State v. Pressley, 2100618.

• Citation: 100 So.3d 1058
• Decision Date: 17 August 2012
• Docket Number: 2100618.
• Parties: STATE of Alabama v. Holcomb Blake PRESSLEY et al.
• Court: Alabama Court of Civil Appeals

100 So.3d 1058

STATE of Alabama

v.Holcomb Blake PRESSLEY et al.

2100618.

Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.

April 20, 2012.

Rehearing Denied June 15, 2012.

Certiorari Denied Aug. 17, 2012

Alabama Supreme Court 1111257.

Luther Strange, atty. gen., and Yvonne A.H. Saxon, asst. atty. gen., for appellant.

Huel M. Love, Jr., Talladega, for Peggy Holcomb, appellee.

PITTMAN, Judge.

The State of Alabama appeals from a judgment of the Talladega Circuit Court forfeiting to the State a 2006 Ford F–150 pickup truck titled in the name of Holcomb Blake Pressley (“the grandson”), subject to the satisfaction of a $10,774.50 lien on the truck held by Peggy Holcomb (“the grandmother”). We reverse the judgment of forfeiture insofar as it requires satisfaction of the grandmother's interest in the truck.

Facts and Procedural History

The grandson was arrested at a Talladega motel on December 3, 2009, and charged with the possession and manufacture of methamphetamine. A search of the motel room occupied by the grandson and the pickup truck parked outside that room disclosed methamphetamine, as well as ingredients and equipment commonly used to manufacture methamphetamine. On December 22, 2009, the State filed a complaint pursuant to § 20–2–93(a)(5), Ala.Code 1975, alleging that the grandson had used the truck to transport, receive, or sell controlled substances and seeking forfeiture of the truck to the State. The grandson answered and denied the allegations of the complaint. On March 9, 2010, the grandmother, a 70–year–old retired biology teacher, moved to intervene in the forfeiture proceedings, claiming an interest in the truck. The trial court granted the grandmother's motion to intervene; the forfeiture case was tried on August 9, 2010. An attorney for the grandson was present during the trial, but the grandson did not present a defense.

The evidence established that on February 9, 2009—10 months before the grandson's arrest and the seizure of the truck—the grandmother and the grandson, accompanied by the grandson's 2–year–old daughter, had traveled to an automobile dealership in Decatur, Georgia, to purchase a truck. The grandmother testified that she had wanted to buy the truck for herself, to haul yard and garden supplies, and for any member of her family, including the grandson, who might need to use the truck. The grandmother explained that the grandson had been driving an unreliable, older-model truck that had broken down often and that he had occasionally borrowed her automobile to drive to and from his place of employment.

After the grandmother and the grandson had decided on a particular truck to purchase at the dealership, the grandmother telephoned a loan officer at her Talladega bank to inquire about a loan. The officer advised her that she could draw on her existing home-equity line of credit to obtain the funds for the purchase. The bank deposited the funds, and the grandmother issued a check to the dealership in the amount of $14,674.50. The grandmother then telephoned her automobile-insurance agent and asked him to add the truck as an insured vehicle and the grandson as an insured driver on her existing automobile-liability policy.

The grandmother testified that, during the negotiations for the purchase of the truck and the completion of all the paperwork concerning the sale, she and the grandson had taken turns minding the grandson's two-year-old daughter; therefore, she said, she might not have been present for all the discussions concerning the sale transaction. She testified, however, that she had assumed that she was the owner of the vehicle because she had paid for it, and, she said, she had asked the business manager at the dealership to “put the truck in [her] name.” John W. Whaley, the business manager of the dealership, contradicted that testimony. He said that the grandmother had directed him, in the presence of the grandson, to “title the truck to [the grandson].” Documentary evidence submitted by the State indicates that the grandson's signature appears on all the sale documents, including the application for a certificate of title to the truck. The certificate of title lists the grandson as the owner of the vehicle.

The grandmother testified that, shortly after the purchase of the truck, she and the grandson had entered into an oral agreement whereby the grandson would pay her the purchase price of the truck. The grandson gave the grandmother a $2,000 down payment and agreed to pay her $50 per week. He also delivered the certificate of title to her. The grandmother testified that she had put the certificate of title in her lock box without looking at it and had not realized until she had retrieved it from her lock box after the grandson's arrest and the seizure of the truck that the grandson had been listed on the certificate of title as the owner of the vehicle. The grandmother's uncontradicted testimony indicated that the grandson's drug offense was committed without her knowledge or consent and that she “could not have obtained by the exercise of reasonable diligence knowledge of the intended illegal use of the [truck] so as to have prevented such use.” SeeAla.Code 1975, § 20–2–93(h).

