State v. Pruser

• Decision Date: 20 August 1941
• Docket Number: No. 3.,3.
• Citation: 127 N.J.L. 97,21 A.2d 641
• Parties: STATE v. PRUSER.
• Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

21 A.2d 641

127 N.J.L. 97

STATE

v. PRUSER.

No. 3.

Supreme Court of New Jersey.

Aug. 20, 1941.

Error to Court of Quarter Sessions, Morris County.

Karola Pruser was convicted of soliciting the registering of her name on the registry list of an election district, knowing that she was not a legal voter in such district, and of voting at general election, knowing that she was not a qualified voter, and she brings error.

Affirmed.

Argued January term, before BROGAN, C. J., and PARKER and PERSKIE, JJ.

Scott M. Long, Jr., of Morristown, for plaintiff in error.

John Drewen, Asst. Atty. Gen. (William Hegarty, of Morristown, Prosecutor of the Pleas, on the brief), for the state.

PERSKIE, Justice.

The basic question requiring decision on the facts of this case, which involves unlawful registration and unlawful voting, is whether the trial judge misapplied, as claimed, the maxim, ignorantia juris neminem excusat, in denying the motion of plaintiff in error for an acquittal at the end of the state's case.

Plaintiff in error was convicted by a verdict of a jury, in the Morris County Court of Quarter Sessions, on an indictment found under the section of our election laws designated as N.J.S.A. 19:34-20.

The indictment consists of two counts. The first count charged that the plaintiff in error, late of the City of New York, at the general election held for the First District of Kinnelon, in the County of Morris, on November 8, 1938, "did solicit the registering of her name on the registry list of said election district * * * then and there knowing that she was not a legal voter in such district, * * * that she had not resided in the state of New Jersey for a period of one year, nor in the County of Morris five months before said general election * * *." The second count charged that at the same time and place, the plaintiff in error "knowing that she was not a qualified voter, did vote at said general election, * * * then and there knowing that she had not resided in New Jersey for a year, nor in Morris County five months next before said general election * * *."

Concededly, the state's prosecution of the plaintiff in error was, and is, based upon the theory that the knowledge contemplated by the language of the statute, upon which the indictment was found, means knowledge of the facts which disqualified or disentitled plaintiff in error to register and to vote and not knowledge of the law applicable to those facts. The state "frankly asserts that in the trial of this indictment it was the state's theory that the offense charged is within the maxim, ignorantia juris neminem excusat."

Pursuant to its theory, the presentation of the state's case was short.

A stipulation was offered and objected to, but the objection was withdrawn and the stipulation was read into the record. It stated that plaintiff in error registered on October 14, 1938, in New York City for the election then pending, had been registered as residing at 1665 York Avenue, had been thirteen years in this country, one year in the district and had certified to the truth of these facts over her own signature. The stipulation further stated that on November 8, 1938, plaintiff in error had registered and voted in Kinnelon Borough, Morris County. Additionally, the state produced the Clerk of the New York Board of Elections (Thomas F. Cummings) who testified as to the New York election procedure. He produced the registry book showing the same facts as they appeared on the stipulation regarding the New York registration of the plaintiff in error. Technically the book was not offered in evidence, but it seems to have been treated as evidential. The state then rested. A motion was made for the plaintiff in error for a directed acquittal on the ground that there was "no evidence on which defendant could be found guilty as charged in the indictment." In other words, the state had failed to prove criminal intent. State v. McBarron, 66 N.J.L. 680, 51 A. 146, which reversed the affirmance of the conviction by the Supreme Court (Magie, C. J, and Justices Dixon, Garrison and Gummere, opinion by Garrison, J.), McBarron v. State, 63 N.J.L. 43, 42 A. 777.

The theory of the plaintiff in error was, and is, that the knowledge contemplated by the statute made it necessary for the state also to prove that plaintiff in error had knowledge of the legal effect of the facts stipulated.

Pursuant to that theory plaintiff in error proceeded with her proofs. It will serve no useful purpose to detail them. For it is not argued that no case for the jury was made out at the end of the entire case. Indeed, no such argument could be successfully made. The proofs at that juncture of the case unquestionably required the submission of the case to the jury and amply supports the verdict of the jury. It will therefore suffice to say in passing that the proofs for plaintiff in error were aimed to show that she was ignorant of the legal effect of the proofs adduced by the state, and, therefore, she was free from any corrupt or guilty knowledge. Halsted v. State, 41 N.J.L. 552, 598, 32 Am.Rep. 247, but read comment thereon in State v. Kuehnle, 85 N.J.L. 220, 225, 88 A. 1085, Ann.Cas. 1916A, 69, for the proper construction of statutory offenses.

At the end of the entire case plaintiff in error again moved for a directed acquittal for the same reason urged for her at the end of the state's case. The trial judge denied that motion, and in a comprehensive, accurate and fair charge submitted the case to the jury. As already observed, the jury returned a verdict of guilty as charged. Plaintiff-inerror was adjudged to pay a fine of $350 and was placed on probation for a period of one year. She now appeals. The appeal is before us on a strict writ of error and also on a certificate of the entire record of the proceedings had at the trial pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2:195-16.

Plaintiff in error sets down 38 assignments of error and three specifications of causes for reversal. Seven points are argued. But one requires discussion.

Did the trial judge err, as claimed, in refusing to direct a verdict of acquittal at the end of the state's case when so requested? We do not think so.

It is altogether settled that contrary to the rule in civil cases (Van Cott v. New Jersey St. Railway Co., 72 N.J.L. 229, 62 A. 407; McGee v. Kraft, 110 N.J.L. 532, 166 A. 80; Borough of Hawthorne v. Jowett, 121 N.J.L. 38, 1 A.2d 431), the rule in criminal cases is that when, as here, the entire record of the proceedings at the trial is returned with the writ of error, pursuant to the above cited statute, the plaintiff in error is entitled to have the appellate court consider whether such plaintiff in error suffered manifest wrong or injury in the refusal to direct a verdict at the close of the state's case even though later in the case sustaining evidence is received...