State v. Provet

• Citation: 747 S.E.2d 453,405 S.C. 101
• Decision Date: 14 August 2013
• Docket Number: No. 27297.,27297.
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court
• Parties: The STATE, Respondent, v. Karriem PROVET, Petitioner. Appellate Case No. 2011–192746.

405 S.C. 101

747 S.E.2d 453

The STATE, Respondent,

v. Karriem PROVET, Petitioner.Appellate Case No. 2011–192746.

No. 27297.

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

Heard June 19, 2013.

Decided Aug. 14, 2013.

Tricia A. Blanchette of Law Office of Tricia A. Blanchette, LLC, of Columbia, for Petitioner.

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson, Chief Deputy Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Senior Assistant Deputy Attorney General Salley W. Elliott, Senior Assistant Deputy Attorney General Deborah R.J. Shupe and Solicitor William Walter Wilkins, III, all of Columbia, for Respondent.

Justice PLEICONES.

The Court granted certiorari to review a Court of Appeals opinion that affirmed the convictions and sentence of Karriem Provet (petitioner) for trafficking cocaine and resisting arrest. State v. Provet, 391 S.C. 494, 706 S.E.2d 513 (Ct.App.2011). On certiorari, petitioner argues the Court of Appeals erred when it affirmed the trial court's determination that reasonable suspicion existed to justify extension of a traffic stop and that petitioner voluntarily consented to the search of his vehicle. We affirm.

FACTS

Corporal John Owens (Officer) is a 14–year veteran of the South Carolina Highway Patrol and 4–year veteran and supervisor of the upstate Aggressive Criminal Enforcement unit that targets drug trafficking and other serious crimes utilizing highway transportation. One evening in May 2002, while patrolling Interstate 85 in Greenville County, he stopped petitioner's vehicle for following another vehicle too closely and driving with a burned out tag light. He approached and asked petitioner for his driver's license and vehicle registration.

Officer testified that as petitioner produced those items, he observed that petitioner's hands were shaking excessively and his breathing was accelerated. Upon viewing the vehicle's registration, Officer discovered that the vehicle was registered to a third party. He asked petitioner to step out of and to the rear of the vehicle. Officer performeda pat-down search which did not yield any weapons.

As Officer prepared a warning citation, he asked petitioner where he was coming from, and petitioner answered that he had been visiting his girlfriend at a nearby Holiday Inn. However, Officer had observed petitioner's vehicle approach and pass the exit at which the only Holiday Inn in Greenville was located. Officer asked petitioner at what exit the Holiday Inn was located, and petitioner could not say. Officer asked whether petitioner had gone to another location after leaving the Holiday Inn, and petitioner denied having done so. In response to Officer's questions, petitioner explained that the vehicle belonged to a different girlfriend than the one he had been visiting in Greenville; that he had recently graduated from a technical college and did not yet have a job; and that he had been in Greenville for two days but without bringing luggage. Officer also testified that he observed petitioner use delay tactics. Officer called for a canine drug detection unit. He then called dispatch to check on the status of petitioner's driver's license and the vehicle's registration.

Officer then approached petitioner's vehicle to check the vehicle identification number. While doing so, he observed several air fresheners and fast food bags, a cell phone, and some receipts, as well as a bag on the rear seat. The canine unit arrived before Officer received the dispatcher's return call regarding the status of petitioner's license and registration. When the dispatcher reported no problems with either of these items, Officer returned petitioner's license and registration and issued him a traffic warning citation.

Officer then asked for permission to search the vehicle, and petitioner assented. The officer handling the drug detection canine began preparing for the search. As he did so, petitioner fled the scene on foot but was apprehended. The drug detection canine alerted on the fast food bag, in which officers discovered a substance that field tested positive for and was later confirmed to be cocaine.

Petitioner moved to suppress the cocaine because it was obtained as a result of an illegal search. The trial court denied the motion. It found that the purpose of the traffic stop was complete when Officer asked for permission to search the vehicle, so that two detentions existed for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. It found the second detention justified by Officer's reasonable suspicion that petitioner was involved in criminal activity and found that petitioner voluntarily consented to the search of the vehicle. The jury returned a guilty verdict on charges of drug trafficking and resisting arrest, and the trial court sentenced petitioner to twenty-five years' imprisonment. The Court of Appeals affirmed. This Court granted certiorari. We now affirm the Court of Appeals, and clarify that off-topic questioning by a law enforcement officer during the course of a traffic stop does not constitute a separate seizure for purposes of the Fourth Amendment, so long as the off-topic questioning does not measurably extend the duration of the stop.

