State v. Prieur, 52365

• Decision Date: 19 February 1973
• Docket Number: No. 52365,52365
• Citation: 277 So.2d 126
• Parties: STATE of Louisiana v. Raymond PRIEUR.
• Court: Louisiana Supreme Court

Page 126

277 So.2d 126

STATE of Louisiana v. Raymond PRIEUR.

No. 52365.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Feb. 19, 1973.

Rehearing Denied March 26, 1973.

Dissenting Opinion March 29, 1973.

Orleans Indigent Defender Program, Anthony R. Messina, New Orleans, for defendant-appellant.

William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Harry H. Howard, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jim Garrison, Dist. Atty., Louise Korns, Asst. Dist. Atty., for plaintiff-appellee.

BARHAM, Justice.

Raymond Prieur was charged with the armed robbery of Morris Johnson on the night of June 23, 1970, under a factual allegation that Prieur while armed with a pistol took $44.00 from Johnson, who was driving a New Orleans Public Service bus along his usual route. Prieur was arrested about a week later in connection with the armed robbery of Leroy Quarles at a service station. Prieur was tried and found guilty of the armed robbery of Morris Johnson, the bus driver, and sentenced to 25 years. From the conviction and sentence he has filed this appeal, relying on 21 bills of exceptions. ¹

Bills of Exceptions Nos. 13, 14, 15, 17, 18, 19 and 20 pertain to testimony given and evidence introduced concerning the armed robbery of Leroy Quarles for which the defendant was arrested on July 1, 1970, eight days after the commission of the offense in this case.

Defendant reserved Bill of Exceptions No. 16 when a witness, Clayton Johnson, testified about a third armed robbery. Like the victim in this case, Clayton Johnson was driving a New Orleans Public Service bus when on June 5, over two weeks before this offense, that armed robbery occurred.

The per curiams of the trial judge to these bills of exceptions state that the testimony and evidence were permitted under R.S. 15:445 and 446 to show knowledge, intent, and system. These statutes provide:

' § 445. Inference of intent; evidence of acts similar to that charged.

In order to show intent, evidence is admissible of similar acts, independent of the act charged as a crime in the indictment, for though intent is a question of fact, it need not be proven as a fact, it may be inferred from the circumstances of the transaction.

' § 446. Evidence where knowledge or intent is material and where offense is one of system.

When knowledge or intent forms an essential part of the inquiry, testimony may be offered of such acts, conduct or declarations of the accused as tend to establish such knowledge or intent and where the offense is one of a system, evidence is admissible to prove the continuity of the offense, and the commission of similar offenses for the purpose of showing guilty knowledge and intent, but not to prove the offense charged.'

This Court has become divided in its interpretation and application of the above provisions. See State v. Crook, 253 La. 961, 221 So.2d 473 (1969), with Justice Barham dissenting; State v. Bolden, 257 La. 60, 241 So.2d 490 (1970), with Justices Barham and Tate dissenting; and State v. Hills, 259 La. 436, 250 So.2d 394 (1971), with Justices Barham, Tate, and Dixon dissenting. Clearly, introduction of the testimony as to the service station robbery is unwarranted by the statutes cited, and further, sound notions of fundamental fairness embodied in our State's constitution necessitate its exclusion. The statutes cited were adopted in 1928 as part of the old Code of Criminal Procedure and reflect a conscious desire on the part of the draftsmen to adopt a limited, rather than expansive, approach to the admissibility of other acts of misconduct.

The admissibility of other acts of misconduct involves substantial risk of grave prejudice to a defendant. As to the prejudicial effect of evidence of other crimes, Wigmore says:

'* * * The natural and inevitable tendency of the tribunal--whether judge or jury--is to give excessive weight to the vicious record of crime thus exhibited, and either to allow it to bear too strongly on the present charge, or to take the proof of it as justifying a condemnation irrespective of guilt of the present charge. * * *' 1 Wigmore, Evidence § 194 (3rd Ed.).

The probative value of evidence of unrelated offenses in relation to the charged offense should therefore be weighed in light of its possible prejudicial effect, its tendency to influence the triers of fact improperly as to the present guilt of the accused. See McCormick on Evidence, § 190 (Cleary Ed. 1972). If evidence of other crimes were freely admissible, a defendant would often be forced to defend against charges of which he had no notice and for which he is unprepared.

