State v. Provenzano, A--96
| Decision Date | 20 March 1961 |
| Docket Number | No. A--96,A--96 |
| Citation | 34 N.J. 318,169 A.2d 135 |
| Parties | STATE of New Jersey, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Anthony PROVENZANO, Defendant-Respondent. |
| Court | New Jersey Supreme Court |
William A. O'Brien, Asst. Prosecutor, Jersey City, for appellant (Lawrence A. Whipple, Hudson County Prosecutor, Jersey City, attorney).
Maurice M. Krivit, Jersey City, for defendant-respondent (Clive S. Cummis, Newark, on the brief).
The opinion was delivered
Defendant was indicted for violation of N.J.S. 2A:93--7, N.J.S.A., which reads:
'Any person who gives, offers or promises any money, real estate, service or thing of value to any duly Appointed representative of a labor organization, with intent to influence him in respect to any of his acts, decisions or other duties as such representative, or to induce him to prevent or cause a strike by the employees of any person, or any such representative who accepts or agrees to accept the same for any such purpose, is guilty of a misdemeanor.' (Emphasis added.)
The indictment alleged that defendant was 'a duly appointed representative' of teamster Local No. 560. Defendant moved to dismiss the indictment on the ground that although on the day of the alleged offense he was a representative, i.e., business agent, yet he acquired the post by 'election' and hence was not an 'appointed' representative within the language of the statute. The trial court granted the motion. We certified the State's appeal before the Appellate Division acted upon it.
The statute denounces bribery in labor-management matters. The Legislature used the word 'representative' to embrace all who act for a labor organization. Defendant's argument runs that although the Legislature used a word of such wide sweep, yet it intended to cut it down by the adjective 'appointed,' and indeed to make the criminality of a bribe depend upon the method whereby the representative status was established. Counsel was unable to suggest any reasson why a rational legislator would want to draw so irrelevant a line, and we too are unable to think of one.
The word 'appoint' means 'designate,' 'choose,' 'select.' 6 C.J.S. Appoint p. 87. Defendant refers to public offices and contends that with respect to them a distinction is drawn between 'appoint' and 'elect.' Even there, however, 'appoint' may well include any method of selection whether it be election by the voters or another technique. McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 27, 13 S.Ct. 3, 36 L.Ed. 869, 874 (1892); State ex rel. Reid v. Gorsuch, 67 N.J.L. 396, 51 A. 457 (Sup.Ct.1902); In re Opinion of the Justices, 118 Me. 552, 107 A. 705, 5 A.L.R. 1407 (Sup.Jud.Ct.1919).
At any rate, there is no basis for the assumption upon with defendant's argument depends, i.e., that the usage of 'appoint' with respect to public office is relevant here. The criminal statute deals with private organizations. Whereas in the case of public posts there are constitutional and statutory provisions dealing with 'appointment' and 'election' to office, thus inviting the question whether in a given measure the Legislature intended 'appointed' to include an 'elected' officer, we do not have a statutory scheme for the selection of officers and other representatives of labor organizations and hence there is no existing statutory frame of reference to which we may look to find a purpose here to include some representatives and to exclude others. We gather from the constitution and by-laws of the local, furnished to us at our request, that the local was and is 'an unincorporated labor union.' Whatever the nature of this local, the significant fact is that the Legislature has not fashioned a mandatory plan for the creation of labor organizations and for the selection of its representatives, and thus the word 'appoint' cannot be measured against other legislative usage in this area.
Hence to accept defendant's argument would be to find the Legislature intended the application of the criminal statute to depend upon the mode of selection which each union may choose to adopt and thus, in net effect, to delegate to each organization the policy question whether its...
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...interests of those subject to it will fairly permit." State v. Gill, 47 N.J. 441, 444, 221 A.2d 521 (1966) (citing State v. Provenzano, 34 N.J. 318, 322, 169 A.2d 135 (1961)). Moreover, "whatever be the rule of [statutory] construction, it is subordinate to the goal of effectuating the legi......
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...'All rules of construction are subordinate to that obvious proposition.' " Id. at 481, 483 A.2d 411 (quoting State v. Provenzano, 34 N.J. 318, 322, 169 A.2d 135 (1961)). Thus, "the words of [a penal statute] are to be accorded a rational meaning in harmony with the obvious intent and purpos......
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