State v. Porter, Docket No. 29852 (ID 1/4/2005)
| Decision Date | 04 January 2005 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 29852. |
| Parties | STATE OF IDAHO, Plaintiff-Appellant-Cross Respondent, v. MICHAEL S. PORTER, Defendant-Respondent-Cross Appellant. |
| Court | Idaho Supreme Court |
Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial District, State of Idaho, Kootenai County. Hon. John P. Luster, District Judge.
Order reducing charging from second degree murder to voluntary manslaughter, reversed.
Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Kenneth K. Jorgensen, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for appellant.
John M. Adams, Kootenai County Public Defender, Coeur d'Alene, for respondent.
By this appeal we are called upon to examine and interpret the mental elements for second degree murder and voluntary manslaughter, as prescribed by Idaho statutes. The district court reduced the charge against Michael S. Porter from second degree murder to voluntary manslaughter based upon the court's determination that insufficient evidence was produced at the preliminary hearing to show that Porter intended to kill the victim. The State brings this interlocutory appeal from that order. Porter cross-appeals, contending that the charge should have been reduced further to involuntary manslaughter, because both second degree murder and voluntary manslaughter require actual intent to kill. We conclude that intent to kill is not a required element of either offense, and we therefore reverse the district court's order.
Porter met the victim, D. J. Flett, during an evening of drinking in a bar. At around 2 a.m., a conflict erupted between Porter and Flett outside the bar. Porter punched Flett, and after Flett fell, Porter hit him two or three more times in the face as Flett lay on the ground. Flett suffered extensive injuries to his face and head, including brain damage likely caused by his head hitting the pavement after he was knocked unconscious. Flett died from his injuries.
At the preliminary hearing, the State conceded that the evidence did not support a finding of intent to kill, but argued that the evidence did show malice aforethought and therefore supported the charge of second degree murder. The magistrate agreed with the State, holding that the State had met its burden to show malice aforethought although there was insufficient evidence to show intent to kill. Therefore, the magistrate held Porter to answer to the charge of second degree murder.
Porter then filed in the district court a motion to dismiss, arguing that intent to kill is an element of both second degree murder and the lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter. Porter contended that the State had failed to produce evidence on the intent element and therefore the charge should be either dismissed or reduced to involuntary manslaughter. The district court reduced the charge to voluntary manslaughter, concluding that intent to kill, which was not shown by the evidence, was an essential element for second degree murder but not for voluntary manslaughter.
Both parties appeal. The State contends that intent to kill is not an element of second degree murder, so that charge should be reinstated, while Porter maintains that intent to kill is an element of both second degree murder and voluntary manslaughter.
To show probable cause at a preliminary hearing, the State must present substantial evidence demonstrating every material element of the offense charged. Idaho Criminal Rule 5.1(b); State v. Munhall, 118 Idaho 602, 606, 798 P.2d 61, 65 (Ct. App. 1990). Idaho Code § 19-815A permits a defendant held to answer to a criminal charge to challenge the sufficiency of evidence adduced at the preliminary hearing through a motion to dismiss.
The State does not challenge the district court's finding, echoing that of the magistrate, that the evidence was insufficient to show intent to kill, but contends that the absence of such proof does not preclude Porter's prosecution for second degree murder because the mental element for second degree murder is malice aforethought, which does not require intent to cause the victim's death.
The elements of an offense are defined by statute. Unfortunately, the statutes addressing the elements of second degree murder fall far short of crystal clarity. Indeed, the fact that there is today room for disagreement concerning the elements of an offense specified by statutes that were adopted more than 100 years ago is attributable to the ambiguity and archaism of the statutory language as well as vagueness and inconsistency in judicial decisions applying them.
Idaho Code § 18-4001 defines murder as "the unlawful killing of a human being . . . with malice aforethought or the intentional application of torture to a human being, which results in the death of a human being." Thus, aside from torture murder, the mental element for murder under this statute is "malice aforethought." "Malice" is described as follows in I.C. § 18-4002, with statutory language that was initially adopted by the Idaho Territory in 1887.1
Such malice may be express or implied. It is express when there is manifested a deliberate intention unlawfully to take away the life of a fellow creature. It is implied when no considerable provocation appears, or when the circumstances attending the killing show an abandoned and malignant heart.
