State v. Powell, 2007 UT App 372 (Utah App. 11/16/2007), Case No. 20060465-CA.

Decision Date16 November 2007
Docket NumberCase No. 20060465-CA.
Citation2007 UT App 372
PartiesState of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. George Aaron Powell, Defendant and Appellant.
CourtUtah Court of Appeals

Appeal from the Fifth District, St. George Department, 051500399, The Honorable Eric A. Ludlow.

Margaret P. Lindsay and Julia Thomas, Orem, for Appellant.

Brock R. Belnap and Ivan W. LePendu, St. George, for Appellee.

Before Judges Billings, McHugh, and Thorne.

MEMORANDUM DECISION

THORNE, Judge:

George Aaron Powell was convicted of assault against a peace officer, see Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-5-102, -102.4 (2003), interference with an arresting officer, see id. § 76-8-305 (2003), and no evidence of owner's or operator's security, see id. § 41-12a-303.2 (2005). Powell appeals, claiming that the State did not provide sufficient evidence of his mental state to sustain a conviction for assault against a peace officer. We affirm.

Powell's assault conviction arose from an incident in March 2005 involving Powell and Officer Clayton Lucas of the St. George City Police Department. The incident occurred when Lucas stopped Powell's van for a perceived registration violation. While Lucas was attempting to obtain Powell's proof of insurance, Powell opened his door and attempted to exit the van. Lucas pushed his hand against the van door and commanded Powell to stay in the van. Powell then forced his way out of the van, knocking Lucas off balance and causing him to step to avoid falling. Powell approached Lucas with his fists clenched, his teeth gritted, and breathing hard. After warning Powell to return to his vehicle a number of times, Lucas backed away from Powell and drew, but did not fire, his taser. Powell never verbally threatened Lucas or used actual force, but continued to exhibit the same aggressive demeanor when other officers arrived and took Powell into custody.

Powell argues that the State failed to prove the mens rea necessary to establish an assault against Lucas, claiming that the jury could convict him only if it found that he intentionally attempted, with unlawful force or violence, to do bodily injury to Lucas; intentionally threatened, accompanied by a show of immediate force or violence, to do bodily injury to Lucas; or intentionally committed an act, with unlawful force or violence, that caused bodily injury to Lucas or created a substantial risk of bodily injury to Lucas.1 Powell claims that the State failed to show any specific intent to assault. He argues that without more direct evidence of either a verbal threat or an attempt to strike Lucas, the State merely proved that he intended to get out of his van. Therefore, Powell continues, a reasonable jury could not have found the required culpable mental state and the verdict cannot be sustained. We disagree.

A jury verdict will fail judicial scrutiny only if "the evidence presented at trial is so insufficient that reasonable minds could not have reached the verdict." State v. Clowell, 2000 UT 8, ¶ 42, 994 P.2d 177. Furthermore, the evidence presented to the jury must be reviewed "in a light most favorable to the verdict." Id. Powell argues that the State provided no direct evidence of his intent, but direct evidence is not required. Rather, we can look "to the circumstantial evidence and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom" to support a jury verdict. State v. Martinez, 2002 UT App 126, ¶ 42, 47 P.3d 115. This is particularly true when the issue is a person's intent. See State v. James, 819 P.2d 781, 789 (Utah 1991) ("[U]nless the court is somehow able to open the mind of the defendant to examine his motivations, intent is of necessity proven by circumstantial evidence.").

Here, the State presented circumstantial evidence sufficient for a jury to infer that Powell intentionally assaulted Lucas. First, a jury could reasonably infer that when Powell shoved open his door hard enough to knock Lucas off balance, despite Lucas's command to remain in the vehicle, Powell intentionally took action with unlawful force that created a substantial risk of bodily harm to Lucas. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-305 (criminalizing the failure to comply with the lawful order of a detaining officer). Regardless of whether Lucas sustained any actual harm, the jury need only have decided that Powell's intentional action created a substantial risk of...

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