State v. Pontbriand

Decision Date18 February 2005
Docket NumberNo. 03-537.,03-537.
PartiesSTATE of Vermont v. Shawn PONTBRIAND.
CourtVermont Supreme Court

Robert Simpson, Chittenden County State's Attorney, and Pamela Hall Johnson, Deputy State's Attorney, Burlington, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Matthew F. Valerio, Defender General, and Henry Hinton, Appellate Attorney, Montpelier, for Defendant-Appellee.

Present: AMESTOY, C.J.,1 DOOLEY, JOHNSON, SKOGLUND and REIBER, JJ., and C.J. ALLEN (Ret.),2 Specially Assigned.

SKOGLUND, J.

The State appeals a trial court order suppressing statements defendant Shawn Pontbriand made to law enforcement officers before his arrest. The trial court found that Pontbriand was in police custody at the time the statements were made, and that the officers improperly reinitiated questioning after Pontbriand invoked his right to counsel. We reverse.

¶ 2. In early May 2002, the Chittenden Unit for Special Investigations began investigating Pontbriand's relationship with the minor daughters of his girlfriend, T.N. During this investigation, T.N. contacted the police after Pontbriand sent her an e-mail in which he admitted to having an inappropriate sexual relationship with one of the girls. The following day, Pontbriand collapsed and was transported to Fletcher Allen Hospital, where he was diagnosed initially with dehydration and later with cancer.

¶ 3. State Police Corporal James Claremont and Detective Sergeant Jennifer Morrison of the Burlington Police Department came to Fletcher Allen to interview Pontbriand the morning he was hospitalized. When they arrived, he was in bed and a medical technician was performing diagnostic tests on him. After the technician left the room, they introduced themselves as detectives who investigate sexual offenses. They brought a printed copy of the incriminating e-mail Pontbriand had sent to his girlfriend and held the copy so that Pontbriand could see it. Corporal Claremont told Pontbriand they were sure he knew why they had come. At that point, Pontbriand indicated that he wanted to talk to a lawyer.

¶ 4. Detective Sergeant Morrison testified that she immediately replied by saying that they would respect that, but explained to Pontbriand that this was his opportunity to tell his side of the story and that they were not going to come back again.

¶ 5. At the suppression hearing, the State submitted a compact disc recording of the hospital conversation, on which Pontbriand is heard to say he wanted to take care of the problem, and that he wanted to solve it. Corporal Claremont repeated that he was not under arrest, and that he did not have to talk to them. After more conversation in which Pontbriand stated that he did not want to run from the problem, Detective Sergeant Morrison again told him that his cooperation had to be voluntary if they were going to continue talking, and that they would not force him to talk. Both officers made clear that they could not promise not to arrest him.

¶ 6. The trial court found that Pontbriand informed the investigating officers "he wanted to talk to them and that he would do so without speaking to a lawyer."

¶ 7. Corporal Claremont then began to ask him questions about the alleged abuse, and Pontbriand made incriminating statements in response. At the close of the interview, the investigating officers informed him that he was under arrest. Based on his statements and other evidence, Pontbriand was charged with aggravated sexual assault and lewd and lascivious conduct with a child.

¶ 8. Pontbriand moved to suppress the statements he made to police, alleging (1) that he was in police custody at the time of questioning and that the investigating officers were therefore barred from reinitiating interrogation after he requested a lawyer, and (2) that his statements were coerced and therefore inadmissible. The trial court granted his motion to suppress, concluding that Pontbriand was in custody for purposes of Miranda, that the police failed to give the warnings required by Miranda, and, therefore, that any statements Pontbriand made could not be used as evidence against him at trial. The State then filed this interlocutory appeal.

¶ 9. On appeal, the State contends that the trial court erred when it found that Pontbriand was in police custody at the time of questioning, rendering his statements inadmissible under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). We agree.

