State v. Preston

• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: [120 Wash. 570] HOVEY, J.
• Citation: State v. Preston, 120 Wash. 569, 208 P. 47 (Wash. 1922)
• Decision Date: 28 June 1922
• Docket Number: 17214.
• Parties: STATE ex rel. BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 306 et al. v. PRESTON, Superintendent of Public Instruction.

208 P. 47

120 Wash. 569

STATE ex rel. BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 306 et al. v. PRESTON, Superintendent of Public Instruction.

No. 17214.

Supreme Court of Washington

June 28, 1922

Department 2.

Appeal from Superior Court, Thurston County; John M. Wilson, Judge.

Writ of review to the superior court by the State of Washington, on the relation of Board of Directors of School District No. 306 and others, against Josephine Corliss Preston, as Superintendent of Public Instruction, of an order of defendant reversing an order dismissing R. J. Baldwin as principal and teacher of the Little Rock, shcool. From an affirmance of defendant's order, plaintiffs appeal. Reversed, and order of dismissal approved.

Roscoe R. Fullerton and Nat U. Brown, both of Olympia, for appellants.

Lindsay L. Thompson and O. R. Schumann, both of Olympia (P. M. Troy and Geo. F. Yantis, both of Olympia, of counsel), for respondent.

HOVEY, J.

R. J Baldwin was employed by the appellant school directors as principal and teacher of the Little Rock school under a contract for nine months commencing September 6, 1920. Appellants discharged Baldwin on January 29, 1921, and the latter appealed to the county superintendent, where a full hearing was had, and on April 7 the county superintendent affirmed the order of the board of directors. Baldwin then appealed to the state superintendent of public instruction and the latter, on July 21, 1921, reversed the order of the county superintendent. The superior court of Thurston county upon writ of review affirmed the order of the superintendent of public instruction, and an appeal was taken to this court. The state superintendent of public instruction refused to consider the case upon its merits, but held that, inasmuch as no notice was given nor trial had by the appellant directors their action is void, and the order of the county superintendent is without effect.

In the recent case of Andrus v. Church (Wash.) 201 P. 917 the point was raised whether under our statute (section 4481 Rem. Code), which provides among the powers of boards of directors 'to employ, for not more than one year, and for sufficient cause to discharge, teachers,' a teacher has the right to a formal hearing and trial before he or she may be discharged, notwithstanding the fact that ample grounds may exist for such action. We found it unnecessary to decide the question in that case, as we held that the teacher there did have ample notice. In the present case it appears the teacher had several conferences with the board and was advised to some extent of their complaints, but the matters do not seem to have been gone into as fully as they were in the former case, and at the time he was discharged the teacher demanded a trial.

A teacher is an employee, and not a public officer. Board of Education v. Bacon, 22 Ga.App. 72, 95 S.E. 753, in which case the Court of Appeals of Georgia has fully reviewed the authorities. Voorhees on the Law of Public Schools, p. 164. They are employed in this state by contracts for definite periods with the teacher as one party and the board of directors of the school district as the other. In the absence of express legislation we do not think it can be successfully maintained that one party to a contract must sit as a tribunal before exercising its privilege of terminating it.

Of course, if the contract is terminated wrongfully, the district is liable for the damages suffered, but we hold that the use of the words 'for sufficient cause' is simply a limitation upon the power to discharge given by the same section. The investigation which the board may see fit to make is within its own discretion. It should, and probably will, where practicable, discuss matters with the teacher before acting.

Under our present statute, however, the teacher is not without remedy, as by section 4707 right of appeal to the county superintendent is given from any decision or order of the board of directors, and the procedure is covered by sections 4708 to 4710, inclusive. It is contended by the respondent that, as section 4710 contains express provision for trial de novo before the board of county commissioners in the matters they review, no such procedure can be followed before the county superintendent, but we think that this does not follow, as it is provided that the county superintendent shall hear testimony, may administer oaths, summon witnesses, and demand records.

It should be noted in this connection that by an amendment...