant was told to retake his seat, and he did so without incident. The trial court issued written findings and conclusions of law, which tracked the limited testimony of Dr. Ives, with this additional finding:
The Defendant took the stand, with the consent of his Guardian Ad Litem, and responded to a question by his lawyer in a forthright manner. After he was excused, he took his seat without objecting or becoming unmanageable.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Based on Dr. Ives' testimony, the court concluded that defendant was competent to enter a guilty plea to the charges. The guardian ad litem who had been appointed prior to the competency hearing was discharged. At a second arraignment hearing on September 12, 1985, defendant pled guilty to second-degree murder. The court accepted the plea and ordered a presentence investigation report for the sentencing hearing.
The day before the October 25 sentencing hearing, defendant's appointed counsel moved to withdraw from the case. At the hearing, the court initially denied the attorneys' motion, but granted the request after defendant indicated during the following colloquy that he wanted to proceed pro se:
The Court: Now, if I do permit these two attorneys to withdraw and if you want to go ahead and represent yourself; is that what you want?
Defendant: Pro se, like you.
The Court: You want to represent yourself pro se?
Defendant: Most certainly, exactly.
The Court: Any doubts in your mind about that?
Defendant: No doubt whatsoever. I think we've already reiterated that.
The Court: Now, let me ask you this: If you do represent yourself, ... you understand that you cannot afterwards claim any inadequacy of representation?
Defendant: I most certainly cannot. I assume a matter of an individual entering their plea of guilty to adverse effects, that they waive all their rights.
Like I say, waive all their rights to trial and anything adamant to stand on the grounds that preview--like I said, would follow the previews and the entrance of fact of a post-conviction sentencing, and the withdrawal of plea, appeal, and the matter of collateral attack.
....
The Court: Are you aware of the dangers of self-representation?
....
Defendant: Exactly. Like I say, I practiced law in California before. You know, you individuals don't really have all the scoop on my past. You have a little there. It's basically primarily excerpts, but I've got an epilogue that is precise and concise on my own; you see what I'm saying?
Like I say, you've very few. And I practiced law in California myself before, and I'm very aware of the matter of pro person and a pro se and all things of that nature, and we are definitely aware of the 5th, the 6th, and the 14th Amendment to the Constitution regarding due process of law.
Just say, in this particular instance, due process of law in the 14th amendment, we're aware of the constitutionality.
The Court: How old were you when you first starting studying law?
Defendant: Excuse me? Oh, 19 years old. Six years ago.
....
The Court: And have you acquainted yourself with the statutes of what states?
Defendant: Excuse me? What states? California. California. Well, actually, that's the only state in which I've really been in for the past five years prior to my coming out to the--out to the State of New York to do some novelist work.
....
The Court: You understand that if I ... allow you to represent yourself and discharge your attorneys, ... you understand that you must follow all the technical laws here of substantive law, the criminal procedure and the evidence?
Defendant: Most certainly.
....
The Court: Right, and you understand you're going to be up against someone who's a member of the bar?
Defendant: I understand that individual is a member of the bar, right.
The Court: And is the attorney of this county and is the prosecutor of this county?
Defendant: I'm aware of the disposition. I'm aware of the disposition, exactly.
Although the court permitted defendant to proceed pre se, it instructed defendant's attorneys to remain at his side during the remainder of the hearing to answer any questions that defendant might have. Defendant offered no mitigating evidence before he was sentenced. In fact, he offered aggravating evidence, agreeing with the State that he was dangerous, and stating that, under the same circumstances, he would act in the same manner as he had before.
On appeal, defendant makes two claims. First, he contends that the court erred in finding him competent to plead guilty and in failing to advise him of his rights before accepting the plea. Second, defendant asserts that the court denied him his constitutional right to counsel at the sentencing hearing by allowing him to represent himself.
Defendant argues that the court erroneously found him competent to enter a guilty plea, and that because he lacked the competence to enter the plea, he could not, in pleading guilty, knowingly and voluntarily waive his rights to trial, to confrontation of witnesses, and against...
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State v. Cleary, 01-289.
...may be impaired, the court has a responsibility to delve further to determine the defendant's comprehension"); cf. State v. Pollard, 163 Vt. 199, 207, 657 A.2d 185, 190 (1995) (given defendant's acknowledged mental problems, trial court should have engaged defendant in full-scale inquiry co......
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State v. Lee, 07-334.
...that we require a personal waiver based on a record colloquy for a defendant to waive the right to counsel. State v. Pollard, 163 Vt. 199, 206-07, 657 A.2d 185, 190-91 (1995), or the insanity defense, State v. Brown, 2005 VT 104, ¶ 39, 179 Vt. 22, 890 A.2d 79. This Court examined a similar ......
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State v. Bean
...competent, his conduct was so bizarre that it showed him to be incompetent. His argument is based largely on State v. Pollard, 163 Vt. 199, 205-06, 657 A.2d 185, 189-90 (1995), in which we found a determination that defendant was competent to be erroneous even though it was supported by the......
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State v. Bean
...VI; Vt. Const. ch. I, art. 10. The right can be waived if the waiver is made knowingly and intelligently. See State v. Pollard, 163 Vt. 199, ----, 657 A.2d 185, 190 (1995). Waiver of this right will not be inferred from doubtful conduct, however, and courts will "indulge every reasonable pr......