State v. Powe
Decision Date | 22 September 2021 |
Docket Number | A172584 |
Citation | 314 Or.App. 726,497 P.3d 793 |
Parties | STATE of Oregon, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Deonte Ahmad POWE, Defendant-Appellant. |
Court | Oregon Court of Appeals |
Ernest G. Lannet, Chief Defender, Criminal Appellate Section, and Laura A. Frikert, Deputy Public Defender, Office of Public Defense Services, filed the brief for appellant.
Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General, and Julia Glick, Assistant Attorney General, filed the brief for respondent.
Before Armstrong, Presiding Judge, and Tookey, Judge, and Aoyagi, Judge.
Defendant was convicted of coercion constituting domestic violence, ORS 163.275 (Count 1), and fourth-degree assault constituting domestic violence, ORS 163.160 (Count 2). He was acquitted of interference with making a report, ORS 165.572 (Count 3). On appeal, defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal (MJOA) on the coercion charge. He also challenges both of his convictions on Sixth Amendment grounds. We conclude that the trial court erred in denying defendant's MJOA and, accordingly, reverse the coercion conviction. As for the assault conviction, we reverse and remand, because the conviction was based on a nonunanimous verdict in violation of the Sixth Amendment.
Defendant asserts that the trial court violated the Sixth Amendment by instructing the jury that it could find him guilty by nonunanimous verdict and then by accepting the jury's verdicts. The jury was polled, establishing that defendant was found guilty of assault by nonunanimous verdict (10-2) and guilty of coercion by unanimous verdict (12-0). Under Ramos v. Louisiana , 590 U.S. ––––, 140 S. Ct. 1390, 206 L. Ed. 2d 583 (2020), the trial court erred in convicting defendant of assault based on a nonunanimous verdict, the state concedes the error, and we reverse and remand that conviction. We reject defendant's Sixth Amendment argument as to the coercion conviction, however, for the reasons stated in State v. Flores Ramos , 367 Or. 292, 334, 478 P.3d 515 (2020), and State v. Kincheloe , 367 Or. 335, 339, 478 P.3d 507 (2020), cert. den. , ––– U.S. ––––, 141 S. Ct. 2837, ––– L. Ed. 2d ––––, No. 20-8126 (June 21, 2021).
Defendant asserts that the trial court erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal on the coercion charge, because the evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to convict him of that crime. We review the denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal to determine whether, viewing the facts and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the state, a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proved beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Wakefield , 292 Or. App. 694, 695, 425 P.3d 491 (2018). We state the facts in accordance with that standard.
Defendant and H had previously dated and were "still talking." One evening, they met at a bar, and, at the end of the night, defendant agreed to give H a ride home. They argued during the car ride. Upon arriving outside H's home, defendant told H to get out of the car. As H gathered her belongings, defendant "got mad" and told her that it was taking too long. H responded that she would not get out of the car until she had her shoes on (which she had removed during the ride) and her belongings. Defendant got out of the car, walked to the passenger side, and opened the door. He grabbed H by the hair, dragging her out of the car and down the sidewalk for a distance of about a car length. Defendant threw H's belongings onto the ground and gave H her dog, who had been in the hatchback area with defendant's dog. Believing defendant had driven away, H called 9-1-1. Within 30 seconds into the call, defendant reappeared, took the phone from H's hand, and smashed it to the ground. Defendant punched H hard in the eye, causing an orbital fracture
, and then drove away.
H passed out for a few seconds. When she came to, defendant was gone, and she called out for help as she lay on the sidewalk. A passing bicyclist stopped to help her. H was in pain and needed assistance to get up. An ambulance transported H to the hospital. She had scratches, bruises, and abrasions, and she required surgery for her orbital fracture
.
Defendant was indicted on charges of coercion, fourth-degree assault, and interference. As to coercion, the indictment charged that defendant "did unlawfully and knowingly compel and induce [H] to engage in conduct from which [H] had a legal right to abstain, by means of instilling in [H] fear that if [H] refrained from the conduct compelled and induced, defendant would unlawfully cause physical injury to [H]."
Soon thereafter, defendant moved for a judgment of acquittal, arguing that the evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to establish coercion. The state opposed the motion, reiterating its position that defendant had coerced H to be dragged down the sidewalk by dragging her down the sidewalk:
The trial court denied the MJOA, stating without elaboration that the evidence was sufficient to go to the jury. The jury subsequently found defendant guilty of coercion.
ORS 163.275(1) defines the crime of coercion as follows:
Thus, coercion requires a person to use fear of a particular consequence as a means to "influence or persuade a victim to alter his or her course of conduct—to do something that the victim otherwise would not have done or to not do something which the victim otherwise would have done." State v. Pedersen , 242 Or. App. 305, 312, 255 P.3d 556, rev. den. , 351 Or. 254, 264 P.3d 1285 (2011) (emphases added). As the Supreme Court said about a prior version of the coercion statute, "[t]he target of the law is the effective use of fear to induce compliance with a demand." State v. Robertson , 293 Or. 402, 418, 649 P.2d 569 (1982).
In State v. Phillips , 206 Or. App. 90, 96-97, 135 P.3d 461, rev. den. , 341 Or. 548, 145 P.3d 1109 (2006), we affirmed the denial of motions for judgment of acquittal on two coercion charges where there was evidence that two child victims complied with the defendant's demands to stay at his apartment because he had instilled in them a fear that he would physically injure them if they did not comply. Similarly, in State v. McNair , 290 Or. App. 55, 59, 413 P.3d 1017, rev. den. , 362 Or. 860, 418 P.3d 761 (2018), the evidence was sufficient for a coercion charge to go to the jury where the defendant ordered the victim to sit on a couch, and she...
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