State v. Pringle, No. 42819

• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Washington
• Writing for the Court: HUNTER; HALE
• Citation: 517 P.2d 192,83 Wn.2d 188
• Parties: STATE of Washington, Petitioner, v. Darrell Lee PRINGLE, Respondent.
• Docket Number: No. 42819
• Decision Date: 20 December 1973

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83 Wn.2d 188 517 P.2d 192 STATE of Washington, Petitioner,
v.
Darrell Lee PRINGLE, Respondent. No. 42819. Supreme Court of Washington, En Banc. Dec. 20, 1973.

[517 P.2d 193] Christopher T. Bayley, Pros. Atty., Charles J. Delaurenti, II, Seattle, for petitioner.

Robert T. Czeisler, Seattle, for respondent.

HUNTER, Associate Justice.

This case involves a petition for writ of mandamus brought by the plaintiff (petitioner), State of Washington, to require a trial judge at a sentencing hearing to enter a special finding of fact that the defendant (respondent), Darrell Lee Pringle, was armed with a deadly

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weapon and firearm during the commission of a robbery for which he entered a plea of guilty.

On March 9, 1973, the defendant and another were charged by amended information in the Superior Court for King County with three counts of robbery while armed with a deadly weapon (as defined by RCW 9.95.040) and a firearm (pursuant to RCW 9.41.025). On March 30, 1973, the defendant, represented by counsel, entered a plea of guilty to count 1 of the information, and counts 2 and 3 of the information were dismissed by the court upon motion by the plaintiff. At this time the trial court advised the defendant of the consequences of entering a plea of guilty to the charge, which, because of the deadly weapon and firearm allegations, carried with it the mandatory minimum sentences imposed by RCW 9.95.040(1) and RCW 9.41.025(1).

The sentencing hearing was held on May 3, 1973, before a judge of the Superior Court who did not preside over the case at the time of the entry of the plea. At the hearing it was disclosed that the 36-year-old defendant had no prior felonies on his record and had committed only two misdemeanor offenses of vagrancy and minor consumption of alcohol. After considering the arguments of counsel, the sentencing judge deleted the language in the finding portion of the judgment and sentence, referring to 'armed with a deadly weapon, to wit: a firearm' upon the theory that he was acting within the court's power under RCW 10.46.090. At the same time the sentencing judge refused to enter the special finding of fact pursuant to RCW 9.95.015 as to whether or not the defendant was armed with a deadly weapon at the time of the commission of the crime, and sentenced the defendant to imprisonment for the crime of robbery for a maximum term of 20 years.

On May 16, 1973, the plaintiff filed an application for a writ of mandamus with this Court to compel the sentencing judge to enter the special finding of fact pursuant to RCW 9.95.015, or to have this Court enter an order making such a finding. At a preliminary hearing held on June 28, 1973, we

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ordered the matter be set for a full hearing, and stayed the determination of the duration of confinement by the Board of Prison Terms and Paroles. Meanwhile, on July 2, 1973, the Board of Prison Terms and Paroles, apparently unaware of the stay order, set the minimum term of the defendant at five years. The plaintiff's first contention before this court is that the sentencing judge had no authority under RCW 10.46.090 ¹ to strike [517 P.2d 194] the language referring to 'armed with a deadly weapon, to wit: a firearm' from the judgment and sentence when the defendant had entered a valid plea of guilty to the allegations in the information. We agree. The statute upon which the sentencing judge relied provides as follows:

The court may, either upon its own motion or upon application of the prosecuting attorney, and in furtherance of justice, order any criminal prosecution to be dismissed; but in such case the reason of the dismissal must be set forth in the order, which must be entered upon the record. No prosecuting attorney shall hereafter discontinue or abandon a prosecution except as provided in this section.

RCW 10.46.090.

Pursuant to this statute, the sentencing judge reasoned that it was within the power of the court to delete the language in question from the judgment and sentence 'in furtherance of justice.' This statute, however, relates to the dismissal of a 'criminal prosecution' and in no way authorizes a sentencing judge to modify a criminal information after the conclusion of the prosecution and after a valid plea of guilty has been entered. In entering the plea to the

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charge in the information, the defendant admitted all the allegations therein and acknowledged full responsibility for the legal consequences of his guilt. State v. Dodd, 70 Wash.2d 513, 424 P.2d 302 (1967). This Court on prior occasions, has addressed the issue of the finality of a valid plea of guilty, and we adhere to the reasoning set forth in In re Woods v. Rhay, 68 Wash.2d 601, 414 P.2d 601 (1966), on page 605, 414 P.2d on page 604:

A plea of guilty to a criminal offense, if voluntarily made in open court, is a confession of guilt and the result equivalent to a conviction. Unless withdrawn before sentence is pronounced, such a plea has the same effect in law as a verdict of guilty, for nothing remains to be done save the imposition of sentence. In re Mohr v....