State v. Price
| Citation | 311 Mont. 439,57 P.3d 42,2002 MT 229 |
| Decision Date | 10 October 2002 |
| Docket Number | No. 01-810.,01-810. |
| Parties | STATE of Montana, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Ryan Scott James PRICE, Defendant and Appellant. |
| Court | Montana Supreme Court |
Bruce Gobeo, Office of Public Defender, Missoula, MT, for Appellant.
Mike McGrath, Montana Attorney General, Jim Wheelis, Assistant Montana Attorney General, Helena, MT; Fred Van Valkenburg, Missoula County Attorney, Kirsten LaCroix, Deputy Missoula County Attorney, Missoula, MT, for Respondent.
¶ 1 Ryan Price (Price) was charged in the Fourth Judicial District Court with the offense of custodial interference after failing to return his daughter, S.L.P., to the custody of her mother. Price moved to dismiss the charge for improper venue, arguing that Lake County, where he had withheld S.L.P., and not Missoula County, where both parties resided and the dissolution proceedings were taking place, was the proper venue. Price also moved to dismiss the charge on the grounds that § 45-5-304(3), MCA, was unconstitutional, arguing it violated equal protection and was void for vagueness. The District Court denied both motions, and Price subsequently entered into a plea agreement, reserving the right to appeal the court's rulings. We affirm.
¶ 2 The issues Price presents are:
¶ 3 This case began in February 2000, when Price filed a petition for dissolution of marriage in the Fourth Judicial District Court, in Missoula County, Montana. Price and his wife, Ling Ling Cheng (Cheng), had one child, S.L.P., who was four years old at the time. The parties entered into an amended interim parenting plan on February 24, 2000, wherein the parties agreed that Monday through Friday, S.L.P. would reside with Cheng, and from Friday at 3:00 p.m., until Monday at 8:30 a.m., she would stay with Price. The interim parenting plan also provided that Price and Cheng, who both lived in Missoula, Montana, would exchange S.L.P. at designated locations in Missoula. The parties could not agree on a final parenting plan, so a non-jury trial was set for Monday, October 23, 2000.
¶ 4 As provided under the interim plan, Price had custody of S.L.P. the weekend prior to the October 23, 2000 trial. However, Price did not appear at the trial. According to Price's mother who was present in court, Price had left Missoula in the middle of the night, taking S.L.P. with him. The bench trial proceeded and the court ultimately found the marriage to be irretrievably broken, and adopted Cheng's proposed parenting plan, giving Cheng custody of S.L.P. At the trial's conclusion, the District Court ordered that custody of S.L.P. be delivered to Cheng immediately, and that S.L.P.'s passport be returned to Cheng forthwith. Later the same day, Cheng reported to the Missoula City Police that Price had failed to return S.L.P. as he was required to do earlier that day.
¶ 5 Over the next two days, Missoula law enforcement learned Price had been staying in various locations, including Polson, in Lake County, and Columbia Falls, in Flathead County. Price was ultimately discovered in Lake County at a bed and breakfast in St. Ignatius, Montana, where Lake County Sheriff Deputies arrested him on October 26, 2000. Apparently, S.L.P. was with Price when he was arrested and she was later reunited with Cheng.
¶ 6 On November 21, 2000, Price was charged by Information in Missoula County with custodial interference, a felony, pursuant to § 45-5-304, MCA, to which he plead not guilty at his arraignment eight days later. In the Information charging Price, the State asserted the following facts constituted the offense of custodial interference:
On or about October 23 through October 26, 2000, the above-named defendant, knowing he had no legal right to do so, took, enticed, and/or withheld a child, SLP, who had been entrusted by authority of law to the custody of Ling Ling Cheng, by Order of the Honorable C.B. McNeil, issued on October 23, 2000.1
¶ 7 Price filed two separate motions to dismiss. In his first motion, Price argued that Missoula County was not a proper venue, and in his second motion, Price alleged that Subsection (3) of the custodial interference statute, § 45-5-304, MCA, was constitutionally invalid. Following separate hearings, the District Court denied both motions to dismiss.
¶ 8 Ultimately, the parties reached a plea agreement wherein Price agreed to plead guilty, and the State agreed to recommend a three-year deferred sentence. In the agreement, Price reserved the right to appeal the court's rulings on his motions to dismiss. The District Court accepted Price's guilty plea and entered its Judgment on August 8, 2001, in accordance with the plea agreement. Price appeals the District Court's rulings denying his motion to dismiss for improper venue, and his motion to dismiss on the grounds that § 45-5-304(3), MCA, is unconstitutional.
¶ 9 The grant or denial of a motion to dismiss in a criminal case is a question of law which is reviewed de novo on appeal. State v. Hardaway, 2001 MT 252, ¶ 64, 307 Mont. 139, ¶ 64, 36 P.3d 900, ¶ 64 (citation omitted). Our standard of review is plenary, and this Court determines whether a district court's conclusion is correct. Hardaway, ¶ 64. When resolution of an issue on appeal involves a question of constitutional law, we review to determine whether the court's interpretation of the law is correct. Matter of S.L.M. (1997), 287 Mont. 23, 32, 951 P.2d 1365, 1370 (citation omitted).
¶ 10 Did the District Court err in denying Price's motion to dismiss for improper venue?
¶ 11 "Although venue is not an element of the crime, it is a jurisdictional fact that must be proven at trial as any other material element." State v. Diesen, 2000 MT 1, ¶ 14, 297 Mont. 459, ¶ 14, 992 P.2d 1287, ¶ 14 (citations omitted). In criminal trials, the State must therefore prove venue is proper beyond a reasonable doubt. Diesen, ¶ 14 (citation omitted).
¶ 12 Montana's Constitution provides that a criminal defendant has a right to "a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is alleged to have been committed, subject to the right of the state to have a change of venue for any of the causes for which the defendant may obtain the same." Mont. Const. Art. II, Sec. 24. Generally, "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the charge must be filed in the county where the offense was committed unless otherwise provided by law." Section 46-3-110(1), MCA.
¶ 13 Montana law also makes provision for those situations where the requisite acts of a criminal offense occur in multiple counties. Section 46-3-112, MCA, states:
¶ 14 Price was charged with violating Montana's custodial interference provision, § 45-5-304, MCA, which provides in relevant part:
¶ 15 Price argues that the State failed to show beyond a reasonable doubt that he withheld S.L.P. while in Missoula County, since he had legal custodial rights until at least 8:30 a.m. on October 23, 2000. Moreover, he asserts that the Information alleges his act of withholding S.L.P. occurred only in Lake County and not Missoula County. Price argues that according to the Information, the custodial interference did not occur until the District Court's order was entered on October 23, 2000, and contends the determinative inquiry as to venue rests with Price's whereabouts at the time the Final Parenting Plan was issued and Cheng was granted legal custody of S.L.P.
¶ 16 While we agree that the Information alleges Price withheld his daughter in Lake County, thus making that county proper for the purposes of venue, this does not end our inquiry, since charges comprised of more than one requisite act may be brought in any county in which any of the acts occurred. See § 46-3-112(1), MCA. Therefore, we must first examine the requisite elements of § 45-5-304(1), MCA, and then determine if any of those elements occurred in Missoula County.
¶ 17 "A person commits the offense of custodial interference if, knowing that the person has no legal right to do so, the person takes, entices, or withholds from lawful custody any child, ... entrusted by authority of law to the custody of another person...." Section 45-5-304(1), MCA (emphasis added). Therefore, the components of the offense include the act of taking, enticing or...
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