State v. Prince

• Decision Date: 19 December 1942
• Docket Number: 7018
• Citation: 132 P.2d 146,64 Idaho 343
• Parties: STATE, Respondent, v. FRANK PRINCE and ANTHONY BEAUDOIN, Appellants
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

132 P.2d 146

64 Idaho 343

STATE, Respondent, v. FRANK PRINCE and ANTHONY BEAUDOIN, Appellants

No. 7018

Supreme Court of Idaho

December 19, 1942

CRIMINAL LAW-PERSISTENT VIOLATOR.

1. In prosecutions under the persistent violator of the law statute, where prior felony convictions relied upon by the state were committed in the state of Oregon, state was required to establish that the Oregon courts had jurisdiction of accused and jurisdiction to enter the judgments against them. (I.C.A., secs. 17-803, 19-2414.)

2. In prosecutions under the persistent violator of the law statute where judgments of Oregon courts, convicting accused of felonies were properly authenticated, the judgments were admissible and were entitled to "full faith and credit" which would have been accorded to them in the state of Oregon. (I.C.A., secs. 16-310, 17-803, 19-2414; 28 U.S. C.A., sec. 687; U.S. C.A., Const. art. 4, sec. 1.)

3. In prosecutions under the persistent violator of the law statute, where judgments of Oregon courts convicting accused of felonies established that the Oregon courts had a presiding judge, a clerk and a seal, presumption obtained that the Oregon courts were of general jurisdiction and the judgments were final and were proof and "best evidence" of what they showed on their face establishing the jurisdiction of the Oregon courts. (I.C.A secs. 16-310, 17-803, 19-2414; 28 U.S. C.A., sec. 687; U.S C.A., Const. art. 4, sec. 1.)

4. Where the language of a statute is unambiguous, the clearly expressed intent of the legislature must be given effect and there is no occasion for construction.

5. Accused who had for the third time been convicted of a felony were "persistent violators of law" within statute providing that any person convicted for the third time of a felony, whether the previous convictions were had within or without the state, shall be punished as a persistent violator of the law, and that all felonies charged against each accused were not committed in Idaho and whether a felony of which each accused was convicted in Oregon would have been a felony had it been committed within Idaho were immaterial. (I.C.A., sec. 19-2414.)

6. The statute providing that any person convicted for the third time of a felony, whether the previous convictions were had within or without the state shall be punished as a persistent violator of the law, manifests an intent to increase the penalty for the third conviction of a felony whether in the state or elsewhere and under the statute, conviction of a felony in other states will support a judgment enhancing the penalty in this state. (I.C.A., sec. 19-2414.)

Appeal from the District Court of the Second Judicial District, for Latah County. Hon. A. L. Morgan, Judge.

Conviction for crime of escape by prisoners convicted of second degree burglary, and being persistent violators of the law. From order denying motion for new trial, defendants appeal. Affirmed.

Affirmed.

Weldon Schimke for appellants.

A statute authorizing a more severe punishment to be inflicted upon one convicted of a second or subsequent offense is highly penal, and should not be extended in its application to cases which do not by the strictest construction come under its provisions. (16 C. J., p. 1139, No. 3150; Smalley v. People, 43 P.2d. 385, Colo. 1935; Commonwealth v. Woodward, 168 At. 347, Penn. 1933; State v. Bailey, 115 So. 613, 58 A. L. R. 1, La. 1928; State ex rel. McMullen v. Simpson, 277 P. 998, Wash. 1929.)

Under statutes increasing criminal sentences after one or more previous felony convictions, worded substantially similar to the Idaho statutory provision, the weight of authority requires proof that the prior offenses relied upon were felonies under the law of the forum. (People v. Gutterson, 155 N.E. 113, N. Y. 1926; Garcia v. State, 145 S.W.2d 180, Tex. 1940; Kirschner v. State, 9 Wis. 140, Wis. 1859; People v. Camperlingo, 231 P. 601, Calif. 1924; Cf. In re Dampier, 46 Idaho 195, 267 P. 452 (1928).

The state must prove the jurisdiction of a foreign court rendering a felony conviction if such prior conviction is to be used to increase a criminal penalty. (Allen v. Commonwealth, 114 S.W.2d 757, Ky. 1938; Fennen v. Commonwealth, 42 S.W.2d 744, Ky. 1931.)

Bert H. Miller, Attorney General, and J. R. Smead, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.

In Idaho a persistent "violator of law is one who is convicted in Idaho of a felony, having theretofore been at least twice convicted of a felony, whether within Idaho or elsewhere. (I. C. A. 19-2414; State v. Bates, Idaho , 107 P.2d 281.)

