State v. Pontiff

Decision Date02 October 2019
Docket Number18-273
PartiesSTATE OF LOUISIANA v. JARED PAUL PONTIFF
CourtCourt of Appeal of Louisiana — District of US

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

HONORABLE STEVE GUNNELL, DISTRICT JUDGE

JUDGE VAN H. KYZAR

Court composed of Sylvia R. Cooks, John E. Conery, and Van H. Kyzar, Judges.

WRIT DENIED.

Jared Paul Pontiff
Hunt Correctional Center

P. O. Box 174

St Gabriel, LA 70776

In Proper Person
Michael C. Cassidy
District Attorney
Thirty-First Judicial District

P. O. Box 1388

Jennings, LA 70546

(337) 824-1893

COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:

State of Louisiana

KYZAR, Judge.

Relator, Jared Paul Pontiff, seeks review of the trial court's denial of his postconviction relief application. For the reasons set forth herein, we deny the Relator's writ application.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On January 27, 2014, Relator was convicted of one count of sexual battery of an eight-year-old child and sentenced to thirty years at hard labor, with twenty-five years to be served without the benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence. Relator's conviction and sentence were affirmed by this court on May 6, 2015, and Relator's writ application to the supreme court was denied on October 28, 2016. State v. Pontiff, 14-1049 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/6/15), 166 So.3d 1120, writ denied, 15-1107 (La. 10/28/16), 209 So.3d 94.

Relator filed a post-conviction relief application in the trial court, which was dismissed on February 15, 2018. On April 5, 2018, Relator filed the current writ application in which he states that on September 27, 2017, he petitioned the trial court for a copy of his trial transcript in order to file his post-conviction relief application. According to Relator, the trial court granted Relator's request as to court minutes but denied his request as to the trial transcript. Relator sought review by filing a writ application in this court. On July 24, 2018, this court denied Relator's request for a copy of his trial transcript, stating the following:

WRIT DENIED: Relator filed a writ application with this court seeking review of the trial court's September 27, 2017 "ORDER GRANTING PRODUCTION IN PART AND DENYING IN PART." Relator is asking this court to order the trial court to provide him with a copy of the transcript of his trial proceedings. The requested document is not one Relator is entitled to free of charge. . Because Relator does not allege that he made a showing of particularized need by properly filing an application for post-conviction relief with the trial court establishing a need to obtain the document, he is not entitled to a free copy of the requested document. State ex rel Bernard v. Criminal Dist. Ct.' Section "J.", 94-2247 (La. 4/28/95), 653 So.2d 1 174. Accordingly, Relator's writ application is denied.

State v. Pontiff, 17-976 (La.App. 3 Cir. 7/24/18) (unpublished opinion).

In Relator's current writ application, he relies upon the court minutes to set forth his assignments of error and reserved his right to file a supplemental writ application once he received the trial transcript. No supplemental writ application was submitted regarding Relator's need for the transcript.

DISCUSSION

In his writ application, Relator argues three allegations of error in his trial that he claims entitle him to relief. First, he asserts that the trial court erred in partially closing the courtroom during the testimony of the minor victims of his alleged crimes, and alternatively, if this court deems the error waived in the absence of an objection by his counsel to the closure, that such amounts to ineffective assistance of counsel. He next asserts that the trial court erred in refusing to revisit the issue raised on direct appeal wherein Relator challenged the trial court's denial of his right to subpoena and question a juror post-verdict about her omission of relevant information during voir dire, the trial court's denial of his right to subpoena and question other jurors concerning the improprieties of the juror during deliberations, and the trial court's denial of Relator's motion for new trial based on these allegations.

Partial Courtroom Closure

Relator first argues that the trial court erred in partially closing the courtroom without a hearing and without stating the reasons for the closure. Relator argues that the denial of the right to a public trial is a structural due process claim, citing Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 111 S.Ct. 1246 (1991). In Fulminante, the Supreme Court cited Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 104 S.Ct. 2210 (1984), for the proposition that the right to a public trial is a constitutional error not subject to the harmless error analysis. In Waller, the Supreme Court acknowledged that specific prejudice need not be shown for such a violation.

