State v. Price

Decision Date13 July 1990
Docket NumberNo. 63645,63645
Citation795 P.2d 57,247 Kan. 100
PartiesSTATE of Kansas, Appellant, v. Tyrone J. PRICE, Appellee.
CourtKansas Supreme Court

Syllabus by the Court

1. The purpose of a Jackson v. Denno hearing is to allow the trial court to determine the voluntariness of a statement or confession. Factors bearing on the voluntariness of a statement by an accused include the duration and manner of the interrogation; the ability of the accused on request to communicate with the outside world; the accused's age, intellect, and background; and the fairness of the officers in conducting the interrogation. The essential inquiry in determining the voluntariness of a statement is whether the statement was the product of the free and independent will of the accused. Following State v. Prince, 227 Kan. 137, Syl. p 4, 605 P.2d 563 (1980).

2. Questions reserved by the State in a criminal prosecution will not be entertained on appeal merely to demonstrate whether or not error has been committed by the trial court. Questions reserved are generally accepted on appeal where they involve questions of statewide interest important to the correct and uniform administration of the criminal law. They are declined where their resolution would not provide helpful precedent. Following State v. Hudon, 243 Kan. 725, 726, 763 P.2d 611 (1988).

R. Douglas Sebelius, County Atty., argued the cause and was on brief, for appellant.

Thomas H. Johnson, Asst. Appellate Defender, argued the cause, and Jessica R. Kunen, Chief Appellate Defender, was with him on brief, for appellee.

MILLER, Chief Justice:

The State appeals, pursuant to K.S.A. 22-3602(b)(3), on a question reserved: Whether the trial court erred in ruling that the defendant's statement to an agent of the Kansas Bureau of Investigation would not be admissible at trial.

Defendant Price was charged with a rape which occurred at the Norton State Hospital. Price was an inmate of the Norton Correctional Facility at the time and was identified by the victim as her assailant. In his statement to KBI Agent Blecha, he admitted talking to the victim during his work shift at the hospital but denied having sexual intercourse with her.

The trial court held a hearing on the admissibility of the statement outside the presence of the jury. Price was already in custody, serving a sentence, at the time the statement was taken by KBI Agent Blecha. Prior to taking the statement, Agent Blecha recited the Miranda warnings to the defendant from memory. As we said in State v. Prince, 227 Kan. 137, 605 P.2d 563 (1980):

"The purpose of a Jackson v. Denno hearing is to determine the voluntariness of a statement or confession. Factors bearing on the voluntariness of a statement by an accused include the duration and manner of the interrogation; the ability of an accused on request to communicate with the outside world; the accused's age, intellect, and background; and the fairness of the officers in conducting the interrogation. The essential inquiry in determining the voluntariness of a statement is whether the statement was the product of the free and independent will of the accused." 227 Kan. 137, Syl. p 4, 605 P.2d 563.

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1630, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), sets forth a bright line rule listing the procedural safeguards which must be followed in custodial interrogation before a statement thus obtained from a criminal defendant is, pursuant to the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, constitutionally admissible at trial:

"[A defendant] must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires. Opportunity to exercise these rights must be afforded to him throughout the interrogation. After such warnings have been given, and such opportunity afforded him, the individual may knowingly and intelligently waive these rights and agree to answer questions or make a statement. But unless and until such warnings and waiver are demonstrated by the prosecution at trial, no evidence obtained as a result of interrogation can be used against him." 384 U.S. at 479, 86 S.Ct. at 1630. (Emphasis supplied.)

At another point in the opinion, the Court states that, although the suspect may voluntarily waive the rights made known to him,

"[i]f ... he indicates in any manner and at any stage of the process that he wishes to consult with an attorney before speaking there can be no questioning.

... The mere fact that he may have answered some questions or volunteered some statements on his own does not deprive him of the right to refrain from answering any further inquiries until he has consulted with an attorney and thereafter consents to be questioned." 384 U.S. at 444-45, 86 S.Ct. at 1612.

"[W]here in-custody interrogation is involved, there is no room for the contention that the privilege is

waived if the individual answers some questions or gives some information on his own prior to invoking his right to remain silent when interrogated." 384 U.S. at 475-76, 86 S.Ct. at 1628.

That law enforcement agencies understand the spirit of Miranda is shown by the standard KBI and FBI warnings, which go beyond the letter of the law. The KBI warning reads:

"1. You have the right to remain silent.

"2. Anything you say can and will be used against you in a court of law.

"3. You have the right to talk to a lawyer and have him present with you while you are being questioned.

"4. If you cannot hire a lawyer, the court will appoint one for you.

"5. You can decide at anytime to exercise these rights and not answer any questions or make any statements." (Emphasis supplied.)

The FBI warning is even more complete:

"Before we ask you any questions, you must understand your rights.

"You have the right to remain silent.

"Anything you...

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15 cases
  • State v. William
    • United States
    • Kansas Supreme Court
    • 1 Marzo 1991
    ...or refuse to answer questions and statements, and defendant's confessions were freely, voluntarily and intelligently made." In State v. Price, 247 Kan. 100, Syl. p 1, 795 P.2d 57 (1990), this court set out some factors a court may consider to help it determine whether, under the totality of......
  • State v. Morton
    • United States
    • Kansas Supreme Court
    • 3 Julio 2008
    ...Instead, only the fifth factor-the fairness of the officers—is at issue in this case. The district court cited State v. Price, 247 Kan. 100, 795 P.2d 57 (1990) in support of its decision concerning the fairness of the agent's conduct. In Price, the defendant was an inmate at the Norton Corr......
  • State v. Lowery
    • United States
    • Kansas Supreme Court
    • 5 Octubre 2018
    ...that he had the right to stop answering questions should influence the determination of voluntariness. He points to State v. Price , 247 Kan. 100, 103-04, 795 P.2d 57 (1990), where this court denied a State's appeal from an order suppressing a defendant's confession, when the district court......
  • State v. Walker
    • United States
    • Kansas Supreme Court
    • 22 Enero 1993
    ...defendant contends the district court erred in refusing to suppress his confession. A Jackson v. Denno hearing was held herein. In State v. Price, 247 Kan. 100, Syl. p 1, 795 P.2d 57 (1990), we "The purpose of a Jackson v. Denno hearing is to allow the trial court to determine the voluntari......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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