State v. Pruitt

• Decision Date: 25 May 2016
• Citation: 510 S.W.3d 398
• Parties: STATE of Tennessee v. John Henry PRUITT
• Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

510 S.W.3d 398

STATE of Tennessee

v.John Henry PRUITT

Supreme Court of Tennessee, AT NASHVILLE.

May 25, 2016 Session Heard at Cookeville¹

Vanessa Pettigrew Bryan, District Public Defender; J. Gregory Burlison (at trial and on appeal), and Robert Jones (at trial), Assistant District Public Defenders, for the appellant, John Henry Pruitt.

Herbert H. Slatery III, Attorney General and Reporter; Andrée S. Blumstein, Solicitor General; Sarah K. Campbell, Special Assistant to the Solicitor General and the Attorney General; Kim Helper, District Attorney General; Michael J. Fahey and Kate Yeager, Assistant District Attorneys General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

Roger A. Page, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which Jeffrey S. Bivins, C.J., Cornelia A. Clark, Sharon G. Lee, and Holly Kirby, JJ., joined.

OPINION

Roger A. Page, J.

We granted this appeal to consider whether the Court of Criminal Appeals incorrectly held in State v. Hayes , No. M2012–01768–CCA–R3–CD, 2013 WL 3378320, at *7 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 1, 2013), no perm. app. filed , that retroactive application of the Exclusionary Rule Reform Act, Tennessee Code Annotated section 40–6–108, would violate constitutional protections against ex post facto laws and to re-evaluate the ex post facto analysis in Miller v. State , 584 S.W.2d 758 (Tenn. 1979), in light of Collins v. Youngblood , 497 U.S. 37, 110 S.Ct. 2715, 111 L.Ed.2d 30 (1990). Having concluded that Miller was wrongly decided, we overrule Miller and hold that the ex post facto clause of the Tennessee Constitution has the same definition and scope as the federal ex post facto clause. To be an ex post facto violation, a law must be retroactive in its application and must fall within one of the four categories set forth in Calder v. Bull , 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 390, 1 L.Ed. 648 (1798) (opinion of Chase, J.). We conclude that the Exclusionary Rule Reform Act is not an ex post facto statute as applied in this case and that as a result, the Defendant's motion to suppress the evidence against him was not well-taken. In addition, we conclude that the Defendant's issues regarding the sufficiency of the evidence to convict him and to sentence him to life without the possibility of parole do not entitle him to relief. Accordingly, the judgments of the Court of Criminal Appeals are affirmed on the separate grounds stated herein.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

On October 18, 2010, John Henry Pruitt ("the Defendant"), shot three people in his front yard, two of whom died. The third victim was paralyzed. The responding law enforcement officers shot the Defendant four times. The Hickman County Grand Jury indicted him for two counts of first degree premeditated murder (victims Amber Hopkins and John Louis Luster), one count of attempted premeditated murder (victim James E. Kennedy), and three counts of aggravated assault (victims Deputy Jody Simmons, Detective Johnny Davis, and Deputy Ricky Harness). On March 16, 2012, the Defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence seized from his residence based upon an allegedly illegal search warrant.² After a pretrial hearing on April 13, 2012, the trial court³ denied the Defendant's motion, ruling that Tennessee Code Annotated section 40–6–108,⁴ commonly known as the Exclusionary Rule Reform Act ("ERRA"), applied to the case despite ex post facto concerns because it was a procedural statute, that the mistake in the search warrant was a good faith or technical violation of Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 41, and that the mistake did not require the exclusion of evidence.⁵ The evidence presented at the suppression hearing and the Defendant's trial is set forth below.

At the suppression hearing,⁶ the documents entered as exhibits include the affidavit in support of the search warrant (which was dated October 18), the search warrant itself (which has two dates, October 19 above the magistrate's signature and October 18 on the "Issued on" line), and the search warrant return (dated October 18). Hickman County Sheriff's Department Chief Deputy Scott Smith⁷ testified that he wrote the search warrant affidavit and signed it on October 18, 2010. He met with the magistrate, who found probable cause for the search and "issued" the warrant at 11:53 p.m. on October 18. He acknowledged that October 19 was the date listed above the magistrate's signature. Chief Deputy Smith stated that the date might have changed "in between the time that she issued [the search warrant] and [when] she signed it." We understand his testimony to mean that the magistrate might have dated the "Issued on" line prior to signing and dating the signature line. Chief Deputy Smith conjectured that because the time was "so close to midnight," either it had become October 19 by the time she signed the warrant or that her timepiece was incorrect. He stated that he called the officers at the scene immediately after the signing of the search warrant.⁸ Chief Deputy Smith acknowledged that the date on the warrant return was October 18, stating that he was referring back to the date on the search warrant when he entered the date on the return. He denied that the search warrant was executed prior to its signing. Chief Deputy Smith testified that a box of ammunition was recovered from the Defendant's residence and that officers saw a shotgun in the residence during the search. According to Tennessee Bureau of Investigation ("TBI") Agent Mike Cox, the investigators did not know that the shotgun had any significance until a witness mentioned it. Agent Cox obtained a waiver from the Defendant to allow investigators to collect the shotgun. Because the Defendant's sister had already obtained the shotgun from the residence, Chief Deputy Smith recovered the shotgun from her.

