State v. Posey

• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: J.M. JOHNSON
• Citation: State v. Posey, 272 P.3d 840, 174 Wash.2d 131 (Wash. 2012)
• Decision Date: 22 March 2012
• Docket Number: No. 82957–8.
• Parties: STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Daniel Alfred POSEY, Jr., Petitioner.

174 Wash.2d 131

272 P.3d 840

STATE of Washington, Respondent,

v.Daniel Alfred POSEY, Jr., Petitioner.

No. 82957–8.

Supreme Court of Washington, En Banc.

Argued Jan. 20, 2011.Decided March 22, 2012.

Stephanie C. Cunningham, Attorney at Law, Seattle, WA, for Petitioner.

Kenneth L. Ramm, Jr., Yakima County Prosecutor's Office, Yakima, WA, for Respondent.

J.M. JOHNSON, J.

[174 Wash.2d 133] ¶ 1 The question in this case is whether legislation relating to juvenile courts can deprive the superior courts of their constitutional jurisdiction. Article IV, section 6 of the constitution vests in the superior courts' jurisdiction “in all criminal cases amounting to felony....” We hold the legislature does not have the power to alter this constitutional grant of felony jurisdiction. We thus affirm the sentence imposed in this case.

¶ 2 At 16 years of age, Daniel A. Posey Jr. committed two counts of rape in the second degree. A jury convicted Posey, and the superior court sentenced him as an adult. On direct review, we remanded Posey's case with instructions that a juvenile court sentence him. Prior to the mandate of our decision, Posey turned 21 years old.

¶ 3 On remand, Posey challenged the juvenile court's authority to sentence him. The presiding judge agreed. Subsequently, acting in her role as a superior court judge, the trial court sentenced Posey as an adult but imposed a sentence consistent with the standard juvenile range. Posey appeals his sentence arguing that, by operation of statute, neither the juvenile court nor the superior court had jurisdiction to sentence him for his crimes. We disagree and affirm the Court of Appeals' decision upholding the sentence imposed upon Posey.

Facts and Procedural History

¶ 4 In 2003, 16–year–old Posey was charged in Yakima County Juvenile Court with three counts of second degree rape and one count of first degree assault while armed with a firearm. Because the first degree assault charge was classified as a “ ‘[s]erious violent offense’ ” under former RCW 9.94A.030(37)(a)(v) (2002), the juvenile court automatically declined jurisdiction over Posey pursuant to RCW 13.04.030(1)(e)(v)(A) and transferred the case to the Yakima County Superior Court.

¶ 5 The matter proceeded to trial in the Yakima County Superior Court. The jury found Posey guilty of two counts of second degree rape. The jury acquitted Posey on the count of first degree assault and one count of second degree rape. The trial judge sentenced Posey under the adult sentencing guidelines to two concurrent terms of life in prison with a minimum term of 119 months of confinement.

¶ 6 Posey appealed to the Court of Appeals, claiming that the superior court did not have jurisdiction to sentence him as an adult after his acquittal on first degree assault, the charge that led the juvenile court to automatically decline jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals rejected this argument and affirmed Posey's judgment and sentence. State v. Posey, 130 Wash.App. 262, 122 P.3d 914 (2005).

¶ 7 Posey thereafter obtained review in this court. We affirmed Posey's convictions but reversed the Court of Appeals. State v. Posey, 161 Wash.2d 638, 647, 167 P.3d 560 (2007) ( Posey I). We remanded the matter “to juvenile court for further proceedings.” Id. at 649, 167 P.3d 560. The mandate for our opinion issued on October 16, 2007, less than a month after Posey turned 21 years of age.

¶ 8 A few months later, the Yakima County Juvenile Court conducted a sentencing hearing on remand. Yakima Superior Court Judge Susan Hahn presided over the hearing in her capacity as a judge of the Yakima County Juvenile Court. Posey's counsel moved to dismiss “the matter” arguing that the juvenile court was without jurisdiction to sentence him because Posey was now 21 years old. Clerk's Papers at 15. Judge Hahn agreed that the juvenile court no longer had jurisdiction over Posey due to his age but indicated that she would “forget, for a moment,” that she was sitting in juvenile court and would “transform the room and the judge into a [s]uperior [c]ourt ... and sentence [Posey], right now, to a standard range sentence, according to the Juvenile Justice Act.” Verbatim Report of Proceedings at 30. Judge Hahn then imposed a juvenile standard range disposition of 60 to 80 weeks. The judge also entered a protection order and sex offender notice of registration requirements.

¶ 9 Posey appealed this sentence to the Court of Appeals. In response, the State filed a motion on the merits. A commissioner at that court granted the motion and a panel of that court denied Posey's motion to modify. We granted Posey's petition for review.