These references to malice are the only statutory prescription of a mens rea element for second degree murder.2 Section 18-4002 allows room for debate about the nature of this mental element because it is unclear whether "express" and "implied" are varieties of malice or whether the discussion of "implied malice" merely refers to a manner in which express malice (intent to take a life) may be proven or inferred. This distinction is significant because if the statute is viewed as defining two forms of malice, then intent to kill is not in itself an essential element of second degree murder, for an "abandoned and malignant heart," as an alternative to intent to take a life, would satisfy the malice element.
An interpretation that section 18-4002 defines at least two varieties of malice, either of which will suffice for second degree murder, draws support from State v. Snowden, 79 Idaho 266, 272, 313 P.2d 706, 709 (1957), where the Idaho Supreme Court stated that the evidence showed both express and implied malice on behalf of the defendant. It is also supported by State v. Shuff, 9 Idaho 115, 127-28, 72 P. 664, 668 (1903), overruled on other grounds by State v. White, 93 Idaho 153, 159, 456 P.2d 797, 803 (1969), where the Court approved a jury instruction which, in distinguishing between first degree and second degree murder, required a finding of intent to kill only in relation to whether the murder was willful, deliberate and premeditated, and therefore murder of the first degree. The Shuff holding thus implies that a form of malice other than actual intent to kill will suffice for second degree murder.
Subsequently, however, the Idaho Supreme Court plainly stated in State v. Birrueta, 98 Idaho 631, 570 P.2d 868 (1977), that intent to kill is an element of second degree murder. The Court there held that the defendant's guilty plea to second degree murder was invalid because it was not evident that he had understood that intent to kill was an element of the crime to which he was pleading guilty. The Court stated:
Intent to kill is an element of murder in the second degree. State v. Van Vlack, 57 Idaho 316, 364, 65 P.2d 736, 758 (1937). Therefore, before Birrueta could have been proven guilty of second degree murder, the evidence would have to indicate he formed the requisite intent.
Id. at 633, 570 P.2d at 870. It is noteworthy, however, that the Van Vlack opinion cited in this passage from Birrueta does not necessarily support the Birrueta statement that intent to kill is required. In Van Vlack it was said, "Intent to take life or the mental state of having an abandoned and malignant heart which means, of course, a condition of mind and which therefore is a mental state is the essential ingredient of murder in the second degree." Van Vlack, 57 Idaho at 364, 65 P.2d at 758 (emphasis added), overruled on other grounds by State v. White, 93 Idaho 153, 159, 456 P.2d 797, 803 (1969). This statement from Van Vlack, though ambiguous, certainly could be read to mean that either intent to take a life or the mental state of having an abandoned and malignant heart satisfies the mens rea component for second degree murder. If that is the meaning, then Van Vlack is contrary to the holding in Birrueta.
Whether Birrueta is supported by precedent is of no consequence for our task, however, for this Court lacks authority to overturn precedent from the Idaho Supreme Court, and given Birrueta's unequivocal statement that intent to kill is an element of second degree murder, our only remaining query is whether the Supreme Court has changed its position since Birrueta. Several more recent decisions lead us to conclude that it has.
In State v. Aragon, 107 Idaho 358, 690 P.2d 293 (1984), the defendant argued that the district court's jury instructions did not sufficiently distinguish the mental elements for first degree and second degree murder. The district court had instructed that, "Malice is that state of mind manifested by the doing of an unlawful and felonious act intentionally, deliberately, and without legal cause or excuse," and also instructed on express and implied malice using the words of I.C. § 18-4002. The instructions then distinguished between first and second degree murder as follows:
As set forth in the preceding instructions on murder, any unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought is murder. If nothing further characterizes the killing, the murder is of the second degree. To constitute the higher offense of murder in the first degree, there must be wilfulness, deliberation and premeditation in...
To continue reading
Request your trial