State v. Prince

Decision Date28 March 1962
Docket NumberNo. 17891,17891
Citation124 S.E.2d 778,240 S.C. 96
PartiesThe STATE, Respondent, v. Maggie PRINCE, Appellant.
CourtSouth Carolina Supreme Court

Thomas A. Babb, Marshall Abercrombie Laurens, for appellant.

Solicitor William T. Jones, Greenwood for respondent.

MOSS, Justice.

Maggie Prince, the appellant herein, and Hugh Dallis were jointly indicted and charged with committing an assault and battery with intent to kill upon one Posey Davis on August 5, 1958. They were tried at the 1959 February term of the Court of General Sessions for Laurens County, and the jury found both guilty of an assault and battery of a high and aggravated nature. The appellant was sentenced to five years imprisonment, suspended upon serving eighteen months, and then placed on probation for a period of five years. She now appeals from the conviction and sentence upon the ground that the evidence was insufficient to sustain a verdict against her. She preserved this exception by making a timely motion for a verdict of acquittal and for a new trial upon the ground heretofore stated.

A refusal to grant a motion for a directed verdict or a new trial will not be disturbed if there is evidence to sustain the verdict. The exception of the appellant necessitates a review of the evidence to determine whether there was error in the refusal of the trial Judge to direct a verdict of acquittal of the appellant.

The evidence in this case discloses that Posey Davis had intimately known the appellant for twelve years. During such period of time, even though she was a married woman, he had given her various sums of money. The testimony shows that Hugh Dallis had been going with the appellant for some period of time prior to the assault committed by him on Posey Davis. Davis testified that he had attempted to stop giving money to the appellant and that, as a result thereof, the appellant and Hugh Dallis became belligerent towards him on several occasions. It appears from the evidence that on August 5, 1958, between the hours of four and five P. M., that Hugh Dallis, accompanied by the appellant, and in an automobile owned by her, drove to the home of Posey Davis on Taylor Street, in the village of Joanna, in Laurens County, South Carolina. The automobile in which Dallis and the appellant were riding was parked with the front end thereof pointing towards the house next door to the home of Posey Davis. Hugh Dallis got out of the automobile and went into the yard of Aaron Howell, who was a next door neighbor of Posey Davis. James Patterson was cutting grass in the Howell yard. Dallis asked to borrow a gun from Howell and Patterson, with the statement concerning Posey Davis, that 'I'm going to kill that SOB up there.' Upon being told by Howell and Patterson that they did not have a gun, Dallis, reached in his pocket and 'took something out' and walked up to the porch of Davis's home and knocked on the porch floor. Getting no answer, Dallis went up on the porch of Davis's home and knocked on the door, and upon being advised by Davis not to come in his house, Dallis jerked the door open and went inside. While inside, Dallis grabbed Posey Davis, threw him upon a bed, cutting him on the lip, mouth and chin, necessitating fifty to sixty stitches to close the wounds. Dallis then dragged Davis out of the house, holding him around the chest, and both fell off the porch into the yard, Dallis landing on top of Davis. Dallis struck Davis twice while in the yard. There was also testimony that while Dallis was committing the assault upon Davis that the appellant 'slid over in the driver's seat, backed the car up, straightened it out, and he (Dallis) jumped in the car and she drove off.' There was testimony that the appellant had the motor of her automobile running, with the right hand door open towards the Davis home so that Dallis could get in. Dallis ran from where he had assaulted Davis to the waiting automobile, got in, and the appellant hurriedly drove away.

In considering whether the Court below erred in not directing a verdict in favor of the appellant, we must view the testimony in a light most favorable to the State. We have also held that on a motion for a directed verdict, the trial Judge is concerned with the existence or nonexistence of evidence, not with its weight; and although he should not refuse to grant the motion where the evidence merely raises a suspicion that the accused is guilty, it is his duty to submit the case to the jury, if there is substantial evidence which reasonably tends to prove the guilt of the appellant or from which her guilt may be fairly and logically deduced. State v....

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4 cases
  • State v. Fennell
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of South Carolina
    • March 27, 2000
    ...punishable by up to ten years in prison. State v. Hill, 254 S.C. 321, 331, 175 S.E.2d 227, 232 (1970); State v. Prince, 240 S.C. 96, 100, 124 S.E.2d 778, 780 (1962). ABHAN is the unlawful act of violent injury to another accompanied by circumstances of aggravation. State v. Frazier, 302 S.C......
  • State v. Bass
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of South Carolina
    • April 1, 1963
    ...trial will not be disturbed where there is evidence to support the verdict. State v. Miller, 223 S.C. 128, 74 S.E.2d 582; State v. Prince, 240 S.C. 96, 124 S.E.2d 778. The duty of the Court when considering a motion for directed verdict is not to pass upon the weight of the evidence but to ......
  • State v. Young
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of South Carolina
    • November 4, 1963
    ...evidence which reasonably tends to prove the fact in issue, the case must be submitted to the jury for determination. State v. Prince, 240 S.C. 96, 124 S.E.2d 778. The testimony in behalf of the State was that James A. Rish, a member of the South Carolina Highway Patrol, on the night of Mar......
  • State v. Hill, 19067
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of South Carolina
    • June 16, 1970
    ......Jones, supra, that the foregoing division 'is intended more for the purpose of imposing sentence than of establishing distinct crimes or degrees of a crime.'.         All of the degrees of the offense of assault and battery have been considered as misdemeanors, State v. Prince, [254 S.C. 330] 240 S.C. 96, 124 S.E.2d 778, until 1969 when the General Assembly classified assault and battery with intent to kill as a felony and prescribed the punishment therefor, § 16--11, and 16--93.1, Supplement to 1962 Code of Laws. The remaining degrees of assault and battery are ......

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