Analysis

¶ 10 We affirm the Court of Appeals. We hold that the legislature cannot deprive the superior courts of their constitutional jurisdiction over felony offenses. The legislature may designate special sessions of the superior court to adjudicate juvenile cases. However, where a statute prohibits the juvenile session from adjudicating the case, the superior court retains its constitutional jurisdiction over felony offenses.

A. The Constitutional Framework

¶ 11 In adopting Washington Constitution article IV, section 6 the people of this state granted the superior courts original jurisdiction “in all criminal cases amounting to felony” and in several other enumerated types of cases and proceedings. In these enumerated categories where the constitution specifically grants jurisdiction to the superior courts, the legislature cannot restrict the jurisdiction of the superior courts. See Blanchard v. Golden Age Brewing Co., 188 Wash. 396, 418, 63 P.2d 397 (1936). Even though the legislature cannot restrict the enumerated jurisdiction of the superior courts, it can promulgate laws that govern procedures as to which “sessions” of the superior court will hear certain types of cases. See Wash. Const. art. IV, § 5 (“In any county where there shall be more than one superior court judge, there may be as many sessions of the superior court at the same time as there are judges thereof ... the business of the court shall be so distributed and assigned by law ....”); see also State ex rel. Campbell v. Superior Court, 34 Wash.2d 771, 775, 210 P.2d 123 (1949).

¶ 12 Article IV, section 6 also grants the superior courts residual jurisdiction over nonenumerated cases and proceedings, providing that superior courts “shall also have original jurisdiction in all cases and of all proceedings in which jurisdiction shall not have been by law vested exclusively in some other court....” (Emphasis added.) It is with respect to cases and proceedings that fall within the residual jurisdiction of the superior courts that the legislature can vest exclusive jurisdiction in an alternative forum. For example, by limiting the common law tort claims of injured workers and creating administrative procedures and enhanced remedies under the Industrial Insurance Act, Title 51 RCW, the legislature effectively modified the role of the superior courts over such claims. See Laws of 1911, ch. 74; see also Lidke v. Brandt, 21 Wash.2d 137, 139, 150 P.2d 399 (1944); Dougherty v. Dep't of Labor & Indus., 150 Wash.2d 310, 314, 76 P.3d 1183 (2003).

B. Juvenile Court Jurisdiction

¶ 13 The State of Washington's earliest juvenile legislation recognized that the superior courts possessed original jurisdiction over juvenile cases. See Laws of 1905, ch. 18, § 2. However, the “sessions” of the superior court handling juvenile cases were designated as the “ ‘Juvenile Court.’ ” Id., § 3. This same assignment of juvenile cases held true throughout subsequent revisions of the legislation governing juvenile courts and cases. See, e.g., Laws of 1913, ch. 160, § 2; Laws of 1937, ch. 65, § 1. Likewise, our case law interpreted the juvenile court legislation as a special “session” of the superior court that the legislature directed to preside over juvenile cases pursuant to article IV, section 5 of the state constitution. See Campbell, 34 Wash.2d at 775, 210 P.2d 123; Dillenburg v. Maxwell, 70 Wash.2d 331, 352, 413 P.2d 940, 422 P.2d 783 (1966).

¶ 14 In 1977, the legislature added the language in RCW 13.04.030, which grants the juvenile courts “exclusive original jurisdiction” over all juvenile proceedings. Laws of 1977, 1st Ex.Sess., ch. 291, § 4. We interpreted the effect of these changes in State v. Werner, 129 Wash.2d 485, 496, 918 P.2d 916 (1996). We held that “under Article IV, § 6, the Legislature has not vested jurisdiction exclusively in some court other than the superior court by enacting RCW 13.04.030 because the juvenile court is a division of the superior court, not a separate court.” Id. at 493, 918 P.2d 916 (emphasis added).

¶ 15 Further, we explained that the legislature could not divest the superior courts of their criminal jurisdiction over juveniles. Id. at 496, 918 P.2d 916. We stated:

The only remaining argument ... is that the creation of juvenile courts by statute somehow constrained the power of a superior court.... That argument fails. This Court has resolutely resisted legislative attempts to restrict its constitutional authority ... “[T]he courts are not required to recognize a legislative restriction which has the effect of depriving them of a constitutional grant or of one of their inherent powers. What the legislature has not given, it cannot take away.”

Id. (last alteration in original) (emphasis added) (quoting Blanchard, 188 Wash. at 418, 63 P.2d 397).

¶ 16 Admittedly, our prior jurisprudence discussing juvenile court jurisdiction is not a model of clarity. See Dillenburg, 70 Wash.2d at 353, 413 P.2d 940, 422 P.2d 783 (“When, then, we spoke of ‘surrender of jurisdiction’ and ‘jurisdiction’ in reference to juvenile and superior court proceedings in our original opinion in this case, we were not accurately using the word ‘jurisdiction’ in its true juridical and traditional sense.”). Werner's own discussion of the “ ‘three jurisdictional elements in every valid...