ISSUES

1. Did the Court of Appeals err when it affirmed the trial court's finding the officer had reasonable suspicion to seize petitioner after the conclusion of a lawful traffic stop?

2. Did the Court of Appeals err when it affirmed the trial court's finding that petitioner voluntarily consented to the search of his vehicle?

ANALYSIS

I. Lawfulness of seizure

Petitioner contends the Court of Appeals erred when it affirmed the trial court's finding that the traffic stop was not unreasonably prolonged and that Officer had reasonable suspicion to further detain petitioner. We disagree.

South Carolina appellate courts review Fourth Amendment determinations under a clear error standard. See State v. Brockman, 339 S.C. 57, 64–66, 528 S.E.2d 661, 664–66 (2000). We affirm if there is any evidence to support the trial court's ruling. Id. at 66, 528 S.E.2d at 666.

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures. A police officer may “stop and briefly detain a person for investigative purposes” if he “has a reasonable suspicion supported by articulable facts that criminal activity ‘may be afoot’....” United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7, 109 S.Ct. 1581, 104 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989). The test whether reasonable suspicion exists is an objective assessment of the circumstances; the officer's subjective motivations are irrelevant. See Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 38, 117 S.Ct. 417, 136 L.Ed.2d 347 (1996) (“[T]he fact that an officer does not have the state of mind which is hypothecated by the reasons which provide the legal justification for the officer's action does not invalidate the action taken as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify that action. Subjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis.”) (quoting Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996) (internal brackets, ellipsis, and quotation marks omitted)).

Violation of motor vehicle codes provides an officer reasonable suspicion to initiate a traffic stop. See Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 109, 98 S.Ct. 330, 54 L.Ed.2d 331 (1977). A traffic stop supported by reasonable suspicion of a traffic violation remains valid until the purpose of the traffic stop has been completed. Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 333, 129 S.Ct. 781, 172 L.Ed.2d 694 (2009). The officer may not extend the duration of a traffic stop in order to question the motorist on unrelated matters unless he possesses reasonable suspicion that warrants an additional seizure of the motorist. See United States v. Sullivan, 138 F.3d 126, 131 (4th Cir.1998). The officer cannot avoid this rule by employing dilatory tactics. See United States v. Jones, 234 F.3d 234 (5th Cir.2000) (driver's Fourth Amendment rights violated when, after dispatcher reported no problems and officer had completed warning citation except for obtaining the driver's signature, officer deliberately delayed completing the stop for several more minutes until canine search unit arrived).

Notwithstanding that an officer may not lawfully extend the duration of a traffic stop in order to engage in off-topic questioning, this rule does not limit the scope of the officer's questions to the motorist during the traffic stop. As the United States Supreme Court has recently emphasized, “[a]n officer's inquiries into matters unrelated to the justification for the traffic stop, this Court has made plain, do not convert the encounter into something other than a lawful seizure, so long as those inquiries do not measurably extend the duration of the stop.” Johnson, 555 U.S. at 333, 129 S.Ct. 781;see also Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 101, 125 S.Ct. 1465, 161 L.Ed.2d 299 (2005) (“As the Court of Appeals did not hold that the detention was prolonged by the questioning, there was no additional seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Hence, the officers did not need reasonable suspicion to ask Mena [while detained as an occupant of a house being searched pursuant to a warrant] for her name, date and place of birth, or immigration status.”); United States v. Everett, 601 F.3d 484, 490–91 (6th Cir.2010) (explaining that in Muehler v. Mena the Supreme Court resolved in the negative a circuit split on the question whether asking a motorist questions unrelated to the circumstances justifying the traffic stop violated the Fourth Amendment).

The officer's observations while conducting the traffic stop may create reasonable suspicion to justify further search or seizure. See Mimms, 434 U.S. at 111–12, 98 S.Ct. 330 (finding “little question the officer was justified” in conducting pat-down search after officer asked motorist to exit vehicle and then observed bulge in motorists' jacket).

a. Length of initial seizure

The trial court held that the initial...