The grandson made $50–per–week payments on the truck to the grandmother until his work hours were reduced, after which he paid only $25 per week. When the grandson's employer went out of business and the grandson lost his job, the grandson painted, mowed, and trimmed shrubbery for the grandmother in lieu of making payments. The trial court found that the grandson's payments and his labor in lieu of payments totaled $3,900.

The trial court entered a judgment on March 4, 2011, forfeiting the truck to the State, “subject to the unperfected lien of the [grandmother] in the amount of $10,774.50.” The State appealed from that judgment on March 31, 2011. The grandson has not favored this court with a brief.

Standard of Review

“ ‘Our standard of review is well settled. A trial court's judgment based on ore tenus evidence will be presumed correct and will not be reversed on appeal absent a showing that the trial court acted outside its discretion or that the judgment is unsupported by the evidence so as to be plainly and palpably wrong. Scholl v. Parsons, 655 So.2d 1060, 1062 (Ala.Civ.App.1995). However, when an appellate court is presented with an issue of law, we review the judgment of the trial court as to that issue de novo. Ex parte Perkins, 646 So.2d 46 (Ala.1994).’ ”

Pepper v. Pepper, 65 So.3d 421, 425 (Ala.Civ.App.2010) (quoting Henderson v. Henderson, 978 So.2d 36, 39 (Ala.Civ.App.2007)). The ore tenus standard of review “is applicable only to the trial court's findings of fact, not its conclusions of law.” Ex parte Cash, 624 So.2d 576, 577 (Ala.1993) (citing Moore v. McNider, 551 So.2d 1028 (Ala.1989), and Williams v. Nearen, 540 So.2d 1371 (Ala.1989)).

Discussion

In Jester v. State, 668 So.2d 822 (Ala.Civ.App.1995), a father loaned his son money to buy an automobile. The son had signed a document agreeing to pay the father $200 per month until the indebtedness was paid in full. The document included a description of the automobile and identified the father as the “first lienholder.” The father was also listed as the “first lienholder” on the certificate of title for the automobile. The son was subsequently arrested for possession of illegal drugs, and, when the State initiated a forfeiture action against the automobile, the father claimed that his interest in the vehicle was protected under § 20–2–93(h), Ala.Code 1975. That section provides:

“An owner's or bona fide lienholder's interest in any type of property other than real property and fixtures shall be forfeited under this section unless the owner or bona fide lienholder proves both that the act or omission subjecting the property to forfeiture was committed or omitted without the owner's or lienholder's knowledge or consent and that the owner or lienholder could not have obtained by the exercise of reasonable diligence knowledge of the intended illegal use of the property so as to have prevented such use.”

The parties stipulated in Jester that the son's drug offense was committed without the father's knowledge or consent and that the father “could not have obtained by the exercise of reasonable diligence knowledge of the intended illegal use of the property so as to have prevented such use.” The sole question before this court in Jester, therefore, was whether the father was a “bona fide lienholder.” In addressing that question, this court first analyzed the interest claimed by the father under former Article 9 (now Article 9A) of the Uniform Commercial Code (“UCC”) ¹ to determine whether he had a security interest in the vehicle and, thus, was a “secured party” within the meaning of former § 7–9–105(1)(m), Ala.Code 1975 (repealed and recodified, as revised, as § 7–9A–102(a)(72)(A) by Act No. 481, § 1, Ala. Acts 2001 (effective January 1, 2002)), and a “lienholder” within the meaning of § 20–2–93(h).

This court undertook an Article 9 analysis in Jester because the State argued that the father could not be a “bona fide lienholder” without having a security interest in the vehicle. Although this court did not explicitly say so in Jester, the State's argument was correct. “Under pre-Code law, practitioners were faced with a variety of security devices, each based upon artificial distinctions. Adoption of the Commercial Code eliminated these devices and their artificial distinctions by replacing them with the Article 9 security interest.” Patterson v. Spradlin (In re Patterson), 185 B.R. 354, 356 (Bankr.N.D.Ala.1995). SeeAla.Code 1975, § 7–1–201(35) ( “ ‘Security interest’ means an interest in personal property or fixtures which secures payment or performance of an obligation.”). Since Alabama's adoption of the UCC in 1965, whenever parties to a contract create a consensual lien as security for a debt, that transaction is a secured transaction...