State v. Puckett

• Citation: 531 N.E.2d 518
• Decision Date: 14 December 1988
• Docket Number: No. 49A02-8708-CV-311,49A02-8708-CV-311
• Parties: STATE of Indiana, Appellant, v. Samuel PUCKETT, Appellee (Defendant Below).
• Court: Court of Appeals of Indiana

Page 518

531 N.E.2d 518

STATE of Indiana, Appellant, v. Samuel PUCKETT, Appellee (Defendant Below).

No. 49A02-8708-CV-311.

Court of Appeals of Indiana Second District.

Dec. 14, 1988.

Linley E. Pearson, Atty. Gen., J. Gordon Gibbs, Jr., Chief Counsel, Indianapolis, for appellant.

Philip R. Melangton, Jr., Indianapolis, for appellee.

SULLIVAN, Judge.

The State appeals the trial court's dismissal of its complaint seeking recovery of money paid to or on behalf of Samuel Puckett. We affirm in part and reverse in part.

On November 5, 1979, Samuel Puckett sustained injuries in an automobile accident. Puckett was then Chief of Internal Affairs for the Indiana Department of Correction and was driving a State motor pool vehicle at the time of the accident. Puckett was treated for injuries at Wishard Memorial Hospital, where he was given a blood alcohol test while unconscious. This test revealed a blood alcohol level of .142%. The accident report prepared by the Marion County Sheriff's Department indicated that drinking may have been a contributing circumstance of the accident, but the officer did not request a blood test.

As a result of the accident, Puckett received a workmen's compensation award of $18,750 based upon a determination of a 50% permanent partial impairment. This award was made pursuant to an agreement between the Indiana Department of Correction and Puckett and was approved by the Industrial Board in April of 1980. The Department of Correction also paid $2,503 of Puckett's medical bills. In addition to the workmen's compensation award, Puckett received $7,575.50 pursuant to the occupational injury compensation scheme contained in the Indiana Administrative Code at 30 I.A.C. 1-11-5 (1979) (current version at 31 I.A.C. 2-11-5 (1988)). The purpose of 30 I.A.C. 1-11-5 is to provide compensation to merit system employees for time lost due to disability resulting from injuries sustained while engaged in assigned duties during working hours. These payments were requested by the Personnel Director of the Department of Correction on behalf of Puckett and approved by the Director of the Department of Administration pursuant to 30 I.A.C. 1-11-5 on November 29, 1979.

The estimated value of the State vehicle lost in the accident was $4,782.28.

A report regarding newspaper allegations concerning the Indiana Department of Correction was filed with the Governor by the State Board of Accounts on July 30, 1986. This report included an examination of costs incurred by the State due to Puckett's accident. The State Examiner who conducted the examination found that "the evidence would support a determination that Puckett had been driving under the influence of alcohol while on duty" (Record at 9) and that although there was no indication that Puckett's blood alcohol level had been brought into issue during the determination of Puckett's benefits, concluded that if it had been, "there is substantial doubt as to his right to have claimed benefits under either Workmen's Compensation or 30 I.A.C. 1-11-5." Record at 9. The Examiner recommended that the matter be referred to the Attorney General for a determination of the recovery to be pursued. (This report was evidently made pursuant to the State Board of Accounts Act, I.C. 5-11-1-1 et seq.)

The State filed a complaint on October 7, 1986, seeking to recover a total of $27,397.78 ¹ from Puckett, plus interest and costs. The State alleged in its complaint that the amounts which it sought to recover from Puckett were "public funds" which were paid based upon the concealment of a material fact (Puckett's intoxication) at the time of injury. The State further alleged that Puckett's intoxication would have prevented the payment of those funds if his condition had been known at the time of payment. The State cited I.C. 22-3-2-8 (Burns Code Ed.Repl.1986) and 30 I.A.C. 1-11-5(C)(2)(b) as the underlying bases for its assertion.

Indiana Code 22-3-2-8 of the Workmen's Compensation Act provides that no compensation is allowed for an injury or death due to the employee's intoxication. 30 I.A.C. 1-11-5(C)(2)(b) similarly provides that injuries sustained as a result of the employee's intoxication are not covered under the occupational injuries compensation scheme.

Puckett filed a motion to dismiss in accordance with Ind.Rules of Procedure, Trial Rules 12(B)(1) and 12(B)(6), which contained two grounds for dismissal: (1) lack of subject matter jurisdiction due to the State's failure to exhaust its administrative remedies, and (2) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The trial court granted Puckett's motion without specifying which of the two grounds served as the basis for its action. The State now appeals.

