State v. Poole

• Decision Date: 25 June 2021
• Docket Number: A-0128-19
• Citation: State v. Poole, A-0128-19 (N.J. Super. App. Div. Jun 25, 2021)
• Parties: STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. BRUCE A. POOLE, a/k/a BRUCE POOL, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: New Jersey Superior Court — Appellate Division

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. BRUCE A. POOLE, a/k/a BRUCE POOL, Defendant-Appellant.

No. A-0128-19

Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division

June 25, 2021

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

Submitted April 28, 2021

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division Mercer County, Indictment No. 18-08-0457.

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (Daniel S. Rockoff, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, of counsel and on the brief).

Angelo J. Onofri, Mercer County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Taylor S. Hicks, Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).

Before Judges Vernoia and Enright.

PER CURIAM.

Following the denial of his motion to suppress a handgun seized from his pocket during a pat-down frisk by police, defendant Bruce A. Poole pleaded guilty to second-degree certain persons not to possess weapons, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7(b)(1), and was sentenced to a five-year custodial term with a five-year period of parole ineligibility. Defendant appeals from his conviction challenging the denial of his suppression motion. Defendant contends the frisk was unlawful because the State's evidence did not establish the police had a reasonable suspicion he possessed a weapon, and the search of his person was otherwise improper because the police did not have probable cause to believe he possessed marijuana. Unpersuaded by defendant's arguments, we affirm.

I.

During the hearing on defendant's suppression motion, the State presented the testimony of Trenton Police Department officer Chelsea Quinlan and detective Matthew Hutchinson. Their testimony, which the court found credible, established that during the afternoon of June 27, 2018, Quinlan and police officer John Murphy responded in a marked police vehicle to a report of "shots fired" on East State Street in Trenton.^[1] The location at which it was reported the shots were fired is within a known high-crime area characterized by illegal narcotics distribution and gun violence. Days earlier, there was a homicide, as well as a separate shooting, in the area. The Trenton Police Department's Intelligence Unit had reported to the officers and detectives that gangs were going "back and forth retaliating against each other for the shootings."

As Quinlan and Murphy approached East State Street in their marked patrol vehicle with its lights and siren activated Quinlan observed a black Chevy Impala with "heavily tinted windows" in the "front and back" and a temporary Pennsylvania license plate traveling towards them "at a high rate of speed." The Impala made a "wide left turn." Quinlan testified vehicles with heavily tinted windows and temporary license plates are frequently used in drive-by shootings, and that heavily tinted windows constituted a violation of the motor vehicle code. The Impala was traveling in a direction away from the location Quinlan understood the reported shots had been fired.

The officers conducted a motor vehicle stop of the Impala. Quinlan approached the driver's side of the vehicle, and Murphy approached the passenger side. The officers observed three people in the car: the driver, defendant; a front passenger; and a rear passenger. The officers also detected the odor of marijuana emanating from the vehicle.

Quinlan and Murphy returned to their patrol car and requested backup officers for safety reasons because there were two officers on the scene and three occupants in the Impala. While in their patrol car, the officers were informed the "shots fired" call they had received was a false alarm and the alleged shots had been firecrackers.

Hutchinson, who was assigned to the Trenton Police Department's Street Crimes Unit, and his partner, Detective Vitter, responded to the scene of the motor vehicle stop.^[2] They parked their police vehicle in front of the Impala. After exiting the car, Vitter directed the occupants of the Impala "to show their hands and keep [their] hands where [the officers] could see them." The two passengers in the vehicle complied with Vitter's directive, but defendant did not. Instead, he made "movements toward[s] his lap area." As Hutchinson moved towards the Impala, he detected the odor of marijuana emanating from it.

After conferring with Hutchinson, Quinlan advised the Impala's occupants that she smelled marijuana and asked them to remove themselves from the car. Hutchinson removed defendant, who appeared to be "preoccupied with something in his pants pocket," almost as if he was trying to hide something. Hutchinson observed that defendant kept looking "back and forth" "towards" his pocket, he kept "his hand towards his lap area, his pocket area, almost to be in that specific area of his pocket," and "it seemed like there was something in [defendant's] pocket he didn't want [Hutchinson] to see." Hutchinson testified defendant's movements towards his lap area, his noncompliance with the initial order to show his hands, the recent and recurring gun violence in the high-crime area where the Impala was stopped, and Hutchinson's suspicion that defendant possessed marijuana caused him to believe that defendant might possess a weapon. Hutchinson therefore decided to conduct a pat-down frisk of defendant for weapons.

