State v. Poole

• Decision Date: 10 April 1974
• Docket Number: No. 18,18
• Citation: 203 S.E.2d 786,285 N.C. 108
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE of North Carolina v. Samuel A. POOLE.

Page 786

203 S.E.2d 786

285 N.C. 108

STATE of North Carolina v. Samuel A. POOLE.

No. 18.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

April 10, 1974.

Atty. Gen. Robert Morgan and Asst. Attys. Gen. William W. Melvin and William B. Ray, Raleigh, for the State.

Seawell, Pollock, Fullenwider, Van Camp & Robbins by P. Wayne Robbins, Southern Pines, Chambers, Stein, Ferguson & Lanning by Adam Stein, Chapel Hill, and David E. Kendall, NAACP Legal Defense Fund, New York City, for defendant appellant.

BOBBITT, Chief Justice.

Defendant assigns as error the denial of his motion under G.S. § 15--173 for judgment as in case of nonsuit. The question presented by this assignment is whether the evidence was sufficient to warrant the submission thereof to the jury and to support a verdict of guilty of the criminal offense charged in the indictment.

The rules for testing the sufficiency of the evidence to withstand defendant's motion are well established. 2 Strong, N.C. Index 2d, Criminal Law § 104. The evidence most favorable to the State must be considered as true. When so considered, was it sufficient to warrant a finding that the crime charged was committed and that it was committed by defendant? State v. Goines, 273 N.C. 509, 513, 160 S.E.2d 469, 472 (1968), and cases cited.

The testimony of Miss Maness was sufficient to support a finding that an unauthorized man unlawfully broke into and entered her occupied dwelling between 9:15 and 9:30 p.m. on Saturday, 19 May 1973. Arguendo, we assume the sufficiency of the evidence to warrant a finding that the intruder's intent when breaking and entering was to commit the felony of rape. The crucial question was whether the evidence was sufficient to warrant a finding that defendant was the unlawful intruder. In respect to this crucial question, the State's case depends wholly on circumstantial evidence.

The well established rule, cited with approval in numerous subsequent cases, is stated by Justice Higgins in State v. Stephens, 244 N.C. 380, 383--384, 93 S.E.2d 431, 433--434 (1956), as follows: '(T)here must be substantial evidence of all material elements of the offense to withstand the motion to dismiss. It is immateral whether the substantial evidence is circumstantial or direct, or both. To hold that the court must grant a motion to dismiss unless, in the opinion of the court, the evidence excludes every reasonable hypothesis of innocence would in effect constitute the presiding judge the trier of the facts. Substantial evidence of guilt is required before the court can send the case to the jury. Proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt is required before the jury can convict. What is substantial evidence is a question of law for the court. What that evidence proves or fails to prove is a question of fact for the jury.'

The crucial question is whether there was substantial evidence that this defendant was the intruder who entered Miss Maness's home on the night of 19 May 1973. This question can be answered only after close analysis of the evidence.

Miss Maness did not identify defendant as the intruder. The only time she saw the intruder was when she 'just caught a glimpse' of him when he was 'just standing' in the hall, approximately 10 feet from the door of her bedroom. The hall area was lighted 'by (her) bedroom light.' The intruder did not speak. He was 'a colored man and tall.' He had a 'short-barreled gun.' Miss Maness didn't see his clothes and didn't know whether he was wearing a hat. Although she learned the next day that the lock to her bedroom door had been broken, '(she) did not hear anything which caused (her) to think it was being broken.'

Miss Maness did not see the man outside who called to her that he had a gun and ordered her to stop. No witness testified to the identity of this man. There is evidence that he left the vicinity of Miss Maness's home when Wilmer Maness arrived. The evidence is silent as to the direction in which he was traveling when he left. Wilmer Maness did not testify.

Cheek testified defendant 'is approximately 6 feet 2 inches.' Dowd testified he sold defendant 'a sawed-off .22 rifle' on or about May 12th. Moseley testified that, at 2:30 p.m. on Saturday, May 19th, such a rifle was in a truck operated by defendant.

