State v. Prince A.
Decision Date | 10 March 2020 |
Docket Number | AC 41962 |
Citation | 196 Conn.App. 413,229 A.3d 1213 |
Court | Connecticut Court of Appeals |
Parties | STATE of Connecticut v. PRINCE A. |
John C. Drapp III, assigned counsel, for the appellant (defendant).
Melissa Patterson, assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Gail P. Hardy, state's attorney, and John F. Fahey, supervisory assistant state's attorney, for the appellee (state).
Lavine, Bright and Devlin, Js.
The defendant, Prince A., appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of sexual assault in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-70(a)(2), sexual assault in the fourth degree in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 2009) § 53a-73a(a)(1)(A) and risk of injury to a child in violation of General Statutes § 53-21(a)(2). On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court improperly admitted testimony of a constancy of accusation witness to refute any negative inferences the jury might have drawn from the victim's delay in reporting the sexual assault because that witness mistakenly believed that there had been no delay.1 We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The jury reasonably could have found the following relevant facts. The victim is the defendant's daughter. In 2010 or 2011, when the victim was either ten or eleven years old, the defendant sexually assaulted the victim while they were alone in his apartment. Initially, the victim did not report the assault because she felt uncomfortable and scared. A few years later, in 2013, the victim told a friend at school about the assault. Shortly thereafter, the victim met with Iris Adgers, a behavior technician at the victim's school, and described the assault. Following this meeting, the Hartford Police Department was notified of the assault and investigated the defendant.
The following procedural history also is relevant to this appeal. On November 13, 2017, the state charged the defendant with sexual assault in the first degree, sexual assault in the fourth degree, and two counts of risk of injury to a child, one count under § 53-21(a)(1) and one count under § 53-21(a)(2). Trial commenced on November 27, 2017.
During trial, the jury heard testimony from the victim. When the defendant's trial counsel, William Gerace, cross-examined the victim, he challenged her credibility and her delay in reporting the assault. Following the victim's testimony, the state offered Adgers as a constancy of accusation witness whose testimony, as the court later explained in a limiting instruction to the jury, was offered solely Adgers offered brief testimony confirming that the victim had reported the sexual assault to Adgers. Immediately following the state's direct examination of Adgers, the court gave a limiting instruction to the jury regarding constancy of accusation testimony. On cross-examination, Adgers testified that, as far as she knew, the victim had reported the assault contemporaneously, without delay.2 Following Adgers' testimony, Gerace moved to strike her testimony, arguing that there was no justification for having a constancy of accusation witness testify when that witness testifies that there was no delay in the victim's reporting of the assault. The court denied the motion, noting that because the defendant had challenged the victim's credibility and her delay in reporting the assault, the state was permitted to present constancy testimony.
Following three days of evidence, the case was submitted to the jury. During its final charge to the jury, the court again offered a limiting instruction regarding Adgers' testimony. After deliberating, the jury found the defendant guilty of sexual assault in the first degree, sexual assault in the fourth degree, and one count of risk of injury to a child in violation of § 53-21(a)(2).3 The court then sentenced the defendant to serve a total effective term of seventeen years of imprisonment, followed by three years of special parole. This appeal followed.
Before turning to the claim on appeal, we set forth the applicable law governing the constancy of accusation doctrine and our scope and standard of review. The constancy of accusation (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Daniel W. E. , 322 Conn. 593, 618–19, 142 A.3d 265 (2016).
Presently, the constancy of accusation doctrine, as modified by our Supreme Court in Daniel W. E. , permits 4 (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 629, 142 A.3d 265. A constancy of accusation witness is limited to testifying "only with respect to the fact and timing of the victim's complaint; any testimony by the witness regarding the details surrounding the assault must be strictly limited to those necessary to associate the victim's complaint with the pending charge, including, for example, the time and place of the attack or the identity of the...
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