State v. Posey, Docket No. 39899

Decision Date29 April 2013
Docket NumberDocket No. 39899,2013 Unpublished Opinion No. 468
PartiesSTATE OF IDAHO, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. VALARIE LYNN POSEY, Defendant-Appellant.
CourtIdaho Court of Appeals

Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk

THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED

OPINION AND SHALL NOT

BE CITED AS AUTHORITY

Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial District, State of Idaho, Kootenai County. Hon. Carl B. Kerrick, District Judge. Hon. Barry E. Watson, Magistrate.

Order of the district court, on appeal from the magistrate division, affirming judgment of conviction for excessive driving under the influence and failure to give immediate notice of an accident, affirmed.

John M. Adams, Kootenai County Public Defender; J. Lynn Brooks, Deputy Public Defender, Coeur d'Alene, for appellant. J. Lynn Brooks argued.

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; John C. McKinney, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. John C. McKinney argued.

MELANSON, Judge

Valarie Lynn Posey appeals from the district court's order, on intermediate appeal, affirming Posey's judgment of conviction for excessive driving under the influence (DUI) and failure to give immediate notice of an accident. Specifically, Posey challenges the magistrate's denial of her motion to suppress. For the reasons set forth below we affirm.

I.FACTS AND PROCEDURE

On March 24, 2011, an officer was on duty when he received a call relating to an automobile accident. The officer responded to the scene of the crash and discovered a red car and a gray SUV with visible signs of damage. Upon inspection, the officer discovered the red car's front fender and door were damaged, the airbags had deployed, and the front left wheel wasbroken. The officer located a young girl, approximately age twelve, bleeding at the scene. However, the driver of the red car, later identified as Posey, was not present. Witnesses indicated Posey left the scene and headed westbound on foot. The officer then received additional information from dispatch, indicating that a witness (the reporting party) had followed Posey after she left the scene and called 911. The officer responded to the area where the reporting party had followed Posey to and the reporting party indicated to the officer that Posey entered a nearby house. The reporting party then directed the officer to that residence.

The officer approached the residence and knocked on the door several times. There was no answer, and the officer heard no movement or any voices inside. The officer then contacted dispatch in an attempt to get a phone number for the residence. The officer also requested contact with a supervisor to see whether he could force entry into the residence. At this point, the officer once again made contact with the reporting party, who indicated that Posey appeared to be "out of it" and was bleeding from the face. The party also indicated that, while Posey was still at the scene, she had attempted to start her car again, despite the crash and obvious damage. The reporting party then stopped Posey from doing so and took the keys away, at which point Posey left the scene and the reporting party followed.

The officer's supervisor thereafter approved the request to force entry into the residence. The officer attempted to kick the door open, but these attempts proved unsuccessful. Next, the officer observed the handle on the door begin to move, at which time the officer directed whoever was behind the door to step away. The officer then utilized a sledgehammer, obtained from fire department personnel at the scene, and successfully opened the door. Once open, the officer observed an elderly gentleman in the residence. The officer asked where Posey was located, and the gentleman indicated she was behind the door. The officer instructed Posey to come outside. Posey appeared dazed and confused and declined medical attention despite having a cut nose, cuts on her face, and a black eye.

The officer observed that Posey had the odor of intoxicants on her breath, and Posey indicated she had consumed beer at a bar. The officer placed Posey under arrest after she failed field sobriety tests. Posey was transported to a local medical center, where a blood sample revealed her blood alcohol content to be .34. The state charged Posey with excessive DUI, I.C. § 18-8004C; failure to purchase/invalid license, I.C. § 49-301(1); transporting an open alcohol container, I.C. § 23-505; and failure to give immediate notice of an accident,I.C. § 49-1305. Posey filed a motion to suppress, arguing the officer's entry into her residence violated her state and federal constitutional rights to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.