The State presents three issues upon appeal, which we restate as follows:

1. Whether the State was barred by the doctrine of res judicata from seeking recovery of the award made pursuant to the Workmen's Compensation Act;

2. Whether the complaint failed to state any cause of action upon which to seek recovery of the payment made pursuant to the Indiana Administrative Code and the value of the State vehicle; and

3. Whether the trial court erred in awarding costs against the State.

ISSUE I

The State seeks to recover the workmen's compensation award given as a result of Puckett's 50% permanent partial impairment and the medical expenses paid pursuant to I.C. 22-3-3-4 (Burns Code Ed.Supp.1980) (amended 1988). ² This statute in part provides that after an injury and prior to an adjudication of permanent impairment, the employer shall furnish, free of charge to the employee, an attending physician for the treatment of his injuries and such surgical, hospital and nursing services and supplies as the attending physician or the industrial board may deem necessary. Indiana Code 22-3-1-3 (Burns Code Ed.1974) (amended 1988) authorizes the Board to approve claims and require payments for medical expenses. Thus the Board may include payment of, or reimbursement for, such expenses as part of the award given to the employee. See, e.g., Kaiser Aluminum Chemical Corp., Foil Kraft Division v. Schalton (1965) 136 Ind.App. 636, 204 N.E.2d 225.

As noted above, the Industrial Board approved the agreement reached between Puckett and the Department of Correction in April of 1980. Although the medical expenses were paid voluntarily by the Department, they were paid pursuant to the Workmen's Compensation Act and were therefore subsumed in the award when the Department failed to contest its payment of these expenses at the time the Board approved the award for permanent partial impairment. Our discussion of the State's right to recover the "workmen's compensation award" therefore includes the medical expenses paid by the Department.

Puckett claims that the State's right to recover the workmen's compensation award is barred because the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction due to the State's failure to exhaust its administrative remedies. While we agree that the State's claim is barred, both Puckett and the State have misunderstood the nature of the issue. By couching his defense in terms of the exhaustion of remedies doctrine, Puckett mislabels the applicable principle involved. There was no failure to exhaust administrative remedies because there was no action for either party to take after approval of the compensation agreement; the State had made the payment, Puckett had received it, and neither party was aggrieved.

Despite the fact that the applicable principle was mislabeled, however, the issue of the award's finality was presented and we cannot ignore the issue nor establish precedent which would create confusion as to well-settled principles of law. We therefore recognize that Puckett's claim is more correctly cloaked under the principle of res judicata so that we might fulfill our obligation to apply the correct law to the issue before us. See Big Creek Stone Co. v. Seward (1895) 144 Ind. 205, 42 N.E. 464, 43 N.E. 5 (where counsel complained on petition for rehearing that the sufficiency of the pleading had been determined upon a question not argued by opposing counsel, the court held that the sufficiency of the complaint was duly presented and where it was palpably bad, it would be a perversion of justice to hold otherwise). See also Bryant v. Owens (1953) 232 Ind. 237, 111 N.E.2d 804 (where the question of merger of the causes of action in the first judgment was not presented on appeal of the second judgment upon the same petition, the court would not regard itself as governed by the conceptions of counsel on either side as to the nature of the controlling facts and held the second judgment to be void on the face of the record).

Although as a general proposition we will not discuss matters which are not addressed by the parties, as the court aptly stated in Big Creek Stone, supra, 43 N.E. at 5, "if the court were limited to the arguments and reasoning of counsel in its decisions of cases, to the exclusion of its own observations, many cases would lead us far from what we understand to be the true object of the court."

Having determined the proper nature of the defense presented by Puckett, we now examine whether the State is in fact barred from what is in essence a collateral attack upon the Board's award.

The doctrine of res judicata prevents re-litigation of an issue where there has been a final adjudication upon the merits of the same issue between the same parties. Gayheart v. Newnam Foundry Co. (1979) 271 Ind. 422, 393 N.E.2d 163. The principles of res judicata seek to guard parties against vexatious and repetitious litigation of issues which have been determined in a judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding. South Bend Federation of Teachers v. National Education Association--South Bend (1979) 2d Dist., 180 Ind.App. 299, 389 N.E.2d 23, trans. denied.

An agreement for compensation, made in compliance with the statute and approved by the board,...