¶ 10. Under Miranda, as currently applied, the police must stop questioning a suspect who is in custody after he or she requests an attorney. State v. Trombley, 147 Vt. 371, 374, 518 A.2d 20, 23 (1986) (quoting Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981)). No such requirement exists, however, for suspects who are not in custody. See McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 181-82, 111 S.Ct. 2204, 115 L.Ed.2d 158 (1991) (suspect cannot preemptively invoke Miranda rights by requesting counsel before custody is established); State v. Garbutt, 173 Vt. 277, 282, 790 A.2d 444, 448 (2001) (noting that Miranda warnings are not required for suspects not in custody). A defendant seeking to suppress statements under this rule has the burden of proving that he or she was in police custody when the incriminating statements were made. State v. LeClaire, 2003 VT 4, ¶ 15, 175 Vt. 52, 819 A.2d 719.

¶ 11. The essential question in determining whether a defendant was in custody for Miranda purposes "is simply whether there is a formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest." Id. ¶ 16 (internal quotations omitted). The U.S. Supreme Court has made clear that under this standard

a noncustodial situation is not converted to one in which Miranda applies simply because ... in the absence of any formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement, the questioning took place in a "coercive environment." Any interview of one suspected of a crime by a police officer will have coercive aspects to it, simply by virtue of the fact that the police officer is part of a law enforcement system which may ultimately cause the suspect to be charged with a crime.
But police officers are not required to administer Miranda warnings to [suspects who are not in custody].

Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495, 97 S.Ct. 711, 50 L.Ed.2d 714 (1977) (per curiam). To determine whether a suspect is in custody, courts should look for "situations approximating `incommunicado interrogation of individuals in a police-dominated atmosphere,'" State v. Willis, 145 Vt. 459, 475, 494 A.2d 108, 117 (1985) (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 445, 86 S.Ct. 1602), and must consider "the totality of the circumstances to determine if a reasonable person would believe he or she were free to leave or to refuse to answer police questioning," id. (emphasis added). The suspect's subjective belief as to his or her custody status is irrelevant in this determination. Garbutt, 173 Vt. at 282, 790 A.2d at 448. The beliefs or intentions of the investigating officers conducting the interview are relevant only if communicated to the suspect, and only to the extent they might cause a reasonable person to believe he or she is in custody. Id.

¶ 12. On appeal of a motion to suppress, we accept the trial court's underlying factual findings so long as they are not clearly erroneous, but review conclusions of law de novo. State v. Lawrence, 2003 VT 68, ¶¶ 8-9, 175 Vt. 600, 834 A.2d 10 (mem.). Therefore, the trial court's findings of fact regarding the course of the interview receive deference, but its ultimate legal determination that the totality of the circumstances would have led a reasonable person to believe that he or she was in custody is reviewed de novo. The U.S. Supreme Court has explained that in determining whether a person was in custody for Miranda purposes, "[t]wo discrete inquiries are essential . . . first, what were the circumstances surrounding the interrogation; and second, given those circumstances, would a reasonable person have felt he or she was not at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave." Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 112, 116 S.Ct. 457, 133 L.Ed.2d 383 (1995) (footnotes omitted) (examining suppression of testimony on Miranda grounds in the context of a federal habeas corpus claim). The Court identified the second inquiry as a "`mixed question of law and fact' qualifying for independent review." Id. at 113, 116 S.Ct. 457. We recently employed this standard of review in the Miranda context in State v. Beer, 2004 VT 99, ¶¶ 24-27, 177 Vt. 245, 864 A.2d 643.

¶ 13. In concluding that Pontbriand was in custody, the trial court relied on the following findings: Pontbriand was hospitalized; Pontbriand could see the incriminating e-mail he sent to T.N.; the investigating officers told Pontbriand that they were aware of the situation; and the investigating officers' physical positions during the interview. As explained below, the totality of the circumstances surrounding Pontbriand's questioning does not support a finding that he was in police custody at any point before he was arrested at the close of the interview.

¶ 14. As a preliminary matter, we note that despite the trial court's apparent reliance on the fact that Pontbriand was "sick in a hospital bed" during the interview, any difficulty he might have had leaving his hospital room as a result of his illness is not determinative of the custody inquiry. Custodial interrogation is the questioning of a suspect where the suspect "is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom by the authorities in any significant way." Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478,86 S.Ct. 1602 (emphasis added). Federal appellate courts and a substantial majority of state courts have found that custody is not established merely because a suspect is unable to leave the hospital due to his or her medical condition. See, e.g., United States v. Robertson, 19 F.3d...

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