While performing the frisk, Hutchinson felt the outline of an object in defendant's pocket he recognized as consistent with the size and shape of a handgun. Hutchinson seized the object, a .22 caliber semi-automatic handgun, from defendant's pocket. Officers arrested defendant and subsequently searched the Impala, where they found and seized marijuana in the front driver's side floorboard.

Following the presentation of evidence at the suppression hearing, the court found the officers had reasonable suspicion to stop the Impala for the motor vehicle violations of careless driving, N.J.S.A. 39:4-97, and having heavily tinted windows, N.J.S.A. 39:3-75. The court noted the officers observed the Impala traveling at a high rate of speed and turning abruptly, and the car was stopped in a high-crime area. The court further found removal of defendant from the car was lawful because the officers detected the "distinct odor of marijuana emanating from the vehicle."

The court found Hutchinson's pat-down frisk was proper because defendant "was concerned with his pocket," he "was the one who was operating the vehicle" when it was stopped, "and the smell of weed . . . emanated from the car." The court further determined the officers had probable cause to search the vehicle because they seized a handgun from defendant and otherwise detected the odor of marijuana emanating from the vehicle.

The court entered an order denying defendant's motion to suppress evidence seized without a warrant. Defendant subsequently pleaded guilty to second-degree certain persons not to possess weapons, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7(b)(1), and was sentenced to a five-year custodial term with a five-year parole ineligibility period.^[3] This appeal followed.

Defendant presents the following argument for our consideration:

POINT I

AFTER OFFICERS LEARNED THAT A REPORT OF SHOTS FIRED IN THE AREA WAS FALSE, THERE WAS NO CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS TO FRISK THE OCCUPANTS OF [THE] STOPPED CAR. U.S. Const., [a]mends. IV, XIV; N.J. Const., [a]rt. I., [¶] 7.

II.

"When [an appellate court] review[s] a trial court's denial or grant of a motion to suppress, [it] 'defer[s] to the factual findings of the trial court so long as those findings are supported by sufficient evidence in the record.'" State v. Vincenty, 237 N.J. 122, 131-32 (2019) (quoting State v. Hubbard, 222 N.J. 249, 262 (2015)). We defer to the trial court's factual findings unless they are "clearly mistaken." State v. Hathaway, 222 N.J. 453, 467 (2015). In contrast, "[a] trial court's interpretation of the law . . . and the consequences that flow from established facts are not entitled to any special deference." State v. Gamble, 218 N.J. 412, 425 (2014).

Defendant makes a precise and limited argument on appeal. He does not dispute that the officer's observations of the manner in which he operated the Impala, as well as the vehicle's heavily tinted windows, provided a reasonable and articulable suspicion he committed motor vehicle violations supporting the motor vehicle stop. See State v. Bacome, 228 N.J. 94, 103 (2017) ("To be lawful, an automobile stop 'must be based on reasonable and articulable suspicion that an offense, including a minor traffic offense, has been or is being committed.'" (quoting State v. Carty, 170 N.J. 632, 639-40 (2002))). He also does not challenge the officer's directive that he exit the vehicle following the stop. See State v. Smith, 134 N.J. 599, 611-12 (1994) (explaining "once a motor vehicle has been lawfully [detained, ] . . . police officers may order the driver to get out of the vehicle without violating the Fourth Amendment's proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures" (quoting Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 111 n.6 (1977))). Defendant argues only that the frisk was unlawful because the officers lacked an objectively reasonable basis to suspect he had a weapon or was dangerous.

"The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, paragraph 7 of the New Jersey Constitution require that police officers obtain a warrant 'before searching a person's property, unless the search "falls within one of the recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement."'" State v. Cassidy, 179 N.J. 150, 159-60 (2004) (quoting State v. DeLuca 168 N.J. 626, 631 (2001)). Where a search is conducted without a warrant, the State has the burden to prove, by a preponderance of evidence, that it "falls within one of the few well-delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement." ...