Evidence of crimes related to the offense with which a defendant is charged is inadmissible except under special exceptions. For an excellent discussion of the problem, see McCormick on Evidence, § 190 (Cleary Ed. 1972). Aside from related offenses admissible as part of the res gestae, and convictions admissible for impeachment purposes, Louisiana's statutes provide for only three exceptions--acts relevant to show intent, knowledge or system.

Can it fairly be said that the robbery of the bus driver charged in the instant case and the robbery of the service station were part of a system within the meaning of the statutory exception embodied in R.S. 15:445--446? We explained in State v. Spencer, 257 La. 672, 243 So.2d 793 (1971), that crime of system are those acts and offenses which are of a like nature and exhibit like methods or plans of operation. Spencer was a prosecution for armed robbery, and we held that evidence as to another armed robbery was admissible, for there the other armed robbery followed the same modus operandi as the armed robbery charged and was related in time and location. See also State v. Montegut, 257 La. 665, 243 So.2d 791 (1971), and State v. Smith, 259 La. 515, 250 So.2d 724 (1971).

Clearly the robbery of the service station was not part of any common system. The only similarity between the robbery at the service station and the bus driver robbery charged in this case is that both were robberies with a pistol. The robbery at the service station occurred in the early morning hours. Two people drove up in a stationwagon, and one identified as this defendant got out of the vehicle, held a pistol (identified as resembling a .45) on the victim, and stated that this was it, he wanted all of the money. The robbery for which the defendant was charged in the instant case occurred in the evening around 9:00 when one person boarded a bus occupied by only the driver. The robber made a threat with a pistol (which the victim testified resembled a .38) and took some money from the driver. The victim in the present case could not definitely describe the clothing worn by the robber, nor was he certain that the pistol shown to him at the trial was the one used in the robbery. A comparison of the testimony of the victims in the two robberies lends no support to a theory that there was any similarity between the two offenses.

Since, as seen above, the robbery of the service station was not part of any system, can it properly be said that evidence as to it was admissible under the other two exceptions noted in R.S. 15:445 and 446--knowledge and intent? The ambit of these exceptions is helpfully elaborated in McCormick on Evidence as follows:

'To show, by similar act or incidents, that the act on trial was not inadvertent, accidental, unintentional, or without guilty knowledge.

To show, by immediate inference, malice, deliberation, ill will or the specific intent required for a particular crime.' McCormick on Evidence, § 190, pp. 450--451 (Cleary Ed. 1972).

Under the facts developed by the State it was quite clear that whoever held up the bus driver, Morris Johnson, knew what he was doing and intended what he was doing; there was no question of the robber's acts being 'inadvertent, accidental, unintentional or without guilty knowledge.' Thus, evidence of the service station robbery was in no sense fairly admissible by the State in its case in chief to show 'knowledge' or 'intent'. ² Nor was it properly admissible under any other exception to the 'other crime' exclusionary rule.

In this case it is apparent that the evidence of the service station robbery was offered to show that the defendant had a bad character, not to establish system, guilty knowledge, or intent. But a defendant's character is not properly at issue unless he chooses to put it at issue. See R.S. 15:481. The State's case against the defendant was weak, but it was not to be bolstered by the State's improper attack upon defendant's character. The record of the entire trial of this case consists of about fifty pages. The State's only evidence of the actual offense is taken from one witness, the bus driver who was robbed, and it consists of five pages of direct examination and one-half page of redirect. Two officers laid the predicate for the identification procedure, and four officers testified about the arrest of defendant following the service station robbery and the identification of his clothing and gun found at the scene of the arrest. Much of the evidence elicited from the officers who gave chase to the defendant and arrested him concerns the armed robbery at the service station. The remaining evidence concerns a third offense.

For the foregoing reasons, the admission of evidence as to the service station robbery was reversible error.

Because of the importance of the subject matter and because the defendant may again be tried for the instant crime, we feel it appropriate to state our view with respect to the admissibility of evidence as to the third offense, the robbery eighteen days previously of another bus driver. Since the other robbery was at the same hour, at the same corner, and also of a bus driver, it may well have been part of a common system within the meaning of R.S. 15:445 and 446. Thus we feel that if the State is able to show by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant committed such other crime, such evidence may well be properly...