In his second assignment of error, Relator acknowledges that his counsel did not object to the partial closure of the courtroom, but argues, in the alternative, that his counsel was ineffective for failing to object. Relator argues that if his claim was waived by his counsel's failure to object to the closure of the courtroom, then his counsel was ineffective in failing to object and in preserving his right to a public trial. See State v. Arisme, 13-269 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/9/13), 123 So.3d 1259; Uniform Rules—Courts of Appeal, Rule 1-3.

We first address Relator's claim that the partial closure of the courtroom for the minors' testimony is a structural error, thus, calling for a reversal of the conviction regardless of a showing of actual prejudice, or whether it should be treated as a non-preserved error that must be relegated to an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.

In Weaver v. Massachusetts, ___ U.S. ___, 137 S.Ct. 1899 (2017), the Supreme Court recognized that in a direct review context, a courtroom closure has been treated as a structural error, entitling a defendant to automatic reversal without any inquiry into prejudice. The question before the Court in Weaver was whether the "prejudice inquiry is altered when the structural error is raised in the context of an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim." Weaver, 137 S.Ct. at 1905. The Court stated:

So although the public-trial right is structural, it is subject to exceptions. See Simonson, The Criminal Court Audience in a Post-Trial World, 127 Harv. L. Rev. 2173, 2219-2222 (2014) (discussing situations in which a trial court may order a courtroom closure). Though these cases should be rare, a judge may deprive a defendant of his right to an open courtroom by making proper factual findings in support of the decision to do so. See Waller, supra, at 45, 104 S.Ct. 2210. The fact that the public-trial right is subject to these exceptions suggests that not every public-trial violation results in fundamental unfairness.
A public-trial violation can occur, moreover, as it did in Presley [v. Georgia, 558 U.S. 209, 130 S.Ct. 721 (2010)], simply because the trial court omits to make the proper findings before closing the courtroom, even if those findings might have been fully supported by the evidence. See 558 U.S., at 215, 130 S.Ct. 721. It would be unconvincing to deem a trial fundamentally unfair just because a judge omitted to announce factual findings before making an otherwise valid decision to order the courtroom temporarily closed. As a result, it would be likewise unconvincing if the Court had said that a public-trial violation always leads to a fundamentally unfair trial.
Indeed, the Court has not said that a public-trial violation renders a trial fundamentally unfair in every case. In the two cases in which the Court has discussed the reasons for classifying a public-trial violation as structural error, the Court has said that a public-trial violation is structural for a different reason: because of the "difficulty of assessing the effect of the error." Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S., at 149, n. 4, 126 S.Ct. 2557; see also Waller, supra, at 49, n. 9, 104 S.Ct. 2210.
The public-trial right also protects some interests that do not belong to the defendant. After all, the right to an open courtroom protects the rights of the public at large, and the press, as well as the rights of the accused. See, e.g., Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., Riverside Cty., 464 U.S. 501, 508-510, 104 S.Ct. 819, 78 L.Ed.2d 629 (1984); Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 572-573, 100 S.Ct. 2814, 65 L.Ed.2d 973 (1980). So one other factor leading to the classification of structural error is that the public trial right furthers interests other than protecting the defendant against unjust conviction. These precepts confirm the conclusion the Court now reaches that, while the public-trial right is important for fundamental reasons, in some cases an unlawful closure might take place and yet the trial still will be fundamentally fair from the defendant's standpoint.
The Court now turns to the proper remedy for addressing the violation of a structural right, and in particular the right to a public trial. Despite its name, the term "structural error" carries with it no talismanic significance as a doctrinal matter. It means only that the government is not entitled to deprive the defendant of a new trial by showing that the error was "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." Chapman [v. California], 386 U.S. [18], at 24, 87 S.Ct. 824 [967)]. Thus, in the case of a structural error where there is an objection at trial and the issue is raised on direct appeal, the defendant generally is entitled to "automatic reversal" regardless of the error's actual "effect on the outcome." Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 7, 119 S.Ct. 1827, 144 L.Ed.2d 35 (1999).
The question then becomes what showing is necessary when the defendant does not preserve a structural error on direct review but raises it later in the context of an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim. To obtain relief on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel, the defendant as a
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