No former conviction which occurred in a foreign jurisdiction need have been for acts or conduct which would have constituted a felony in this state. It is sufficient that it was a felony in the other jurisdiction. (Garcia v. State (Tex.) 145 S.W.2d 180.)

At most, it is only required that the punishment provided for the offense defined by the law of the foreign jurisdiction shall have been of the same type as provided by Idaho law for felonies, that is, imprisonment in the penitentiary, or capital. (Kelley v. State (Ind.) 185 N.E. 453, 457-458; Dougherty v. State (Ind.) 191 N.E. 84, 88.)

Proof of a foreign judgment is made by an authenticated record as provided by congress, and by state statute. (U. S. Cons., Art. IV, Sec. 1, 28 U.S.C. A., Sec. 687; I. C. A., Sec. 16-310.)

When such a record, authenticated as required by law, is submitted, it imports absolute verity, and is final and conclusive. (Allen v. Commonwealth (Ky.) supra; Freeman on Judgments, 5th Ed., Sec. 1037; Notes, 5 L. R. A., N. S., 598; 103 Am. St. Rep., 304.)

BUDGE, J. Givens, C. J., and Holden, Ailshie, JJ., and Featherstone, D. J., concur.

OPINION

BUDGE, J.

This appeal is from an order overruling appellants' motion for a new trial. The record discloses substantially the following facts:

Appellants were duly convicted of the crime of second degree burglary in the District Court of the Second Judicial District for Latah County on the 11th day of March, 1941. While incarcerated in the Latah County jail, it is charged in the information "on or about the 12th day of March, 1941 * * * * Frank Prince and Anthony Beaudoin, * * * * did then and there wilfully, knowingly and unlawfully escape from confinement" in said county jail. The information further charges the appellants as "persistent violators of the law" within the meaning of Sec. 19-2414, I. C. A., in that each of them, prior to their conviction of the crime of burglary of the second degree, and the crime of escape by prisoners convicted of a felony, had been convicted of a felony in the State of Oregon: appellant Frank Prince having been convicted of the crime of obtaining money by false pretenses, a felony, in the Circuit Court of the State of Oregon, for Umatilla County, on the 6th day of January, 1939; and appellant Anthony Beaudoin having been convicted of the crime of receiving and concealing stolen property, a felony, in the Circuit Court of the State of Oregon, for Clackmas County, on the 2nd day of December, 1936. It is conceded that both appellants were duly convicted of the crime of burglary of the second degree, and that they were also both convicted under the provisions of Sec. 17-803, I. C. A., of the crime of escape by prisoners convicted of a felony, which is also a felony. Appellants, and each of them, plead not guilty to the charge of being a persistent violator of the law, and it is upon this phase of the case that we are concerned. Appellants specify and rely upon three assignments of error;

I.

That "The evidence is insufficient to support the verdict in that

There is no evidence that the Oregon Circuit Courts had jurisdiction to render the judgments of conviction against the defendants as pleaded in the information.

There is no evidence that the offenses of which the defendants were convicted in Oregon would have been felonies had they been committed in Idaho.

II.

That the court erred in refusing to direct a verdict in favor of the defendants upon the persistent violator aspect of the case for the reason that the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict by reason of the lack of proof of the issues set forth in the first specification of error herein.

III.

That the court erred in refusing to grant a new trial to correct the errors more particularly specified herein".

This appeal involves the "persistent violator" statute, Sec. 19-2414, supra, and presents two questions:

1. Is it necessary for the state to prove that the previous felony convictions relied upon would have been felonies under the laws of Idaho, had they been committed here?

2. Is it necessary for the state to prove that the Oregon courts which rendered the two judgments of conviction against the defendants had jurisdiction to render the same?

It is insisted the state submitted no proof upon either issue. We will discuss these questions in their inverse order. Does the record show the respective Oregon Courts had jurisdiction in the former criminal actions, or proceedings, against appellants in Oregon, and jurisdiction to render the judgment pronounced against them? It may be conceded that it was necessary for the state to establish upon the trial that the Oregon Court had jurisdiction of appellants, and jurisdiction to enter judgment against them, in order to sustain the conviction in the instant case, that they were persistent violators of the law. It is, therefore, with the method of proof of jurisdiction of the Oregon Court we are now concerned, and of what that proof must consist.

The Federal Constitution provides:

"Full faith and credit shall be given * * * * to the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of every other state. And the congress may be...