Bruce, an employee of Bradley, testified that on Friday, May 18th, he (Bruce) had given defendant permission to drive Bradley's red panel truck. Cheek testified he first saw the truck on Saturday, May 19th, at 9:33 p.m., when going to Miss Maness's house; that the truck, unattended, was approximately 2/10 of a mile south of Miss Maness's house; that he checked the vehicle but did not operate it; that the ignition key was missing; that the next day, Sunday, May 20th, he (Cheek) arranged for the truck to be towed to Yow's Garage; that Bradley, the owner of the truck, brought an ignition key to Yow's Garage; and at that time he (Cheek) 'just started the truck up and let it run for a while and shut it off.'

Person testified that on Saturday, May 19th, 'in the evening,' he was 'at the store,' at which time Officer June Cockman 'asked (him) questions'; and that, when he (Person) left the store 'to go home' he saw defendant, alone, 'coming toward (him) . . . coming towards the road to the store.' Cheek, when recalled, testified that he was 'familiar with the store referred to by Mr. Person,' and that 'the store is approximately 3/4 miles from the nearest point to the paved road, 1479.'

The evidence reviewed above tends to show that defendant had possession of the truck and of 'a sawed-off .22 rifle' as late as 2:30 p.m. on Saturday, May 19th; and that he was seen 'coming towards the road to the store' by Person, who didn't 'really know that time it was.'

There was no evidence as to where the truck was on Saturday, May 19th, from 2:30 p.m. until 9:33 p.m. We note Cheek's testimony that defendant told him that, 'as soon as he left the truck, he traveled south on the rural paved road and was picked up by two boys that carried him to his residence.' We further note Cheek's testimony that defendant made no statement 'as to what time he was picked up' and 'did not give the names of any persons who he said picked him up.' Apart from these statements attributed to defendant, there was no evidence as to where defendant was from 2:30 p.m. on Saturday, May 19th, until Person saw him at some unspecified time 'in the evening,' and no evidence as to where defendant was from the time Person saw him until Cheek saw him on Sunday, May 20th, at approximately 9:30 a.m., at the Robbins Police Station.

Cheek, when recalled, testified to the distance from the store referred to by Person to the nearest point of the paved road. Originally, Cheek had testified that '(t)here is a store approximately two miles from the Maness residence in the Belview section.' Whether this is the store referred to by Person is obscure.

The evidence reviewed above tends to place defendant 2/10 of a mile south of Miss Maness's house at some unidentified time on Saturday, May 19th. There was no evidence relating to fingerprints of the man inside the house or relating to track prints of the man outside the house. The man inside the house did not speak. There was no evidence tending to identify the voice outside the house as that of defendant.

To place defendant at the scene of the crime, the State relies upon testimony relating to a dark brown button which Cheek found at approximately 3:30 a.m. on Sunday, May 20th, 'in the fold of the curtain that was laying on the ground directly beneath the open window of the Tennie Maness residence.' At about 5:45 p.m., during his Second search of defendant's residence, Cheek found in the front bedroom a shirt from which one button was missing. Pearce testified to his examination and comparison of the button found by Cheek and the remaining buttons on the shirt. The shirt was 'a common, everyday work shirt, gray cotton,' bearing the label 'Washington Dee and Cee, permanent press shirt.' Pearce concluded that the button 'could have been torn from the shirt'; that the button could have come from a shirt of that particular type made by the same or a different manufacturer; and that the button 'certainly came from a shirt which had other buttons on it which were identical to it.'

In our view, the opinion evidence of Pearce is insufficient to warrant a finding that the button found by Cheek came from the shirt found by Cheek on his Second search of defendant's residence. In addition, we note the following:

The evidence is silent as to when, where and under what circumstances defendant was arrested. When arrested, was defendant wearing the shirt from which a button was missing or had been torn? Was the shirt in defendant's bedroom when Cheek, accompanied by Officer Cockman, first searched defendant's residence at approximately 9:45 a.m. on Sunday, May 20th? The shirt (Exhibit 8) was picked up when Cheek, accompanied by Officer Whitaker, made the Second search of defendant's residence. Defendant was in custody at all times between the first search and the second search. Neither Cockman nor Whitaker testified.

Although Cheek observed the half of...