Witnesses at the Defendant's trial testified that one of the victims, Amber Hopkins, had been in a relationship with the Defendant for approximately a year prior to her death. Ms. Hopkins lived with the Defendant during that year, with the exception of a week that she spent at the residence of James "Elvis" Kennedy, some three to four weeks before the incident in question. Mr. Kennedy described his relationship with Ms. Hopkins as "friends with benefits," noting that they had known each other since they were teenagers. Mr. Kennedy testified that he helped Ms. Hopkins move her things out of the Defendant's residence several weeks before her death, and in the Defendant's statement to Agents Vance Jack and Mike Cox, the Defendant said that Ms. Hopkins returned to his home after several days at Mr. Kennedy's residence.

On October 17, 2010, Ms. Hopkins went to Honda Hills, a recreational area, to ride four-wheelers with Mr. Kennedy and her daughter.⁹ Ms. Hopkins' daughter was in an accident that resulted in a broken wrist and required a visit to the hospital. According to Ms. Hopkins' mother, Belinda Conley, Ms. Hopkins asked the Defendant to take them to the emergency room, and when he refused, Mr. Kennedy took them instead. While Ms. Hopkins and Mr. Kennedy were at the hospital, the Defendant went to Ms. Conley's house.

Ms. Hopkins and Mr. Kennedy arrived at Ms. Conley's house soon after the Defendant. According to Mr. Kennedy, the Defendant thanked him for bringing the young girl home, but when the Defendant began conversing with Ms. Hopkins, the Defendant became angry. Ms. Conley described the Defendant as being upset when he left her house. Ms. Hopkins spent the night at Mr. Kennedy's house that evening.

The following day, October 18, Mr. Kennedy worked until noon and then ran errands with Ms. Hopkins. His friend and co-worker, John Luster, was at his house when they returned around 6:00 p.m. The three of them then went to the Defendant's house in Mr. Kennedy's truck. They planned to pick up Ms. Hopkins' belongings, which were supposed to be by the roadside. According to Mr. Kennedy, he had not had any alcohol that day, but Mr. Luster drank a beer on the way to the Defendant's house.

When they arrived at the Defendant's house, Mr. Kennedy parked in front of the pile of Ms. Hopkins' possessions. He and Mr. Luster both exited the truck while Ms. Hopkins remained inside. Mr. Kennedy began putting Ms. Hopkins' belongings in the bed of his truck, and he was standing at his truck's tailgate when he first saw the Defendant. Mr. Kennedy testified that the Defendant had "a rifle on his shoulder and a pistol in his hand." Mr. Kennedy yelled to Mr. Luster that the Defendant had a gun.

Mr. Kennedy said that he was standing on the back of his truck when he was shot under his right arm. He fell to the ground but pulled himself up enough to see Ms. Hopkins lying on the seat of the truck. He again fell to the ground and could not move his legs. Mr. Kennedy recalled the Defendant's pointing a double-barreled, twelve-gauge shotgun at his head and his telling Mr. Kennedy to get up. Mr. Kennedy said that the Defendant told him to move to the front of the truck so the Defendant could see Mr. Kennedy's face. Mr. Kennedy managed to move himself to the front of his truck and proceeded to beg for his life. He said that he heard Ms. Hopkins' voice and then "heard a thump hit the ground." Believing that the Defendant had dragged Ms. Hopkins out of the truck, Mr. Kennedy looked to the side and saw her. Mr. Kennedy testified that Ms. Hopkins said, "Johnny, don't touch me," repeatedly. She looked at Mr. Kennedy and told him, "I'm sorry." Thereafter, Mr. Kennedy heard the Defendant talking on the telephone.

The Defendant called several people after the shooting. Having already called Belinda Conley multiple times during the day to relay messages to Ms. Hopkins, he called her again between 7:10 and 7:15 p.m., telling her, "[T]hey're all dead." The Defendant told Ms. Conley that he was sorry and hung up. The Defendant also called 9–1–1. He told the dispatcher his name and location, that three people had come into his home, and that he had shot them. The Defendant's brother-in-law, ...