The magistrate ruled most exceptions to the warrant requirement were not applicable, but specifically addressed two. First, the magistrate indicated that, while exigent circumstances applied to an extent, the facts here did not necessarily meet the requirements for that exception.1 The magistrate considered the community caretaker exception. The magistrate applied a totality of the circumstances test and found that the officer harbored a belief that the driver of the red car was in need of immediate assistance. In finding that the community caretaker exception applied, the magistrate did not address the distinction between vehicles and residences. The magistrate ruled that, while using a sledgehammer "is way at the end of what might be considered reasonable in going into somebody's house," it was reasonable under the circumstances. Thus, the magistrate denied the motion to suppress. Posey then entered a conditional guilty plea to DUI and failure to give immediate notice of an accident, reserving the right to challenge the magistrate's denial of her suppression motion on appeal. On intermediate appeal, the district court affirmed. Posey again appeals.

II.STANDARD OF REVIEW

The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, we accept the trial court's findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but we freely review the application of constitutional principles to the facts as found. State v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559, 561, 916 P.2d 1284, 1286 (Ct. App. 1996). At a suppression hearing, the power to assess the credibility of witnesses, resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw factual inferences is vested in the trial court. State v. Valdez-Molina, 127 Idaho 102, 106, 897 P.2d 993, 997 (1995); State v. Schevers, 132 Idaho 786, 789, 979 P.2d 659, 662 (Ct. App. 1999).

III.ANALYSIS

The Fourth Amendment, as well as Article I, Section 17 of the Idaho Constitution,2 protect the right of people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures. The United States Supreme Court has held that the "physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed." United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972). See also State v. Johnson, 110 Idaho 516, 523, 716 P.2d 1288, 1295 (1986); State v. Reynolds, 146 Idaho 466, 469, 197 P.3d 327, 330 (Ct. App. 2008); State v. Robinson, 144 Idaho 496, 498-99, 163 P.3d 1208, 1210-11 (Ct. App. 2007). Such entries and other searches conducted without a warrant are presumed to be unreasonable, Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980); State v. Martinez, 129 Idaho 426, 431, 925 P.2d 1125, 1130 (Ct. App. 1996), but there are a few carefully delineated exceptions to this presumption, Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55 (1971); State v. Brauch, 133 Idaho 215, 218, 984 P.2d 703, 706 (1999). The state bears the burden to show that a warrantless search either fell within one of these well-recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement or was otherwise reasonable under the circumstances. Reynolds, 146 Idaho at 470, 197 P.3d at 331; Martinez, 129 Idaho at 431, 925 P.2d at 1130.

A. Community Caretaker Function

The magistrate denied Posey's motion to suppress, finding that the community caretaker exception applied. Posey argues that the community caretaker function does not apply in the context of residences and that, under this doctrine, an officer's actions are required to be totally divorced from the detection, investigation, or acquisition of evidence relating to the violation of a criminal statute.

One situation where an officer may conduct a warrantless search is when the officer is acting pursuant to the community caretaking function. State v. Cutler, 143 Idaho 297, 302, 141 P.3d 1166, 1171 (Ct. App. 2006). The community caretaking function arises from the duty of police officers to help citizens in need of assistance and is totally divorced from the detection,investigation, or acquisition of evidence relating to the violation of a criminal statute. Id.; State v. Maddox, 137 Idaho 821, 824, 54 P.3d 464, 467 (Ct. App. 2002). In analyzing community caretaking function cases, Idaho courts have adopted a totality of the circumstances test. State v. Wixom, 130 Idaho 752, 754, 947 P.2d 1000, 1002 (1997); State v. Schmidt, 137 Idaho 301, 303, 47 P.3d 1271, 1273 (Ct. App. 2002). The constitutional standard is whether the intrusive action of the police was reasonable in view of all the surrounding circumstances. Wixom, 130 Idaho at 754, 947 P.2d at 1002; Schmidt, 137 Idaho at 303-04, 47 P.3d at 1273-74. Reasonableness is determined by balancing the public need and interest furthered by the police conduct against the degree and nature of the intrusion upon the privacy of the citizen. State v. Godwin, 121 Idaho 491, 495, 826 P.2d 452, 456 (1992); Schmidt, 137 Idaho at 304, 47 P.3d at 1274.

Posey correctly notes that cases addressing the community caretaker function have repeatedly stated that this function is totally divorced from the detection, investigation, or acquisition of evidence relating to the violation of a criminal statute. Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441 (1973); Wixom, 130 Idaho at 754,...

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